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The Soviet Navy and Superpower Foreign Policy in the
Middle East: A Study in the Political Application
of Naval Force
Thesis directed by Professor W. A, E. Skurnik
Originally deployed forward in the waters of the
Middle East only a decade ago to defend the Soviet hone-
land against Western strategic attack from the sea, the
Soviet Navy, since the Six Day War of i9^?» has become an
increasingly important instrument of Moscow's foreign
policy as well as an increasingly significant influence
upon American foreign policy in the region,
Application of the concept of armed naval suasion—
an explanation of the political application cf naval forc*e
as it seems to influence national actors in international
arena situations short of war—to available empirical data
both facilitates demonstration of the Soviet Navy's evolu-
tion as an instrument of foreign policy in the Middle East
and contributes to the determination of appropriate Ameri-
can policy responses to the challenge which that navy as
such continues to pose to United States interests in the
region.
Despite a few setbacks such as that in Egypt during
1972 ? the growing perception of Soviet naval ascendancy
resulting from Moscow's resilient political application of
naval force, albeit somewhat unjustified, has succeeded in
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significantly strengthening the Soviet strategic position
and seriously challenging the interests of the United
States in the region. Application of the naval suasion
concept to the problem of ascertaining the general nature
of appropriate policy responses to this challenge
indicates
that development and deployment of a naval force
structure
credible enough to evoke suasion effects as required
while
minimizing the potentially counterproductive political
effects of such a force is essential to the successful
pur-
suit of American foreign policy in the Kiddie
East. While
overreliance on a weak "policy of surrogation" and
main-
tenance of the no-longer-politically-viable Middle
East
Force are determined to be inappropriate responses,
reten-
tion and revitalization of a modified U. S.
Sixth Fleet in
the Mediterranean Sea and the continuation of
a credible-
intermittent American naval presence in the Indian
Ocean
supported by a modest facility on Diego Garcia—both of
which could be reinforced in time of crisis to
effectively
exercise naval suasion—are shown to be components of
an
appropriate American policy response to the political
challenge of the Soviet Navy. The probable future
of con-
tinued political application of Soviet naval
force in the
Middle East will require the continued presence
of the
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2 . The Middle East as a




The forward deployment of the Soviet Navy in the
waters of the Middle East during the past decade has had a
profound effect on the foreign policies of the superpowers
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics 1—vis-a-vis the region. While the
naval power deployed in these waters by the Soviet Union
has not yet superseded that of the United States, the util-
ity of the Soviet Navy to Moscow throughout this region
appears to reside not so much in its actual war-making
capabilities as in its application as an instrument of
J
'"As World War IT. moved into its final stages, William
T, R. Fox wrote a book called The Superp owers, ^y which he
meant the great powers of the post-war world, the United.
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. But many
nuclear explosions have gone up in smoke since then, along
with colonial possessions, and the disparities in # power
that super-status connoted have come to differentiate the
United' States and the Soviet Union from all the other
rowers of the world. This is not to argue that it will be
ever thus, but only that it is currently the case, as it
has been for most of the post-war period. These powers
stand head and shoulders above all the others in the scope
of their international power—-in their ability to assert,
to protect, and to advance their political, economic, and
military interests around the globe," Bernard C. Cohen,
"National-International Link?..-;-; i Superpolities , " i n
Jarnos N. Hosenau, ed., Linkage Politics , New York, The




which has paid handsome dividends in an
area which the American military presence following World
War II—-particularly in the form of the U. S. Sixth Fleet-
s-had made virtually a Western preserve but which, oy the
end of the 1960s, had become an arena—perhaps even the
salient one —of superpower competition,
As three centuries of British naval supremacy demon-
strated, a nation's naval forces can play a significant
role in its pursuit of certain foreign policy objectives.
Indeed, as Laurence W, Martin observed:-
3
The essential quality of a military navy is obviously
its ultimate capacity to engage and fight an enemy,
Yet, for the greater portion of its existence, a navy
is not engaged in combat. During this time of peace,
however, a navy by no means fails to exert an influ-
ence upon international affairs. This effectiveness
short of war is difficult to characterize but is
nevertheless pervasive and may well comprise the xcst
significant benefit a nation may derive from its naval
investment.
However, perhaps because it is "difficult to characterise,'-'
the peacetime role of naval forces as instruments of for-
eign policy remains a relatively obscure one which often is
neglected in foreign policy literature. While the dramatic
and
2Yair Evron, The Middle Easts Nations, Sugepjowers,
Wars ; New York", Praeger Publishers, 1973 « P-- *o2.
^Richard H. Pfaff, "The American Military Presence in
the Middle East," Middle Bast Forum , Vol, XLVII, [''.o, Z
(Summer 1972) , p. 37.
^Aaron S. Klieman, S evict Rujrsia anp; ^Middle Eist>
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press., 19?0, p. iO,
^Laurence W. Martin, The Sea in [ odern Strategy , Now
York, Frederick A. Fraeger, lW, p. 3-33.

rise of the Soviet Navy certainly has not gone unnoticed,
most analyses have emphasized its military challenge to the
United States or to NATO sea power in the event of war at
the expense of attention to its more subtle but equally
important political utility in and implications for the
current and, hopefully, more likely future regime of peace
—or, at least, of non-war. Given the increasing salience
of the Soviet Navy, not only to policy makers but to stu-
dents of international relations and foreign policy as
well, this is a lamentable situation,
THE STUDY: SCOPE AND APPROACH
In an attempt at least partially to redress this sit-
uation but, more importantly, to develop an increased in-
sight into the employment of superpower naval forces as'
instruments of foreign policy, this study examines some of
the recent past, present, and possible future political
applications of Soviet naval power in the Middle Easi; and
some of their impact on and implications for pertinent
aspects of American foreign policy in the region, More
specifically, by employing as an orienting device the con-
cept of naval suasion—the evocation of reactions through
the existence, display, manipulation, or symbolic use of
naval power which are a function of the observer's percep-
tion:', of the naval capabilities deployed—which reflects
Richard T. Ackley, "The Soviet Navy's Role in Foreign
Policy," Naval War College Review , Vol. XXIV, No. c> (May
I972)i p.":'b.

the ways in which the mere presence of naval forces as well
as the active application of naval force short of war seem
to influence the behavior of national actors, the study
focuses on the ways in which the Soviet Navy functions as
an instrument of foreign policy, the challenge which Mos-
cow's application of it as such represents to American
foreign policy, the appropriateness and effectiveness of
some of Washington's past, present, and possible future
responses to this challenge, and other supporting and re-
lated matters.
The study is, therefore, one which is limited in
scope and well-defined in focus. It is intended neither
as a thorough analysis of Soviet and American foreign poli-
cies in the Middle East nor as a detailed treatment of sthe
naval strategies, doctrines, or capabilities of those two
powers. Rather, within the context of the general nature
of superpower policies toward the region which have evolved
as the rigidities of the "cold war" have given way to the
ambiguities of "detente" or, in preferred Soviet terminol-
ogy, "peaceful coexistence," 7 it is a study of the political
application of naval force in the Middle East by the world's
two foremost naval powers.
^Marshall D. Shulman, "Toward a Western Philosophy of
stence," Foreign Affairs , Vol, 52, No. 1 (OctoberCooxi
1973), PP. 35-36.

THE POLITICAL APPLICATION OF NAVAL FORCE:
A' CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
o
As a primary element of national power, military
force may be manipulated in time of peace as well as in
war to provide the possessing nation the prestige and
leverage essential to the pursuit and achievement of its
interests and objectives in international affairs. ° In
possessing a peacetime political function in addition to
its combat capabilities, a naval force is like all other
forms of military power and potential which may be brought
to bear in support of a nation's foreign policy, only more
10
so. While naval power is only one of the non-belligerent
military instruments of foreign policy, it is by its very
nature a most flexible, maneuverable, and particularly
useful instrument, operating in a medium which is --at
least, in time of peace—much freer of the many restrictions
and risks involved in the deployment of land-based air or
grouna force s„
5Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Third
Edition), New York," Alfred A. Knopf, i960, p. 118.
"Martin, o£. git. , pp. 133-13^.
Edward Luttwak, The Political Application of Naval
Force , Newport, U. S. Naval War College, 19?3» P. 1.
1
1
Martin, op. ci t.
,
p. 13^. According to Luttwak,
loc , cit , : "Land-based forces, whether ground or air, can
aJxo be deployed in a manner calculated to encourage friends
and coerce enemies, but only within the narrow constraints
of insertion feasibility, and with inherentl;. greater ris!:L;,
since the land nexus can convert any significant deployment
into a political commitment with alJ the rigidities that
this implies."

Although naval power plays an important and unique
foreign policy role, it does so in conjunction with other
military forces and within an overall politico-military
12
environment that makes it extremely difficult, at best,
to isolate and evaluate the peculiarly naval contribution.
Yet, in order to explore the political utility of any
naval force within any portion of the international milieu,
the ways in which its political effects are generated must-
be defined and classified—even if the precision and sta-
bility of any such framework imposed upon the dynamic
environment of international politics necessarily is
limited.
Recognizing the fact that "any system of definitions
imposed on the fluid and variegated world of politics will
inevitably be both arbitrary and incomplete" but, at the
same time, that "one need not suspend thought nor distort
every marginal phenomenon in order to obtain a 'good fit',
to make use of the analytical convenience of a typology," J
Edward Luttwak has developed a typology which is useful to
the development of an understanding of the political appli-
cation of naval power. Based on the concept of suasion ,,
the essence of which usefully suggests the indirect nature
of any political application of naval force, this typology




'Luttwak, op. cvt , i p. '-9.

Armed Suasion. Any instrument of military power—in the
present study, naval power—that can be used to inflict
damage upon an enemy in wartime may also be employed to
influence the conduct of nations in the absence of open
hostilities. The necessary, but by no means sufficient,
condition for this to occur is that the leaders of the
nations concerned perceive the capabilities deployed, cor-
rectly or otherwise, so that the combat potential of the
deploying nation intrudes on their image of the policy
environment and thus impinges on their decisions. Armed
suasion, therefore, defines others' reactions, and not the
actions or the intentions of the deploying nation: the
latter may exercise suasion in order to evoke suasion effects,
but cannot achieve them directly in the sense that combat-
Ik
effects are achieved by the application of force,
Since suasion is operative through the perceptions of
others, with all that this entails in the way of distortion,
the exercise of suasion is inherently unpredictable in its
results. For example:
Routine fleet movements may be seen ... as threat-
ening where no threat is intended . . , ; on the other
hand, a deliberate but tacit threat may be ignored.
And then, in the decision-making arena of the target
parties the threat--or supportive
—
perceptions evoked
by the forces deployed have to compete with ail other
political pressures that may have a bearing on the








8The exercise of armed suasion in peacetime does not
necessarily preclude the actual use of force insofar as
this use is "symbolic" politically:
Since this is the era of undeclared conflict
. . ,
the term 'peacetime' now defines only the absence of
general hostilities conducted at a high level of in-
tensity. It follows that no firm dividing line can
be established between the use of threats, and the
actual infliction of damage in small doses. So long-
as the purpose and context of the use of force remains
political, i,e e , intended to evoke suasion effects
rather than to destroy enemy forces or values, it can-
not be arbitrarily excluded from the range of politi-
cal instrumentalities provided by [naval forces] in
'peacetime,' But the political use of symbolic force
does require that the target party recognize its sym«
bolic nature, i.e., that the damage inflicted has
been deliberately minimized. This in turn requires
the deploying party to discriminate successfully
between what is, and what is not, symbolic in terms
of others* perceptions and attitudes which may be
quite different from his own.
Of course, the exercise of naval suasion is not predicate!
17
on the absence of hostilities.
Because armed suasion is operative on both the tacti-
cal and the political levels, perceptive contradictions
may occur between the two and result in serious problems
of decision. For examples
One may readily visualize a situation in which the
•tactical' suasion of, say, much reinforced Russian
naval and naval air forces based, in Egypx and Syria
could discourage the U. S. ,Navy from deploying its
own forces in the eastern Mediterranean for reasons
of elementary military prudence, while at the same




18Ibid. , p. 11.

9was greater than ever. And it is the political fac-
tors that are normally of overriding importance in
the decision-making arena ....
Since men at the tactical and political levels have quite
different responsibilities, contradictions between the two
levels of suasion may produce acute internal controversy—
just as the conflict between tactical and political prior-
ities has proved a chronic source of tension between mili-
iQtary men and politicians in times of war. 7
Armed suasion, then, consists of "all reactions,
political or tactical, elicited by all parties, whether
allies, adversaries or neutrals, to the existence, display
,
manipulation or symbolic use of any instrument of military
power, whether or not such reactions reflect any deliberate
intent of the deploying party," Naval suasion refers to
the effects evoked by sea-based or sea-related forces.
Those effects evoked through the deliberate exercise of
armed naval suasion intended to elicit a given reaction
from a specified nation or group of nations are termed
active; the undirected, and hence possibly unintended,
reactions evoked by naval deployments maintained on a rou-
20
tine basis are termed latent (see Fig. 1, p. 10).
Latent Naval Suasion. The mere presence of a naval force
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Fig. 1. THE POLITICAL APPLICATION OF NAVAL FORCE: LUTT-
V/AK'S TYPOLOGY. The various forms and modes of naval
suasion discusses in the text are depicted in this
diagram. After Edward Luttwak, op_. c i t .
, p. 5a.
or combat capabilities—exerts a political influence in
that it is automatically included as a factor in the cal-
culations of power relationships and probable behaviors
of other states in various contingencies made by the
nations of the region and by other nations operating v.'ith-
21in the region. " Consequently, latent naval suasion—the
undirected, and hence possibly unintended, reactions evoked
?1
Barry M. Blechmun, The Changing Soviet Navy , Wash~
ington, I). C.i The Brookings Institution i T9V3, p. 20,

ii
by naval deployments maintained on a routine basis—contin-
uously shapes the military dimension of the political
environment which policy makers perceive and within which
they operate. As the specific naval capabilities deployed
are viewed either as potential threats or potential sources
of support by those who perceive them, they influence the
behavior of those within the range of these capabilities.
Thus, one mode of latent naval suasion is deterrent in
22
nature and the other is supportive.
In the deterrent mode, the range of naval capabilities
perceived establishes a series of tacit limits on the ac-
tions that others deem to he feasible or desirable. The
presence of one force impinges upon the freedom of action
of adversaries in that the capabilities perceived can al-..
ways intervene while the intention to do so remains an un-
known factor. Deterrent latent suasion is inherently in-
precise bacause of its tacit, rather than explicit, nature;
highly flexible in that, in the event of a failure, there
is no compulsion to carry out a retaliation that never was
threatened overtly; and weak as a deterrent because no
23
rigid commitment to retaliate exists.
In the supportive mode, deployed naval forces serve
as a continuous reminder to allies and clients—as well as
to potential allies and clients—of the capabilities that
Luttwak, oo. cit. , p. 12,
23Ibld. , pp. 13-1')-.
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can be brought to their aid as they provide tangible con-
tent, in their ready intervention potential, to any com-
mitments that may have been made. The effects of support-
ive latent naval suasion usually are beneficial: allies
are encouraged to adhere to alliance policies and dis-
suaded from conciliating adversaries. However, since the
support rendered may also broaden the range of options
open to allies and clients, the net effect of this mode of
suasion may also prove negative.
The indirection inherent in latent naval suasion may,
therefore, produce effects which are not desired by the
deploying nation. Because of their unimpeded mobility,
deployed naval forces entail the potential for inadvertant
and unrecognized latent effects—including undesirable 4
ones. However, once such undesirable effects are recog-
nized, ameliorating adjustments may be made quickly and
quietly. For example, if a routine fleet transit off
another nation's coast is deemed capable of evoking un-
desirable reactions from that nation's government, the
route may be shifted to prevent any such reactions. Thus,
the same quality of naval power that is the source of
possible political difficulties—its flexibility—may also
provide the means of avoiding such difficulties, presuming
the negative political repurcussions are perceived, ^
7h
25Ibid.
, pp c 15-16,
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Ultimately, the effectiveness of latent naval suasion
depends upon others' perceptions of the naval force in
question'—of its tactical configuration and of the under-
lying political intent of its movements—-which may "be, and
often are, subject to severe distortions. Whereas, in the
case of active naval suasion considered below, the politi-
cal leaders of the target littoral nation or nations are
faced, at the very least, with a definite combination of
capabilities in the naval force displayed to or arrayed
against them while the intentions of the deploying nation
are conveyed to them in one form or another, neither of
these conditions obtain in the case of latent effects.
Rather, the leaders of the concerned nations must construe
the capabilities and intentions of whatever naval forces
"
they are aware of "according to their wits" and the possi-
bilities for distortion are concomitantly vast. As far as
the determination of naval capabilities is concerned, pol-
itical loaders around the world commonly understand more
about ground power than air power, and more about the lat-
ter than about naval power. Furthermore, in many areas,
of which the Middle East certainly is one, few if any of
these leaders have access to naval expertise in their own
navies "whose officers can sometimes do little more than
keep their ships afloat," While, in the realm of political
intentions, each leader makes his own judgements based on
his own view of the environment and his bun value's j assess-
ments of naval capabilities, of the significance of various

14
tactical configurations, and of the nature of the possible
threats emanating from the sea require a level of techni-
cal knowledge which many possess neither in their govern-
ments nor in their own naval forces. Therefore, the rela-
tionship between the naval forces deployed and the manner
of their deployment, on the one hand, and the suasion
effects actually evoked by those forces, on the other, is
neither direct nor proportional—even if no account is
taken of the various other political or military factors
extant in the environment v/hich also impinge upon the per-
25
ceptions of the observing nations.
Active Naval Suasion. A wide variety of naval activities
and behaviors are employed in peacetime for the express
purpose of impressing upon other nations the power of the *
27deploying nation ' in such a way as to further its foreign
? o
policy goals. These activities and behaviors, all of
v/hich may be categorized as demonstrations, range from
occasions of the greatest amiability to very specific
29threats of violence and war. ' The movement of warships,
their activity v/hile deployed in any particular area, and






Martin, op_. cit . , p. 13&.
28,
2o
'Martin, loc . cit .
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nation's intentions in various situations—as a means of
commitments as a threat, and so forth. Also, naval forces
may perform various acts such as blockade and interposition
which, while certainly hostile, incorporate only limited
and measured degrees of force. In any of these situations,
naval activity is intended to have an impact upon the ex-
pectations of the nations directly involved and on those
of nations that might consider becoming involved. Naval
activity of this kind is usually supplementary to and ac-
companied by diplomatic or other forms of verbal behavior
and serves as an indicator of the seriousness with which
these verbal communications should be understood.-^ The
traditional maritime powers have long employed naval forces
for such purposes in a form of behavior widely referred tc
as "gunboat diplomacy" which was recently defined as "the
use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an
act of war ..." by James Cable.
Any application of naval force intended to evoke a
specific reaction on the part of others—whether allies,
clients, enemies, or neutrals—consists of the exercise of
active naval suasion and the reaction actually obtained
constitutes the suasion itself. Thus, for example, an
attempt to deter an attacker by deploying retaliatory
^ Blechinan, loo, pit ,
J James Cable, G unboa t Diplomacy: Poli tical Appli-
cations of Limited Naval Force, New York, Praeger Publish-
ers, i 971 ," p. 2i.
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forces and issuing appropriate warnings would constitute
the exercise of active naval suasion and any deterrence
actually achieved thereby would comprise the suasion
effect. As previously stated, the political application
of naval force is concerned with others' reactions rather
than with any objective that may be achieved directly by
the application of the force itself. 3 The actions—such
demonstrative applications of naval force as those described
above—are only inputs; the outputs are the various forms
and modes of naval suasion—i.e., the reactions of others—
33
that are, in fact, evoked. JJ The Appendix (pp. 192 to 195)
provides a listing and classification of some of these
actions and the suasion effects they are meant tc evoke.
Although this tabulation certainly is net exhaustive, it
dbes suggest the wide range of possible inputs that a naval
force may generate in order to evoke the suasion effects
desired.-' All of the inputs listed are associated with
the exercise of active naval suasion since latent naval
35
suasion is, of course, undirected. -'-' Active naval suasion
may be exercised either in a coercive mods intended to
deter or compel another nation or in a supportive mode in
such a way as to reassure allied or client nations.-'
32
^ Luttwak, op_. cit_.
, p. 19.
3\biri_., p. 7 lK






Both forms of coercive suasion, the negative one of
deterrence and the positive one of compellence, are sub-
ject to the same technical and perceptual requirements:
both may be tacit or overt, both may be associated, with
either private or public warnings, and both are subject to
the same psycho-political uncertainties. It has been
argued that compellence is more difficult to effect than
deterrence because "moves are more difficult to reverse
than to prevent in that the moves to be stopped or reversed
may have acquired their own •tactical' and political momen-
tum" and because "it is assumed that compliance , with others*
demands must be public, thus entailing additional losses
in
. . .
prestige," However, although "tactical momentum
may indeed occur in many cases," political momentum is
largely conditioned by whether or not the compellence is,
in fact, made public. "It is apparent that overt, publicly
announced, deterrence may be more difficult for the target
party to comply with than covert compellence, covertly com-
plied with." 37
Also performed continuously in a latent form, the
active variety of supportive naval suasion is an important
aspect of the political application of naval force. Often
involving the deployment of the symbolic warship, the
presence of which asserts no local military superiority





relevant to the situation, the effectiveness of such active
supportive naval suasion depends upon the perception of
the symbolic ship as representative of and proportional to
the national power which will be used, if necessary, rather
than as representative of and proportional to naval power
alone. One element of national power is, of course, naval
power, but the latter need not be the salient source cf
national power s the limits of which it does not define, in
order to symbolize that power. An inherent danger is that
supportive suasion may encourage the supported nation "to
go too far" and that the supporting nation may have to re-
strain its ally or client. In the case of the active form
of supportive suasion, this danger is easier to recognize
and, hence, easier to control. Moreover, the flexibility
of naval forces enables the deploying nation to disabuse
such an ally or client by ordering the force out of the
area or by merely threatening withdrav/al of support afforded
39by the presence of the force.
Whatever the mode of active naval suasion exercised,
the sine qua non for the successful evocation of the desired
response is the target nation's perception of the force
deployed—both its tactical capabilities and, more impor-
tantly, the political intentions which it represents.
38Ibid




Perceptual Determinants. Perhaps foremost among the factors
which determine the perceptions all-important to the poli-
tical application of naval force is the influence of his-
torical experience on current outlook. Also important--
because "the perceived balance of forces that determines
the outcome of 'peacetime' confrontations can only be con-
strued by men in terms of the predicted outcomes of puta-
tive battle (s) f and it is such predictions that determine
political attitudes, and therefore decisions" —appear to
be assessments based upon the observable capabilities of a
naval power and its reputation, including its apparent
disposition to use those capabilities, established through
the media—-especially insofar as superpower efforts to in-
fluence the perceptions of the Third World are concerned,
In the Middle East, visible naval power appears to
have a special significance in the frame of reference of
those to be persuaded because of its prominence in the
modern history of the region. During the imperialist era
of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries,
"showing the flag" by any one navy carried with it the im-
plication of substantial national power and of possible
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respond as the visiting fleet expected. Even today,
although blatant naval diplomacy may prove counterproduc-
tive in an era of burgeoning indigenous nationalism, per-
ceptions in the Middle East may exaggerate the political
implications of either the visible presence or obvious
absence of superpower naval units.
While the superpowers may be able to make fairly
accurate estimates of each other's naval power through the
application of various sophisticated imagery and electronic
intelligence techniques, the perceptions of those who
neither possess such capabilities nor have access to data
derived therefrom must necessarily be based upon the more
visible characteristics of naval forces rather than upon
the not-so-visible elements which are so important to the
€
viability of modern naval forces—e.g., the application of
technology to sensor and weapon systems as well as the less
tangible "dynamic" variables such as seamanship, mainten-
ance levels, and crew performance under stress. Conse-
quently, nations interested in the political application
of naval force must resolve the problem of visibility ver-
sus viability when designing and deploying naval units and
force structures intended as implements of their foreign
policies in such a way as to strike a balance between these
Uf2Howard Wriggms, "U. S, Interests in the Indian
Ocean," in Alvin J. Cottroil and K. M. Burrell, eds.
,
The
Indian Ocean : Its Politi cal, Economic, and Mili tary S'i.-V.l




attributes that ensures perception of their deployed naval
4-3forces as credible by all. ^
Often, in the absence of adequate technical data, the
perceptions of Third World political leaders which are so
important to the political application of naval force are
influenced by whatever public media from around the world
to which they have access. While the more sophisticated
may recognize the extremes of propagandistic bombast and
self-denigration transmitted by these media for what they
are and, mindful of the motivating circumstances which
prevail, discount them, such messages, nonetheless, tend
44
to intrude on perceptions of naval strength. Moreover,
because the media do reflect the overall political mood of
a nation fairly accurately, J perceptions of political
intentions and national resolve, so important to the exer-
cise of naval suasion, are also influenced.
Luttwak's typology certainly cannot be considered the
"last word" in analytical tools. However, in a field of
inquiry which is in the early stages of its evolution, it
appears to be the most thoroughly developed and useful of
46
such tools yet to have been produced and, with the facx
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that limitations necessarily exist in both the typology
and its adaptation as a conceptual framework herein firmly
in mind, it will be applied as appropriate throughout the
present study.
THE STUDY: CONSTRAINTS
Any study based on the foreign policy role of the
Soviet Navy in the Middle East immediately encounters con-
straints which preclude results approaching complete suc-
cess. Significant among—and representative of—-these
constraints are the paucity of available information con-
cerning both the decisional antecedents and the behavioral
manifestations of that policy and the lack of a definitive
understanding of the relationship between the two.
The lack of information was characterized recently by
Uri Ra'anan who, in commenting on the press and official
application of naval force has produced one other recent
categorization of the way in which "the use or threat of
use of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of
war , . ," (Cable, loc . cit . ) may be employed as an instru-
ment of foreign policy in James Cable's Gunboat Diplomacy.
This writer, however, agrees with Luttwak TppT cit, , p. '•>)
that Cable's "... definitions [of] 'Definitive",'' 'Pur-
poseful,' 'Catalytic,' and 'Expressive' force . . „ inter-
mingle functional and intensity criteria [and are] more
useful for descriptive than for analytical purposes where
the need is not to aggregate but rather the contrary."
Even i", as is sometimes said, "the great sin of American
academics is overcategorization" (Captain J. R. Hill,
Royal Navy, "Maritime Forces in Confrontation," in Major-
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,
it is essential, when confronted with a new and complex
problem, bo bring some order out cf chaos and make the
problem manageable as Luttwak has done.
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. . , search in vain for a Russian equivalent of "The
Pentagon Papers," of the minutes of Washington's
"Special Action Group" on the Indo-Pakistani crisis,
or some other publication of contemporary, classified
documents that may throw light upon a superpower*
s
decision-making process.
As a consequence of this lack of information, Western know-
ledge of the Soviet Navy's foreign policy role in the Mid-
dle East and elsewhere remains, at best, imperfect. That
which is known derives primarily from what is more or less
readily observable—the statements and actions (i.e., naval
operations) which are the end products of the policy pro-
cess. Whatever may be learned from such observable phenom-
ena about the antecedent decisions which are made or poli-
cies which are articulated, therefore, necessarily relies
almost exclusively upon inference rather than empirical
48
evidence. Explanations partially based upon such infor-
mation must be developed with caution. For example, it
cannot be assumed that observed naval capabilities reflect
foreign policy intentions. Indeed, because of the long
lead time involved in procuring and deploying naval forces,
the foreign policy orientation that informed the develop-
ment of a specific capability may have lost validity or
"uri Ra'anan, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East,
1969-73," Midstream , Vol. XIX, No. 12 (December 1973),
p. 24
Robert G. Wc inland, The Changing Mi ssion of t]
Soviet Navy , Arlington, Center for Naval Analyses, Novem-
ber f97i* P. 4.
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political support by the time that capability is deployed
and observed. ' The problem of information is further
exacerbated by the fact that, for obvious reasons, most of
what is known about the subject does not appear in the
public record and by the fact that it is difficult to
assess the quality of that which does.
Even if complete information concerning Soviet naval
behavior v/ere available, the problem of determining v/hen
and to what degree that behavior resulted from and imple-
mented the decisions of Kremlin policy makers would remain.
In other words, it cannot be assumed that all Soviet naval
operations are conducted with foreign policy objectives in
mind—that a linear-causal relationship exists between the
two. Consequently, in order to approach meaningful con-
clusions concerning the Soviet Navy as an instrument of
foreign policy in the Middle East, it is essential to rocog.
nize, as Robert G. V/e inland observed:-'
first, that some portion of their [i.e. , the Soviet
Navy's] behavior is the result of explicit decisions
of the Soviet government, some the result of general
naval policies, and some the result of the initiative
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. , . that much of their behavior cannot be
explained as the result of some . . . rationally
articulated and implemented policy, since it is the
product of physical and organizational constraints—
•
some of which we can identify, and some of which we
cannot.
Within the bounds set by these constraints and others,
the present study attempts to transcend mere descriptive
narrative with analysis, to the extent possible, of the
Soviet Navy's foreign policy role and its meaning for




THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
A NAVAL PERSPECTIVE
Significant deployments of modern United States and
Soviet naval forces in the waters of the Middle East—long
the domain of British sea power—are essentially post-World
War II phenomena and, in the case of the Soviet Navy, a
recent occurrence indeed. While the U. S. Navy initially
deployed in the region as a political force and subsequently
acquired an additional mission of strategic offense, the
,
Soviet Navy in the Middle East experienced a very different
evolution. The necessity of responding to and neutralizing
the United States' sea-based strategic strike capability
originally dictated the establishment of a Soviet naval
presence in the waters of the Middle East only a decade
ago. Although the strategic defense of the homeland against
attack from the sea has been and probably continues to be
its primary mission in these waters, the Soviet Navy has
evolved , in the past several years, into both an important
determinant and an increasingly significant active instru-
ment of the USSR's foreign policy throughout the region.
Any effort to explore some of the past, present, and
possible future relationships between the forward deployment

2?
of the Soviet Navy in the waters of the Middle East and
the foreign policies of the superpowers vis-a-vis the
region require a substantive
—
geographical, historical,
and political—perspective, as well as a conceptual one,
which facilitates understanding. This chapter provides
such a perspective: (1) by defining the nature of the
Middle East as a naval environment} (2) by surveying
briefly the relationships between American and Soviet for-
eign policies toward and naval developments within this
environment from the end of World War II through the ini-
tial stages of the forward deployment of the Soviet Navy
in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean; and
(3) hy approaching in general terms the interests, objec-
tives, and foreign policies of both superpowers vis-a-vis'
the region which comprise a significant portion of the
policy environment within which their navies are employed
and interact.
THE MIDDLE EAST A3 A NAVAL ENVIRONMENT
No universally accepted standard boundary delimitation
exists by which the region called the Middle East—an area
"focused on a tricontinental node reflecting the coastal
configurations of Africa, Europe, ana Asia where they most
nearly converge" important historically as "the strategic
1
G. Etzel Pearcy, The Middle East—An Indefinable






crossroads of three continents" ""---is precisely located geo-
graphically^ by scholars, strategists, diplomats, and
others concerned with the area. Rather, the term "Middle
East" somewhat ambiguously describes an area of great
diversity and political instability of no little current
significance in international affairs which, while possess-
ing certain elements of physical and social unity,-3 owes
most of its regional character to other than indigenous
factors. As evidenced by such Western appellations as the
"Near East" and the now more commonly used "Middle East"
which indicate the location of the region relative to Eur-
ope, these lands and waters are included in a single term
merely because they are "near to" or "in the middle of"
other regions. According to Don Peretz:
Whatever unity dees exist within the region today is
largely functional: it is a unity in relation to the
outside world rather than an inherent unity arising
from similar geographic and social conditions or from
a recent common history.
2
William B. Quandt, United States Policy in the Middle
East i Constraints and Choices, Santa Monica, The Rand
Corporation, February 1970, p. 27.
3;3
-Tearcy, op_. c.it e , p. 1.
Don Perets, The Middle East Today (Second Edition),
New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971» p. J>.
-%, B. Fisher, The Middle East: A Physics 1, Social
,
aJil Regional Geography (Sixth Edition), London, Methuen &
Co, , Ltd. , 1971. P. 2.
Peretz, op, pit.
, p, 6.





Yet, for the purposes of the present study, a some-
what more definite concept of the Middle East as a naval
environment should be delineated. This concept (see Fig,
2, p, 30) » based upon prior applications of regional iden-
tification techniques employed by geographers 7 rather than
purely arbitrary delimitation, describes the naval environ-
ment associated with the term "Middle East"—a term report-
edly first employed by the American naval strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan in 1902 to denote the vast area between Arabia
and India centering upon the Persian Gulf. In terms of
specific political units, then, the Middle East may be con-
sidered to directly include Turkey, Iraq s and Iran (the
so-called "Northern Tier" countries); Israel, Egypt, Syria,
Lebanon, and Jordan (the 'eastern Mediterranean, "Levant,"
or "Fertile Crescent" countries) ; the Arabian Peninsula
entities of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Southern Yemen,
Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates; and,
because of its close- relationship to the Arab nations to
11
the east, Libya.
A nava.l view of this region tends to make it an open
one, serving to integrate rather than to isolate surround-
ing areas. Accordingly, the Middle East may be defined in










Fig. 2. THE MIDDLE EAST A3 A NAVAL ENVIRONMENT. These
maps depict the relationship of the Middle East to
important superpower naval influences and locate sig-
nificant features—oceans and seas, straits, gulfs,
ports, etc.—mentioned in the text,
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naval terms as that area bounded by, and in most cases
littoral to, the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean Sea,
the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf, When
conceived of as bridges rather than barriers to political
interaction, these five bodies of water indirectly affect
neighboring riparian countries: the Soviet Union to the
north; the North African nations of Morocco, Tunisia, and
Algeria to the westj the Sudan and the Horn of Africa
countries to the south; and, finally, the Indian subconti-
12
nent to the east.
The juxtaposition of penetrating water areas and land
masses v/hich characterize the Middle East creates a geo-
graphical situation of naval significance not found to
this extent anywhere else in the world. Not only the Med-
iterranean Sea but the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and their
tributary waters provide easy access for sea-based forces
13deep into the region's landmass. J The recent increased
interest of the superpowers in the waters, littorals, and
narrow straits of the Middle East reinforces this naval
perspective. Especially significant are five narrow straits
which connect the seas and gulfs of the region with each
other and with the oceans and which have long been a matter
of international concern and controversy. The Turkish
Straits—consisting of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara,
Kliemarii op_. cit
. , pp. B~o.
1 3
•Tearcy, op. pit
. , p, 7.
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and the Bosporus—are the only outlet from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean ^ and are, therefore, of paramount
importance' to the Soviet Navy which deploys most of its
Mediterranean squadron from its Black Sea Fleet head-
16quartered at Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula, Con-
trolled by Turkey and administered in accordance with the
terms of the 193& Montreux Convention, they are, politi-
cally, the most quiescent of the Middle Eastern straits.*'
For 98 years after its completion in 1869, the Suez Canal
provided the most convenient and rapid water route from
1 ft
Europe to the East. Once re opened , it will greatly en-
hance the Soviet Navy's access to the Middle East "east of
1 9Suez" and to the Indian Ocean; ' however, unless expensive
enlargement to accommodate modern supertankers is accom-
plished, it probably will not regain its former importance
to the world oil trade. As the entrance to the Gulf of
Aquaba, the Strait of Tiran is of little importance to world
shipping but vital to the interests of -Israel and Jordan
•^Central Intelligence Agency, Issues in the Middle
Eas t, Washington, D„ C, U. S, Government Printing Office,
^973, P. 38.
1 6
Siegfried Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, Anna-
polis, United States Naval Institute, 1970, pp. 9-10.
1?Central Intelligence Agency, loc. c i t
.
Ibid..
'Alvin J. Cottrell, "Implications of Reopening the
Canal for the Area East and South of Suez," The New r; Ad
d
ie
East, No. 3^ (July I97l)i PP. 29-31.

33
whose southern ports—Israel's only outlet to the East and
20Jordan's only seaport—lie at the head of the Gulf. Fear
of its blockade was one of the major motives for the Israeli
21
attack on Egypt in October, 1956, and Egypt's I967 closure
of the strait to Israeli shipping v/as a major factor in
triggering the Six Day War during which Israel seized the
22
area. Bab el Mandeb, which joins the Red Sea at its
southern end to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, also
causes much anxiety for Israel because its closure to Israeli
shipping would have the same effect as the closure of the
Strait of Tiran. Finally, the Strait of Hormuz, which
connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean, is a choke-
point transited by over 60 ships each day carrying over 5°
percent of the world's oil requirements. v
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE U. S. NAVY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The United States had no significant political or stra-
tegic interest in the Middle East until World War II made
involvement, as part of the Allied grand strategy, inevi-
2 Ci-
table. However, despite the magnitude of American naval
power during the v/ar, neither U. S. Navy battleships nor
20Central Intelligence Agency, 1 oc . pit ,
Malcolm W. Cagle, "The Gulf of Aqaba—Trigger for
Conflict," U. S. Naval Institute Proceed ings, Vol. 05,
No. 1 (January 1959). P. 75.
22
'Central Intelligence Agency, op_. pit, , p. 39.
23Ibid.
Perctz, cp_. pit . , p. 33.

34
aircraft carriers ever entered the Mediterranean Sea—
a
preserve of the Royal Navy—with the single exception of
the carrier USS Wasp which delivered a load of British
"Spitfires" to Malta. -* After the war, Soviet pressure
on the region and the decline of British power resulted
in a new American involvement.
Deployment in the Mediterranean Sea . When, in 19^6, Joseph
Stalin attempted to force Turkey to accept the USSR as a
senior partner in the "defense" of the Turkish Straits, by
which he meant to assure the Soviet Navy unrestricted tran-
sit between the Black and the Mediterranean seas while
denying that right to all other major powers, ' the post-
war deployment of American naval power in the Middle East
was inagurated by the visit of the battleship USS Missour i
27
to Istanbul m March of that year. Ostensibly sent by
President Harry S. Truman on a good will mission to return
the remains of the Turkish ambassador to the United States
28
who had died months before, the Missouri and her escorts
served as a symbol of American power perceived by the Turks
as a commitment to protect the status quo. As a result, '
25Pfaff, op_. cit.
, p. 33.
J, C. Hurewitz, Changing Mil i tary Perspectives in
the Middle Fast
,
Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, Sep-
tember 1 970 , p. 6.
27Luttwak, op, cit.
, p : "}1
.
p Q
Ernest McNeill El lor, The Soviet Sea Challenge
,
Chicago, Cowles Book Company, Inc. , 1 9?1 » P. 93.
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the Turks felt free to reject Stalin's demands for a re-
negotiation of the Montreux Convention, assuming that
29they had found a new protector in the West. 7
In a brilliant diplomatic gesture, President Truman
had exercised naval suasion intended to support the Turks
and to deter Moscow. V/hile less sophisticated observers
than the Turks or Soviets may have been impressed by the
sheer size and formidable guns of the Missouri , this sym-
bolic ship represented the national power of the United
States, rather than naval power as such, and was propor-
tional to the former rather than to the latter. Indeed,
the specific tactical capabilities of the battleship, or
of naval capabilities of any kind, were of doubtful mili-
tary relevance to the crisis because the Soviet threat to
Turkey would have emanated from Moscow's large ground
forces and associated, tactical air power which could have
been deployed on the Turco-Bulgarian and Turco-Soviet bor-
ders. It is not known what impression the Missouri made
on Stalin's government. Moscow's diplomatic and propa-
ganda pressure on Ankara continued, as did Turkish resis-
tance thereto, even after the U. S, Navy task force built
around the aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt
arrived on the scene six months later. However, by the
end of 19^6, before the formal enunciation of the Truman
Doctrine and its endorsement by Congress, the Soviet





political offensive had dwindled.^ The Missouri'
s
visit
to a menaced Greece immediately after departing Istanbul
on April 9» 19^6, evoked similar responses. Her visit to
Piraeus, A then' s seaport, the following day was heralded
by the Greek newspaper Acropolis ; "The Russian shadow is
cast over the Balkans. So America comes and tells us 'Sit
tight and don't worry. I'm with you. • "-'
Washington, alarmed by the rapid fall of the Eastern
European nations to Soviet domination and by continued
Soviet pressures on the Middle East as well as Britain's
admitted inability to meet its traditional responsibilities
in the region, formulated and issued the Truman Doctrine
32in 1 9^+7 • This doctrine, by offering "to uphold the in-
dependence and integrity of all states beyond the Soviet
ambit against the threat of direct or indirect Communist
33
aggression," began the policy of "long term, patient,
but firm and vigilant containment"-^ designed to surround
the Soviet Union with nations allied to and supported by
35the United States and pledged to resist Soviet expansion
3
°Ibid., pp. 32-35.
3 U. S. Navy, H ist ory of Ships Named Missour i, Wash-
ington, D. C.i no date, pp.~T2~i3,
2 Spanier, op_. cit .
, pp. 27-30, 33-39.
^
«T, C. Hurewitz, Middl e East Politics; The Military
Dimension, New York, Praeger Publ'isKirs'J 19&9» P» "?°»
3^
"* Spanier, op_. cit
. , pp. 29-.30.
P. M. Dadant, American and Sovie t Defense Sy_.
Vis-A-Vis the Middle East', Santa Monica, The Hand Corpor-




which characterized American foreign policy for the next
two decades. In the Middle East, this containment policy
took sevei^al forms in the late l9^0s and early 1950s, in-
cluding the establishment and permanent stationing of the
U, S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea in 19^8 and,
under the terms of bilateral agreements between the United
States and a number of Middle Eastern countries, deploy-
ment of American land-based strategic strike aircraft
along the southern frontiers of the USSR—a combination
which brought most of European Russia and western Siberia
within range of atomic attack^ and increased concern to
the Kremlin.
Two months after British and French military leader-
ship in the region ended suddenly in November 9 195&, when"
the United States compelled them to abandon their unfinished
Suez campaign, President Dwight D, Eisenhower proposed the
Eisenhower Doctrine which verbalized the principle of uni-
lateral American protection of existing regimes in the
Middle East, ' According to that doctrine, approved by
Congress in March, 1957* the United States was "prepared
to use armed force to assist any nation or group of nations
requesting assistance against armed aggression from any
J Oles M c Smolansky, "The Political' Background to
Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean," in MccGwire,
2SL* ?.M' » PP» 327-323,
^ Hurewitz, Chan^in^ r.'ii litary Pornpo ctives in the
Middle East




country controlled by international Communism. "-'
The application of the Eisenhower Doctrine was almost
immediate. Y/hen, in April, 1957 i King Hussein of Jordan
charged that "international Communism" was responsible for
an internal crisis and efforts to overthrow him, ° a task
force of the Sixth Fleet, including the attack carrier
USS Forrestal and an amphibious contingent of 1,800 Marines,
was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean in an act of
naval suasion designed to underline the United States'
announcement that it regarded "the independence and integ-
41
rity of Jordan as vital" and to help Hussein cling to
his throne. At the height of a Syrian-Turkish crisis
the following October, American naval power was again
applied when the United States delayed the withdrawal of
several ships that had joined the Sixth Fleet for exer-
43
cises J while, simultaneously, the State Department warned
the Soviet Union, Syria's sponsor, to "be under no illusion
that the United States, Turkey's friend and ally, takes
lightly its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty
and is determined to carry out the national policy expressed
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in the Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East"
(the Eisenhower Doctrine). In the summer of 1958, at the
request of President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon, -* a Sixth
Fleet task force of some 70 ships, including three attack
carriers, landed U. S. Marines under the Eisenhower Doc-
trine to, in Chamoun' s words, "preserve order" and to help
Lebanon "defend itself against indirect aggression" which
—
following General Abdul Kassem's destruction of the pro-
Western Hashemite regime of Iraq on July Ik—threatened to
throw the country completely into the radical Arab camp.
Toward the end of the 1950s, technological advances
and growing nationalist agitation presaged both the demise
of American land bases in the Middle East and an increased
reliance on the Sixth Fleet which assumed an expanded stra-
tegic strike role in addition to its traditional political
one. As a result, the Sixth Fleet—which, in the past
decade and a half, has averaged about 50 ships organized
into: two task forces, each built around an attack aircraft
carrier and its embarked air wing; an amphibious force in-
cluding a batallion landing team of U. S. Marines; attack,
and, since I963, ballistic missile submarine units; and
mobile support forces—serves, in effect, as a roving base,
projecting both American influence and power across the
Z
^U. S. Department of State, Bulletin , Vol. XXXVII,
No. 957 (October 20, 1957), p. 67k".
-'Tcrets. op_. cit. . p. 339.
Eiler t op. cit . , p, 125.
'Perots, loc. cit .

Mediterranean and the Middle East. ^8
Deployment in the Persian Gulf. During the political and
social chaos that followed the withdrawal of British and
Soviet forces after World War II, Iran, like Turkey and
LlG
Greece, was threatened by insurrection, ,p Among the right-
and left-wing extremist and tribal autonomy movements which
emerged, J the greatest threat to the young Shah Muhammed
Reza Pahlavi's government was the Tudeh Party—founded "by
the Soviets shortly after their occupation of Iran's north-
ern provinces, including Tehran, in 19*H -—which had bene-
fited from the problems of the country and had tried to
assassinate the Shah. Late in 19^9* the Shah flew to
C A
Washington and appealed to President Truman for help,-3
Grouping Iran with Turkey and Greece under the Truman
Doctrine, Washington detached a seaplane tender and two
destroyers from the Sixth Fleet to create the U, S, Middle
East Force v/hich was deployed to the Persian Gulf for
Tehran's reassurance. For the past quarter century,
this three-ship force has carried out its essentially
Hurewitz, op_. cit
. , pp. 9-Hj Dadant, o£. cit, p. 31
"Lawrence Griswold f "The Bear on the Roof: Soviet
Power Encircles Persian Gulf," reprinted in U, S„ Congress,
House, U. S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian
Gulf , Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office,
1972, p. 199.
-> Peretz, op_. cit
. , p. ^37.
Griswold, Ice, cit .
^Ipid .. pp. 199-201.
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political mission of maintaining a "friendly presence"
symbolic of continued American interest in the Persian
Gulf, the Red Sea, and the western Indian Ocean through
periodic visits to friendly ports throughout the region, -
Although, through an informal arrangement with the British,
the Middle East Force obtained access to the logistic sup-
port facilities of the Royal Navy's base on Bahrain, all
ships assigned to the force served on a rotational basis
until the flagship, the USS Vale our , was homeported there
in I966. The two destroyers assigned to the force were
deployed from the Sixth Fleet until the Suez Canal was
closed in I967 and now usually rotate to. the Persian
Gulf from the Atlantic Fleet.
^
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
At the end of V/orld War II s the Middle East v/as of
relatively little interest to a Soviet Union which was
extensively preoccupied with the problems of post-war
settlement and consolidation of its control in Eastern
Europe and the Far East, Only recovering from the shock
of Hitler's invasion, Moscov/'s "machinations in the Balkans
CO
-^U« S, Congress, House, op, cit , , pp. 11-13.
5 Alvin J, Cottrell, "The United States and the Future
of the Gulf After the Bahrain Agreement/' The New Middle
East , No. 22 (July 1970), p. ?-0.
c c








and the Middle East were as much a factor of political
momentum as real military power, "^ When the demands
pressed by Stalin which reflected Soviet interests in the
region—notably, control of the Turkish Straits described
above and continued control over northern Iran--encountered
stiff Western resistance, the USSR quietly backed down.
By late 195^+ and early 1955* however, the new Soviet
premier, Nikita Khrushchev, had decided to thwart Washing-
ton's plan to advance its containment of the Soviet Union
through a new British-sponsored, American-backed regional
defense alliance, later known as the Baghdad Pact, by
establishing close relations with those Arab states which
had, for reasons of their own, refused to join. 7 Moscow
soon implemented this new foreign policy toward the Middie
East—a foreign policy based primarily upon its extra-regional
requirements for national security rather than upon its
interests in the region per se_—when Egypt offered it the
opportunity in l955i simply by purchasing Soviet weapons,
to disrupt the Western plan to link the Northern Tier states
in a military alliance along the southern periphery of the
USSR. 60
^ 7Pfaff, pp_. cit. , p. 37.
J Smolansky, loc . cit .
^ 9lbjd.
, p. 328.
A r S. Becker and A. L, Horel.ick, Soviet Policy in
the Middle Eas_t, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation,
September 1970, p. 8.
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But, even as the Soviet Union established itself in
the Middle East
—




1958» Iraq --and became increasingly involved in the n-
ternal affairs of its new clients and the Arab world,
events and technology were changing the nature of the
threat which this policy had been designed to counter.
These changes would soon force a mediocre Soviet Navy, a
navy v/hose operations during World War II had been confined
largely to enclosed home waters and which remained sub-
stantially oriented toward its traditional mission of sup-
porting the seaward flanks of Moscow's ground forces and
6t
defending Soviet coastal areas, -* to modernize and go to
sea,
4
Deployment in the Mediterranean Sea. By the late 1950s,
the strategic threat to the USSR emanating from the Bagh-
dad Pact countries and other American allies in the Middle
East had been significantly reduced, not because of Khrush-
64
chev's political offensive, but as a result of techno-
logical advances which moved much of the West's strategic
strike capability from land bases in the Middle East to the
61
Smolansky, 1pc . cit.
62Becker and Horelick, op_. cit .
, pp. 9-10.
^Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Naval Interaction with the
United States and its Influence on Soviet Naval Develop-




seas surrounding the region. •* The development and deploy-
ment aboard Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers during this time
of attack aircraft with longer ranges and enhanced nuclear
weapon delivery capabilities increased Soviet fears of the
threat from the sea, u However, from the early 1950s,
Moscow had based a Soviet Navy submarine squadron at
67Vallona, Albania; apparently it was not, at this stage,
deemed expedient or possible to deploy a surface fleet
4
forward in the Mediterranean merely to cope with the car-
68
rier threat. V/ithdrawal of this submarine squadron in
I96I following Albania's adoption of pro-Chinese policies
"
during the first public airing of the Sino-Soviet dispute
coupled with the anticipated deployment of the new Polaris
A2 submarine launched ballistic missile to the eastern
Mediterranean which materialized in I963 forced the defen-
sive forward deployment of the Soviet Navy into the Medi-
70terranean Sea. ' By 196^, Moscow had officially recognized
-'Michael MccGwire , "Soviet Naval Policy—Prospects




Geoffrey Jukes, The Indian Ocean jin S ovie t Naval
Policy , London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, May
T9?27p. 5.
Curt Gasteyger, C onflic t and Tensi on in the Medi-
terranean, London, The Institute for Strategic Studies,
September 1968, p. 2.
68
Jukes, loc . cit .
69
'Gasleyger, loc . cit.
70Jukes, op_. cit
. , pp. 5-6.
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the U. S, Navy's ballistic missile submarine as the primary
71
naval threat to the Soviet Union. ' Although any early
solution to the missile threat was precluded by the extra-
ordinary technological difficulties involved in the detec-
tion and, if necessary, destruction of nuclear submarines,
any Soviet hope of the eventual neutralization of this
latest addition to the American nuclear arsenal as v/ell as
of the impressive nuclear strike capability of the Sixth
Fleet's attack carriers depended to a great extent on Mos-
cow's ability to establish and maintain a naval and air
72presence in the Mediterranean. This presence began
haltingly with units of the Black Sea Fleet entering the
Mediterranean in I963 ^° ^e followed by the elements of a
squadron in 1964- and then the continuous deployment of 4
74
surface warships the following year. The cautious nature
of this new departure for the Soviet Navy was evident in
its seasonal fluctuations: the Soviet ships filtered in
during the spring, reached a peak in the summer, and by
75Christmas had mostly returned home. y While the Soviet
71
'""Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy : Fifty
Years of Theory and Practice , Annapolis", United States
Naval Institute, T*96b\ pp. 96-97.
72Srnolansky, cd* cit
. , p. 329.
'-'John Erickson, Soviet Military Power , London, Royal
United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1971. p.. 55>
74Blechman, op. cit.
, p. 12.
^Laurence W. Martin, "The Changing Military Balance,"
in J. C. Hurewitz, ed. , S ovie t-American Rivalry in the Mid-
dle East, New York, Praeger Publishers, I9S9, pp, 62-63.
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Navy's forward deployment could also serve the political
purpose of "showing the flag" in support of Khrushchev's
Arab clients, its primary raison d'etre must have been the
emergence of the eastern Mediterranean as an area from
which a serious strategic threat was posed to the indus-
trial heartland of the Soviet Union,
Deployment in the Indian Ocean, The extension of the Soviet
Navy's forward deployment in the waters of the Middle East
to the Indian Ocean beginning in I968 appears to have been
motivated primarily by the same extra-regional concern for
strategic defense that powered its entry into the Mediter-
ranean Sea in 196^. Although no United States ballistic
missile submarines had yet deployed to the Indian Ocean,
the fact that the advantages of stationing submarines
carrying the new long-range Polaris AJ. missile in the north-
western corner of the Indian Ocean—the Arabian Sea—would
make such a deployment highly likely to occur was recog-
nized by Soviet naval analysts no later than 196^* Alerted
to this new potential danger, the Kremlin debated response
either by the deployment of a counterveiling Soviet naval
presence designed to reduce the attractiveness of the Arabian
Sea to the U. S. Navy or through pursuit of an agreement to
prevent deployment of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean,
'
' Jukes, log . c_it,
^Olcs H. Smolansky, "Soviet Entry into the Indian
Ocsan: An Analysis," in Cotbrell and Burrell, op_. cit,
,
pp. 3^0-3^1.
78Jukes, 0£. cit. , pp. 6-7.
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Because of the impact which Soviet naval expansion
into yet another sea area would have on the defense budget,
Khrushchev's new successors, General Secretary Leonid I,
Brezhnev and Premier Alexi Kosygin, probably did not react
favorably to Soviet Navy proposals for a presence in the
Indian Ocean. However, once Moscow's December, 196^, pro-
posal for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the
Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean was rejected by the
79United Nations, 7 the eventual deployment of the Soviet
Navy in the Indian Ocean was virtually assured.
That neither the Soviet Union nor the United States
actually effected a permanent naval presence in the Indian
Ocean for the next three years is explained by events and
conditions elsewhere, Moscow was preoccupied with build-
ing up its Mediterranean squadron to counter an existing,
rather than potential, threat and the closure of the Suez
Canal as a result of the Six' Day War precluded the develop-
ment and maintenance of an Indian Ocean presence via that
most convenient and economical of accesses. Escalation of
the American involvement in Vietnam increased the hostility
of most non-aligned Indian Ocean littoral countries tc an
American ballistic missile submarine presence which,
without a permanently stationed tender in the area, would







81in the area by significantly reducing on-station time,
During this time, however, the all-important Soviet
perception of the American intention to station ballistic
missile submarines in the Arabian Sea kept plans to deploy
the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean alive, Moscow's anxi-
eties over this eventuality were reinforced by such events
as the I966 Anglo-American agreement "allowing the United
States to build and use facilities in the British Indian
Ocean Territory" on the island of Diego Garcia which could
support such a presence and improvements in the sea-based
missile delivery capability which involved the projected
deployment of the new Poseidon missile in the Indian Ocean
in the 1970s. 82
Thus, it was not Western withdrawal--.the Labor govern-
ment's famous decision to terminate the operational British
military presence "east of Suez" and President Nixon's ex-
pressed desire to avoid any further American military in-
volvement in the mainland of Asia •—which was the major
consideration impelling the establishment of a Soviet naval
presence in the Indian Ocean, but the desire to establish
a credible defense posture against potential submarine
launched ballistic missile strikes from the Arabian Sea
81
James M, McConnell, The, Sov iet Navy _in_ the Indian
Ocean, Arlington, Center for Naval Analyses, August JV'/l,
p. 2.






which is "second only to the Eastern Mediterranean in terms
of target coverage" of Soviet territory,
THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
It is often difficult to ascertain the nature of "a
foreign policy" v/hich usually "consists of a series of de-
cisions expressed through policy statements as well as di---
rect actions" D which are often "internally inconsistent,"
OS
"vaguely related," and subject to innumerable interpreta-
tions. V/hile detailed analysis of foreign policies (systems
of activities evolved by national actors for influencing
the behavior of other nations and for adjusting a nation's
37
own activities to the international environment which are
dynamic rather than static, varying over time as they ini-
tiate or respond to change in pursuit of perceived inter-
ests and objectives) is beyond the scope of the present
study, a brief description of the interests and objectives
which inform and reflect the general nature of the foreign
policies of the superpowers in the Middle East is in order.
8
^Ibid., p. 3^0,
^William D, Ccplin, Introduct ion to Internati onal
Poli tics ; A Theoretica l Overview , Chicago , Markhasn Pub-
lishing Company, 1971 » p. 29.
Roger Hi Isman, To Move a Natjcnt The Pol itics of
Foreign Policy in the A d rnlnIs t'ra tf on of oohn £l Kennedy ,
Garden city, N. Y., Doubleclay & Company, Inc., 196?, p. 5.
'George Modelski, A The dry of Fcroirrn Policy, New
York, Frederick A. Praoger, 1962, p, 7.
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American Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Although, since
the end of World War II when a Middle East policy began to
be formulated, United States objectives in the region have
remained essentially constant, Washington's policy toward
the Middle East has been subject to a process of constant
adjustment to changing conditions within the region as well
as to alterations in both its domestic and international
environments. This process is reflected in policy orien-
tations which have ranged from the familiar theme of "de-
fending the Middle East" ^ which found expression in both
the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines to the "disengagement
and engagement on a more selective basis "° approach of the
Nixon Doctrine through which, with whatever assistance is
deemed appropriate by a United States which " , , . cannot




,;? the nations of the Middle East "must pro-
°2
vide for their own security.'"' While the key interests
and objectives of the United States in the Middle East can
be simply stated, the complex policies through which these
are pursued are difficult to summarize in general terms.
oo
' Bernard Reich, "America in the Middle East: Chang-
ing Aspects in U. S Policy," The New Middle East, Ho. 1,
(October 1968), p. 9.
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93 Melvin R. Laxrd , National Security Strate gy of
Realistic Deterrence
,
Washington, D. C, U. S. Government
Printing Office. 1972, p. 21.
92,
U. S. Congress, House, o£„ pit, , p. 26.

Because the greatest danger for the United States in
the Middle East is the possibility of a direct confronta-
tion and possibly war with the Soviet Union resulting from
local conflicts within the region,-' the vital interest
and primary objective of American foreign policy has been
and continues to be the prevention and control of such con-
flicts and, thus, the avoidance of war between the super-
powers. The other predominant interests of the United
States in the Middle East have been: to prevent the Soviet
Union from dominating the area because a Soviet hegemony
would represent a perilous shift in world power relation-
ships against the United States and the West;"-3 to ensure
continued American and Western access to Middle Eastern
communications facilities, resources—especially Persian
Gulf oil—and strategic positions; to make possible orderly
political and economic development that will permit profit-
able American investment in the region; and to secure and
promote the continued existence and well-being of the State
of Israel.
^William B. Quandt, "The Middle East Conflict in
U. S. Strategy, 1970-71," Journal of Pales tine Studies,
Vol. I, No, 1* (Autumn 1971), p. 39.
9^4-
Temple Wanamaker, American F ore ign Poli cy Today
,
New York, Bantam Books, l cjG^ p, 199; Reich, loc . c i t.
.
OK
U, S. Congress, House, Soviet Involvement in t he
Middle East and the Western Response , Washington, u. C.
,
U, S. Government Printing Office, 1971 i P. 13?.
y Pfaff, o£, cit
. , p. 33; Reich, loc . cit,, Wana-
maker, loc. cit .
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In pursuit of these interests—which have often proved
Q7
to be incompatible'' —the United States evolved the policy
of containment intended to thwart Soviet penetration of the
region and developed the guiding concept of "peace and sta-
bility with change" within the Middle East.™ By the end
of the 1960s, with the Northern Tier both softening toward
Moscow and being leapfrogged by Soviet advances into the
Arab states, containment appeared nearly defunct in the
Middle East although the United States continues in its
efforts to prevent Soviet inroads in the region, " Once
the Six Day War underlined the inherent instability of the
Middle East as manifested in the Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab
conflicts extant in the region, the "peace and stability"
concept experienced a shift In focus from an emphasis on
stability to an emphasis on peace as the appropriate goal
~
,
- i • 100of American policy.
077
'Quandt, United States P olicy in the Middle East ;
Constraints and Choices, p. v. As an example of this in-
compatibility, Quandt (p. 2) offers the United States'
desire 'to bring the Arab states into collective security
arrangements to prevent Soviet expansion, as had been
successfully done in the 'Northern Tier' countries of
Turkey and Iran," a policy which "would have required ac-
tive cooperation from The Arab states" which was precluded
by American involvement in the creation of a Jewish state
in Israel to which the "Arab states . . were violently










. . pp. 9-H.
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Y/ithin this context, three general courses of action
emerged as policy alternatives. At one end of the spectrum
was increased United States involvement. However, any
attempt by Washington to become the area's "policeman"
would have been precluded by the "numerous intra-regional
disputes, lack of clear benefit for the United States of
such an act, and the unwillingness of most of the states
in the region to accept such a posture" ' if not by the
pronounced reluctance of the United States born of the
Vietnam experience to be drawn into any entanglements
which might entail military involvement in another "peri-
102
pheral" area. At the other end of the spectrum, a
policy of disengagement and withdrawal to isolationism
might accomplish the objective of preventing a war between
the superpowers which could grow cut of local conflicts in
the region, but would endanger other American interests in
the Middle East and elsewhere. ' -' Consequently, American
foreign policy today, v/hich is based on recognition of the
fact that "some involvement [in the Middle East] is inevi-
table and the need is to determine form and content," es-
chews the simplistic approach of the two extremes and pur-
sues a course which, for want of a better term, may be




Dadant, op_. pit .
, pp. 7-8.




called "selective involvement." The new Nixon admin-
istration's February, 19&9* decision to become actively
involved in the pursuit of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict—manifested by such initiatives as the Rogers
Plan attempt to end Egypt's "war of attrition" against
Israel and probably reaching its apogee in Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger's post-Yom Kippur War negotiations
of 1973 and 197^—is representative of this approach—one
which the United States pursues through relatively active
or passive means depending upon the priority accorded the
problems of the Middle East over those of other parts of
.. -, 106
the world,
Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East. It is especially
difficult to establish the nature of Soviet foreign policy
in the Middle East. Unlike many of their American counter-
parts, Soviet leaders are not given to introspective com-
mentary on the motivating factors in the formulation of
their foreign policy and policy pronouncements are often so
obscured by ideological jargon that all-«even specialists---
107
approach them with trepidation. Officials of the U. S.
Reicn, loc. cit.
^Quandt, op_. cit .
, pp. k\-k$,
Quandt, United States Policy in the Middle East :
Constraint;:, arid Choices , p. 55.
1 07Gary G, Sick, Russia and the West in the Mediterr-
anean » Perspectives for the 1970s , Newport ( U. S. Naval
War College, 1970, p. 'fo.
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Department of State admit to having no "firmly formulated
loft
view on the point of Soviet long-term aims" in the
region. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin
leaders themselves are certain of the exact nature of their
policy toward the Middle East, y
The motives and objectives which have been attributed
by Western observers to Soviet foreign policy in the Middle
East since its most recent activation in 1955 appear to run
a gamut best characterized by William Welch's typology of
110
of American images of Soviet foreign policy. Beginning
with what has been termed "militant expansionism" aiming
at world domination, these progress through a "limited ex-
pansionism" view of Soviet behavior as a considerably more
ambiguous militance tempered by a realistic assessment of
means to a "reluctant expansionism" image of Soviet belli-
gerence reflecting a pervasive sense of insecurity and fear
rather than any ambition on Moscow's part to expand its
111power and influence. Western views of the Soviet Navy
as an instrument of foreign policy tend to parallel these
images.
1 oft




110William V/elch, American Images of Soviet Foreign
Policy , New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970, pp. 55-58,
111 Griffiths, ep_. cit
. , p. 10.
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Taken alone $ any one of these explanations is, at
best, an oversimplified and inadequate explanation of ex-
tremely complex and dynamic behavior patterns. The least
valid appears to be the "militant expansionism" interpre-
tation which reflects a strong tendency to overstate the
importance attached to the Middle East by Soviet leaders
and to exaggerate the purposefulness of Moscow's policies
and actions that ha.ve led to its extensive involvement in
1 12
the region x on the part of Western observers whose con-
clusions have been based not on any likely view of priority
Soviet interests in the region but on priority Western
113fears of Moscow's intentions J and whose perceptions have
been colored by preconceived ideas and value judgements
about how the West should react toward and cope with the
11^
Soviet "threat" to the region.
A more valid explanation of Soviet foreign policy and
forward naval deployment in the Middle East is to be found
in some combination of the limited and reluctant expansion-
ism tendencies which reflect the extent to which the evo-




pursuit of more highly valued extra-regional objectives,
and reactive, or improvised in response to opportunities
112
Becker and Horelick, op_. cit .
, p. 5.
•'Kenneth Booth, "Military Power, Military Force,
and Soviet Foreign Policy," in MccGwire, op_, cit . , p. 33.
Evron, Hoc , cit.
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that presented themselves as consequences of events over
which Moscow had little control, or as the unintended con-
sequences of actions undertaken for other purposes. -^
Within this context,, general Soviet foreign policy orien-
tations which have persisted through time and which are
pertinent to the presence of the Soviet Navy in the waters
of the Middle East may be identified.
In general terms, Soviet foreign policy shares moti-
vations and characteristics common to the foreign policies
evolved by every other national actor in international
politics in that it aims first to maximize the national
security of the USSR and then to maximise its political
influence, economic potential, and other benefits to be
1 1 fi
derived through relations with the rest of the world,'
An evaluation of the significance of the Middle Eastern
landmass to these interests reveals that no vita l Soviet
interests are presently at stake therein; as has been
shown, the vital interest of the USSR in the Middle East,
the extra-regional one of national security, is currently
affected only from the waters which surround the landmass
—
the eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Sea as well
117
as the Indian Ocean. The first objective of Soviet
-'Arnold L. Horelick, Soviet Middle East Policy :
Origins and Prospects , Santa Monica, The Rand Ccrpor.---tion,
February iy?l„ pp. 1-2.
1 1
°B o o t.h , oi) . cit . , p . 'H .
r01es M, Smolansky, "The Political Background to
Soviet Waval Policy in the Mediterr i," In riccGwire,
op. cit,




foreign policy in the Middle East, then, is the security
of the homeland, and the primary mission of the Soviet Navy
in implementing that policy in the waters of the region is
to develop and maintain its capability to counter the West's
1 1 Pi
sea-based strategic strike capability, The second ob-
jective is to enhance the image and influence of the USSR
while eroding that of the West to ensure Moscow's establish-
ment as the dominant superpower in a Middle East it covets
as a "sphere of influence" essential to other extra-regional
goals such as "the creation of a system of collective secu-
119
rity in Asia" f oriented toward the containment of China
and the pursuit of future interests in Asia and Africa as
well as many and varied intra-regional goals ranging from
its desire to be the political arbiter within the region
1 or,
121-
to its political and economic interests in Middle Eastern
122
oil. Moscow does not desire to establish the Soviet.
flag or satellites in the Middle East, but to establish a
11 R
i
Michael MccGwire, "The Mediterranean and Soviet
Naval Interests," in MccGwire, op_. cit.
, p« 321.
119
'Leonid I. Brezhnev, Opening Speech to the Inter-
national Conference on Communist and Worker's Parties,
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tute for Strategic Studies, September 19&9, p. 1.
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dominant Soviet political, economic, and military presence
123in the area. 'J The interest of the Soviet Union in the
Middle East, then, is that of a superpower in an adjacent
area which offers good prospects for extending its influ-
12^
ence and enhancing its security, Moscow appears to pur-
sue these interests through policies designed to maintain
a state of exploitable controlled tension throughout the
region,
; Finally, however, Moscow certainly shares Washington's
interest in preventing a superpower nuclear confrontation
over the Middle East and Soviet foreign policy in the region
since the Six Day War has appeared to reflect this interest,
In mid-1 9^9t for example, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A,
Gromyko observed that ", , . it is in the interests of both
countries [i.e., the U, S, and the USSR] to prevent clashes
12Sbetween the world's two biggest pov/ers . , , ," ** and
Soviet diplomacy in the highly charged atmosphere of the
Arab-Israeli conflict generally has been characterized by
caiition, counsel of moderation to its Arab clients, and a
continuing emphasis on the need to find a political rather
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'Andrei A, Gromyko, Speech to the Supreme Soviet
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Bernard Lev/is once observed that: "In the \7est as in
Russia the question that arises is a basic and simple one—
>
127how much trouble is the Middle East worth?" ' Apparently,
quite a lot. In spite of the overriding concern with avoid-
ing a nuclear confrontation, the other interests of the
superpowers in the Middle East seem destined to prolong
1 op
Soviet and American involvement in the region.
1 ?'?
"'Bernard Lewis, "The Consequences of Defeat," For -
eign Affairs . Vol, 46, No. 2 (January 1968), p. 325.
1 9 P,
Dadant, op_, cit
. , p. 3.

CHAPTER III
THE SOVIET NAVY: AN INSTRUMENT OF
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The necessity of neutralizing the United States' sea-
based strategic strike capability originally dictated the
establishment of a Soviet naval presence in the waters of
the Middle East only a decade ago. Although the strategic
defense of the homeland against attack from the sea has
been and probably remains its primary mission, the Soviet
Navy has evolved, in the past, several years, into both an
important determinant and an increasingly significant in-
strument of the USSR's foreign policy throughout the region.
THE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY
AND FOREIGN POLICY
The physical requirements for the maintenance of the
defensive forward deployment of the Soviet Navy in the
waters of the Middle East have been a primary consideration
in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy toward the
region--policy which, in turn, the Soviet Navy eventually
helped to implement. Because the vital interest of national
security takes priority over all other Soviet interests in
the region, the Soviet Navy's requirement for shore support
facilities and for the reopening of the Suez Canal appear

62
to have justified moves such as deep involvement in Egypt
and in the Arab-Israeli conflict with attendant risks
which otherwise might be construed as running counter to
Moscow's long-term interests in the Middle East.
Shore Support Facilities. The most immediate advantage to
be derived from naval shore support facilities adjacent to
an area of forward deployment is the increased time which
any ship can spend "on station" as opposed to "in transit"
tp and, from its home port. Such facilities were and con-
tinue to be of special importance to the Soviet Navy—.pri-
marily a coastal defense navy prior to 196^—which did not
possess and is now only developing adequate mobile logistic
support capabilities essential to naval forces deployed for-
word without access to an extensive shore support infra-
structure. Moreover, in terms of countering the Western
sea-based strategic threat, forward support facilities are
of equal if not greater significance to the employment of
long-range maritime surveillance aircraft for anti-carrier
and anti-submarine warfare and as terminals for fixed
2
underwater submarine detection systems.
The overriding value placed by the Soviets on the
acquisition of essential shore support facilities is appar-
ent from the extensive diplomatic efforts exerted toward
Michael MccGwire, "Soviet Maritime Strategy—Purpos-
ive or Preventive?" in MccGwire, op. cit
. ,
p. ^5^.
? .Michael MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Policy—Prospects
for the Seventies,' in MccGwire, pp . cit. , pp. L'Al-kl'}.
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this end. Moscow commenced overtures to Cairo aimed at
obtaining facilities in Egypt as early as December, I96I
—
six months after the loss of the submarine base at Vallona
and only shortly after the decision to move forward in
strategic defense had been taken—when Admiral Sergei G.
Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, made the
first of four visits to that capital. Khrushchev's 1964
tour of Egypt was, no doubt, prompted in part by his deter-
mination to obtain facilities for the use of the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron. Although Soviet warships made
their first naval visit to Egypt in ten years late in 1965*
Moscow did not acquire the facilities its navy needed until
after the Six Day War in I967. The extensive involvement
generated by acquisition of these facilities, the defense 1*
systems to support them (the defense of Egypt from Israel
at the same time v/as largely incidental) , and the consequent
Soviet incursion on Egyptian sovereignty appear to have
been among the reasons for President Anwar Sadat's expul-
sion of the bulk of Moscow's military personnel in July,
19?2, which constituted a major setback to the USSR's
Middle Eastern policy.
3
^Michael MccGv/ire, "The Mediterranean and Soviet
Naval Interests," in MccGwire, op_. pit. t pp. 320-321.
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In an attempt to provide for the support of forward
deployment in the Indian Ocean, Gorshkov paid a ten-day
visit to India in February, 1968, followed by Soviet Navy
o
"good will" port calls, which marked the beginning of in-
tensive Soviet naval assistance to that country. Contin-
ued efforts, including extensive assistance to the develop-
10ing Indian Navy and naval demonstrations in support of
India during the Indo-Pakistani war of December, 1971,




naval facilities. India has, however, peatedly refused
to grant base rights to the Soviet Union.
Although the Soviet Navy has been striving to develop
Ik




it is apparent from its continued efforts to secure bases
throughout the region—most recently evidenced by Moscow's
o
Dadant, loc . cit.
^Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power : Challenge for
the 1970 s, New York, National Strategy Information Cenxer,
Inc., 1972, p. 48.
10
U. S. Congress, House, The Indian Ocean : Political
and Strategic Future , Washington, D. C, U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1971 • P. 115.
11James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, Superpower
Naval Diplomacy in the Ind o -Paki s
t
an i Crisi s. Arlington,
Center for Naval Analyses, February 1973i PP- 2-6.
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U. S. Congress, House, ojo. cit .
, p. 141.
13
-^"Soviet Setback," Washington Star-News (March 4,
197*0 1 no page number; "U. S. -British Plan Defended for
Base on Diego Garcia," The Christian Science Monitor
(March 5, 197*0 » P. 6.
14
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micL-1 97^+ strengthening of its naval position in two coun-
tries which border the Indian Ocean entrance to the Red Sea,
South Yemen and Somalia"1 -*—that the requirement for shore
support facilities to support its forward deployment will
have a continuing effect on Soviet foreign policy in the
Middle East for at least the next several years.
The Suez Canal. The Soviet Navy's interest in the reopen-
ing of the Sues Canal also appears to have had a determi-
native influence on Soviet foreign policy in the Middle
East. Although Moscow currently maintains a naval force
16
of over 20 ships in the Indian Ocean, it does so at great
cost as a result of the closure of the canal since June,
1967» which has severely restricted the forward deployment,
which began the following year. In order to reach the
western portions of the Indian Ocean— the Arabian Sea and
its missile threat as well as the oil-rich Persian Gulf-
Soviet warships must either travel over 11,000 miles from
the Black Sea through the Mediterranean and around the Cape
17
of Good Hope or steam up to 9»000 miles from Vladivostok
or other Pacific Ocean bases which are often severely
IS
^Paul wohl, "Moscow Courts Somalia and South Yemen,"
The Christian Science Monitor (August 15, 197 Z
, p. *+.
1 (-
Richard Burt, "Verbal Gunfire Over U. S., Soviet
Roles in Indian Ocean," The Chri stian Scienc e M on it or
(March 6, 197*0 » p. 5.
17






handicapped by fog in the spring and autumn and by ice in
the winter. However, as is evident from a glance at a
map (see Fig. 2, p. 30) , were its ships able to transit
the Suez Canal—the voyage from the Black Sea through the
eastern Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean via the canal
is only 2,200 miles-—the Soviet Navy could greatly enhance
19its presence in the region. 7 The prospect of gaining this
objective was probably a primary reason why Moscow did not
actively oppose Washington* s efforts at the beginning of
the 1970s to effect an interim settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict which would involve the separation of
Egyptian and Israeli forces at the Suez Canal front and
20
permit the opening of the canal itself as well as its
apparent underwriting of the October, 1973* Yom Kippur Wan
21in which Egypt regained control of the canal from Israel,
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET NAVY
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
Eeginning in the middle 1960s, the new permanent pre-
sence of the Soviet Navy in the eastern Mediterranean con-
ceivab3.y could have been employed by the Kremlin, in concert
1 R
i
Dadant, op_, pit .
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19
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Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "A Sensible Suez Proposal,"
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with other policy tools, to enhance its own capability for
strategic defense of the USSR through active application
to efforts aimed at acquisition of the desired shore sup-
port facilities as well as in attempts to further other
Soviet foreign policy goals in the Middle East. In theory,
this Soviet naval presence should have promoted Soviet
interests in the Middle East while simultaneously eroding
the interests of the West. As the result of such a pre-
22
sence, according to MccGwire:
Local states would be able to contemplate alignments
and alternative sources of support which were pre-
,
viously not available. States hitherto associated
with the V/est might be tempted to the opposite align-
ment; states hostile to Western powers might prove
even less amenable to blandishments or pressure.
States willing to be uncommitted might now feel com-
pelled to deny facilities and friendly gestures once,
offered to Western fleets, so as to avoid offering
similar concessions to the Soviets, Meanwhile the
presence of Soviet naval units
. . .
would introduce
a complicating factor which would . . . inhibit if
not actually limit the . , . freedom of action at sea
which the V/est
. . .
has seemed to enjoy.
Although the Soviet Navy had made a habit of occasional
23
official visits in areas of strategic concern since 1953»
there is no evidence to indicate that the political and
naval leadership in Moscow perceived the possible political
benefits of the forv/ard deployment in the eastern Mediter-
ranean when it was first undertaken.
22
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Latent Naval Suasion Before the Six Day War. Indeed, the
pattern of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron's operational
activity during the first four years of forward deployment
--with the possible exception of the 196^ appearances of
Soviet warships in the Aegean Sea and off the coast of
Cyprus at the moments of greatest tension in the relations
2*5between Greece and Turkey over the island J—-could not
support the thesis that it was directed to earn political
dividends among the nations of the Middle East.
..
In pursuit of its mission of strategic defense from
1964 through the first half of I967, the Soviet Navy main-
tained a i low political profile in the eastern Mediterranean.
At least partly out of fear of being charged with naval
•) f
imperialism and partly because of an ideological barrier
27
against foreign bases which probably was reinforced by
the experience in Albania, the squadron operated from an-
chorages located well over the horizon, out of sight of
land, in. spite of the advantages that would accrue from
no
lying closer to shore or from utilizing facilities ashore.
Occasional regular visits of Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
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average number of Soviet ships deployed forward was only
about ten or twelve.-'
Nonetheless, the mere presence of the new Soviet Med-
iterranean Squadron—as politically undirected as it seems
to have been-—apparently had begun to reshape the military
dimension of the local international environment perceived
by eastern Mediterranean policy makers enough to enhance
Moscow's position and contribute to the erosion of Washing-
ton's influence there. The case of Turkey offers an inter-
esting illustration of these effects of latent naval sua-
sion. A staunch and dependable ally of the United States
in the early post-World V/ar II period, Ankara, in the
mid-1960s, began to move more and more toward non-alignment
and, thus, away from amenability to Western influence. It
is, of course, obvious that Moscow's activist policy in the
Middle East was not the sole reason for this change in
Turkey's attitude. Probably the most important single fac-
tor was Ankara's growing disenchantment with Washington'
s
attitude toward and actions in the dispute with Greece over
Cyprus. The examples of Iran and Pakistan, Turkey's allies
in the Central Treaty Organization, both normalizing rela-
tions v/ith the Soviet Union and deriving important economic
and political benefits from the arrangement must have been
another important factor in motivating the establishment of
-> Neville Brown, "Soviet Naval Expansion—The Global




closer ties with Moscow. But, on an imponderable yet no
less significant level, Turkey's uneasiness was augmented
by the establishment of a permanent Soviet naval presence
in the Mediterranean which rendered Ankara vulnerable to
Soviet pressure from both the north and the south.-' In
other words, the deployment of the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron in the waters surrounding Turkey was a reality
which no Turkish government, regardless of its political
persuasion, could possibly ignore.
However, the event which would demonstrate to Moscow
the value of the Soviet Navy as an active instrument of
foreign policy in the Middle East was yet to occur.
The Six Day War as a Turning Point. A turning point f or
,
the Soviet Navy in the Middle East came in June, 1967» when
the Arab-Israeli conflict erupted in the Six Day War which
both opened the door for a substantial augmentation of the
?2Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean-^ and prompted
a shift toward the active political exploitation of ships
33
on forward deployment. ^
In early May, 1967, Moscow had inexplicably "warned"
Syria and Egypt that Israeli troops were massing on the
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untrue, these reports commenced a series of political es-
calations and military movements within the Arab states
which forced Israel to launch what she considered a pre-
ventive war on June 5. Initially, the war appeared to
ruin Moscow's position in the Arab world. * When Israel
struck, the Kremlin's' immediate resort
' to" the "hot line"
dramatically demonstrated its overriding interest in avoid-
ing a military confrontation with the United States. To
the USSR's clients, this meant that there could be no di-
rect Soviet intervention to rescue them from a defeat at
35the hands of the Israelis, * To the USSR, it meant the
possible loss of all its recent gains in the Middle East.^
i Faced with one of the great debacles of its foreign
policy, the Soviet Union after the Six Day War might con-'
ceivably have chosen to disengage itself from the radical
Arab cause. Although this alternative undoubtedly was con-
sidered in Moscow, the decision to maintain its position in
the Middle East was quickly taken and the USSR undertook
massive arms deliveries to the defeated Arab states and
37
extended full diplomatic and political support,-^' As a
part of this effort, elements of the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron intervened in such a way as to reap a modest
3^< •
•* Dadant, op_. pit.
, pp. 5-6.
35J Horelick, op_. cit .
,
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38diplomatic reward for the Soviet Union^ and to firmly
establish the Soviet Navy as an instrument of foreign pol-
icy in the Middle East,
Although it was "a little risky" to deploy eight ships
(including a cruiser and two destroyers) to Port Said so
soon after the fighting~-the Israeli forces across the Sues
Canal were still flushed with victory and only a month had
passed since the "accidental" Israeli attack on the Ameri-
can electronic intelligence ship USS Liberty—Admiral Molo-
chov's bold July 10 declaration that the Soviet Navy stood
"ready to cooperate with Egyptian armed forces to repel any
aggression" had the desired effect. Whether or not the
Israelis had planned more attacks, none occurred, and some
of the credibility lost by the Soviet Union during the Six
39Day War was regained by the Soviet Navy^ through the exer-
cise of naval suasion which apparently deterred Israel as
it supported Egypt. According to a U. S. Defense Intelli-
gence Agency statement, the Soviet Navy's "show of force
in and near Alexandria and Port Said enhanced the Soviet





to Cable, "this seemingly trivial intervention on the part
of the Soviet Navy probably had more immediate impact than
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the more important deliveries of arms, because the Soviet
Union was seen by the Arabs as at last having displayed
some resolution." When tension flared up a few months
later following the October, 19&7» sinking about 13 miles
off Port Said of the Israeli Navy's destroyer Elath by
three Soviet-supplied "Styx" surface-to-surface missiles
fired from Soviet-built "Komar" -class guided missile patrol
boats of the Egyptian Navy, elements of the Soviet Med-
iterranean Squadron which had just left the Egyptian har-
bor returned to Port Said amid the cheers of crowds of
in
Egyptians. J Again, the presence of the Soviet Navy in
Port Said, backed as it was by the prestige and menace of
the Soviet military establishment in the area, appears
to have evoked precisely the suasion effect intended: the
Israelis did not attack Port Said in reprisal, Soviet
propagandists claimed, and the Egyptians seemed to believe s
that this Soviet naval action prevented a renewed Israeli
attack on Egypt, ^
These naval successes following the Six Day War con-
tributed to the Soviet Navy's acquisition of the desired
l±1
'Cable, loc. c_it.
Robert D. Colvin, "Aftermath of the Elath," U, S^
Naval Institute Proceed ings, Vol. 95, No. 10 (October 1969),
pp. 61^27











shore support facilities in Egypt which made that country
47
the pivotal Soviet outpost in the eastern Mediterraneans '
to its continued welcome in other Arab ports closed to the
warships of the USSR's Western rivals , and to the favorable
attention devoted to Soviet naval activities by the Arab
43press.
Within Egypt, large sections of the harbor at Alex-
andria were restricted to the exclusive use of the Soviet
4q
Navy 7 which imported a complex of support ships to serve
as a floating support facility adjacent to the shore where
their ships and submarines—including nuclear submarines-
could come and go at will. Development of deep-water
port facilities at Mersa Matruh en Egypt's western coast
was geared largely tc the Soviet Navy's needs^ ' and a
Soviet naval air station, the first of several, was estab-
lished there. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron also
gained facilities at Port Said and at Latakia, Syria t None
of these facilities were formal bases; Moscow avoided con-
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imperialistic connotations which might expose the USSR to
dangerous comparisons with V/estern powers which only recently
had used bases in Arab countries. J
Access to these facilities brought a sharp rise in the
scale, quality, and effectiveness of Soviet naval operations
in the eastern Mediterranean. Ship-days deployed increased
by roughly three times"^ as the Soviet Mediterranean Squad-
's^- i So
ron expanded to an average presence of 35 or 4-0 -^ comba-
tants and auxiliaries and reached peaks of about 60 vessels
during exercises in November, I968, and April, I9&9f and 63
to 65 ships in August, I969. As ^e Soviet Navy continued
to pursue its primary mission of strategic defense, there
was an increasing use of naval units for specifically poll-
57tical purposes. ' . This dramatic departure from past Soviet 4
naval practice not only gave Moscow's naval power much
greater visibility in waters which had previously been vir-
tually the exclusive preserve of the U. S. Sixth Fleet and
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credence to declarations that the Soviet Navy was thence-
forth prepared to operate "wherever required to protect the
state interests of the USSR"—a notion relatively new to
eg
the Kremlin's political repertoire. Although it is not
exactly clear precisely what is meant by the "state inter-
ests" of the USSR, contextual analysis indicates that the
term does not, properly speaking, cover strategic defense.
Thus, as Admiral Gorshkov has explained, Soviet naval forces
in the waters of the Middle East have the wartime mission
of defending the sea frontiers of the socialist bloc, while
"in peacetime our Navy reliably protects the state interests
of the Soviet Union on sea and ocean." His deputy, Fleet
Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov, has declared the Soviet Navy to
be "capable of executing strategic missions and reliably
protecting the state interests of the Soviet Union on the
seas and oceans."^ 7 Admiral Sir John Hamilton, former
Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Allied Forces Mediterranean,
recognized the political impact of the Soviet squadron whan
he observed "that the presence of this fleet is having a
profound effect on men's minds, j;n this respect, it is con-
tributing significantly to the rise of Soviet influence in
the Mediterranean area."
The deployment which proved Moscow's new grasp of the








policy was the Indian Ocean cruise of March to July, 1968,
made by a "Sverdlov" -class cruiser, a "Krupnyy" -class
guided missile frigate, and an oiler from the Pacific
Fleet, The stated purpose of the cruise was to establish
61
friendly contacts in the area. After calling at Machas
and Bombay in India and making their first visit ever to
Pakistan by putting in at Karachi, they entered the waters
of the Middle East to call at Basra and Umm Qasr in Iraq,
Bandar Abbas in Iran, and Aden in the new People's Republic
6?
of South Yemen as well as in nearby Mogadiscio, Somalia.
By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Navy was firmly
established as an instrument of Moscow's foreign policy in
the Middle East and was emerging as a potential agent for
Soviet policy in areas accessible through the strategic
waterways of the region. *
Active Naval Suasion Since the Six Dav War. The favorable
»! '* III! ' 1——m i I . 1 1 I II .... . I I M if ..A*— .. - 1 ->——
consequences of the Soviet naval actions in Egypt following
the Six Day War so enhanced the Kremlin's perception of the
64Soviet Navy as an instrument of foreign policy that,, dur-
ing the ensuing several years, it has been employed in the
61
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Middle East and in nearby Third World areas in ways which
continue to exceed the bounds of "good will" port calls and
simple "showing the flag" operations -* in both their mili-
tary and their political significance. Sufficient data
are available to permit brief treatment of seven instances
—four in the Middle East and three in Sub-Saharan Africa—
.
in which Moscow has exercised some form of naval suasion
intended to further its foreign policy in these areas of
the world,
South Yemen in I967 . In November, 1967, only five
months following its successes in Egypt, the Soviet Navy
acted ostentatiously to "support" the demand made by the
revolutionary leaders of the new People's Republic of South
Yemen for the withdrawal of British forces from Aden with
which London quickly complied. Within days, Soviet war-
ships had entered Aden's deepwater harbor and tied up at
the docks "in order to safeguard the South Yemeni Govern-
ment," Subsequently becoming the unofficial property of
the Soviet Navy, Aden was soon frequented by Soviet war-
ships making port calls throughout the Persian Gulf and
western Indian Ocean area, ' By the middle of 197^» there
were always two or three Soviet naval units in the port of
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which the Soviets have improved to service their increased
68Indian Ocean presence once the Suez Canal is reopened.
Ghana in I969
.
Moscow's next demonstration of its
readiness to apply limited naval force in pursuit of its
interests occurred outside the Middle East in I969 when
Ghana, which had impounded two Soviet fishing vessels the
previous October for allegedly entering its waters, refused
to release the trawlers in the face of strongly-worded
Soviet protests and the imposition of significant economic
sanctions. The release of those vessels in March, 1969»
coincided with the unprecedented deployment and obvious
presence of three Soviet Navy combatants off the Ghanian
69
coast in the Gulf of Guinea. 7 In this incident, the
Soviet Navy demonstrated its capability to protect the
interests of the USSR through the application of pressure:
the implicit threat perceived as a result of this exercise
of coercive naval suasion appears to have compelled Accra
to respond as Moscow intended v/ith the return of the trawl-
ers.
Libya in I969 . When, in early September, 1969* a coup
d'etat led by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi deposed King Idris of
Libya, ships of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, including
the new helicopter carrier Moskva , which had been conducting





maneuvers off the coast of Syria, and Egypt, v/ere inter-
posed between Western naval forces in the Mediterranean
Sea and the Libyan capital at Tripoli. Although it is
most unlikely that the British contemplated a naval inter-
vention or that the United States considered a repetition
of the Sixth Fleet's 1958 Lebanon landing to oppose this
coup , Tripoli radio announced that the presence of Soviet
71
warships had deterred Western intervention' and the new
Libyan government publicly expressed its thanks to the
Soviet Navy. In point of fact, both the United States
and Britain controlled air bases in Libya at the time and
73
would not necessarily have had to intervene by sea.
'
J
What mattered, however, v/ere not the facts but what was
believed. Although it is highly improbable that any
deterrence did, in fact, occur, Libyan perceptions of the
Soviet Navy's interposition on its behalf might have pro-
duced benefits there similar to those which Moscow had
realized two years earlier in Egypt. The United States'
subsequently evacuated V/heelus Air Force Base near Tripoli
was of great potential importance to Soviet naval aviation
70 . '
' "Soviet Maneuvers m the Mediterranean/' The New
York Times (August 26, I969), p. 12.
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for reconnaissance jot the Sixth Fleet. However, a com-
bination of Libyan nationalism, anti-communism, and fresh
memories of massive foreign presence—American and British
--on Libyan territory prevented Libya's military rulers
nc
from offering this base to the Soviet Union. J
Somalia in 1970 . Soviet gunboat diplomacy became a
fact of life in the Indian Ccean in 1970. As the result
of the military coup of October, 19&9* i-n Somalia, a
government was installed which became friendly with the
USSR and increasingly cocl toward the United States.
When, on April 27, 1970, Mogadiscio announced discovery of
a plot against this regime, two Soviet warships in that
port for a five-day official good will visit remained
there—apparently in a protective intervention status--
until the second week in May when the stability of the
"progressive" Siad regime seemed assured. Unconfirmed
reports indicate that Soviet Navy ships had been pre-
deployed to provide moral support for the c oup which had
brought Siad's regime to power the previous year.
Through its presence in Somalia, the Soviet Navy exer-
cised naval suasion in support of what might be considered
a client regime, which it may have helped to establish,
against a domestic threat and, in doing so, certainly
helped to ensure the access to Somalian ports such as
nc
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Berbera and Mogadiscio which it continues to enjoy. On
July 11, 197^» Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny, ac-
companied by First Deputy Defense Minister General Sergei
Sokolov, signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation
with the Mogadiscio regime to secure the Soviet Navy's
position at Berbera which, combined with Moscow's estab-
lished naval presence at Aden 200 miles across the Gulf of
Aden to the north, has strengthened Moscow's position
astride the Indian Ocean entrance to the Red Sea in anti-
77
cipation of the reopening of the Suez Canal,
Guinea in 1970 . In November, 1970, in the aftermath
of a Portugese-supported attack on Conakry, Moscow estab-
lished a regular patrol of naval combatants off the coast
78
'
of Guinea to deter or prevent further raids. ' The per-
sistence of this force suggests that a West African patrol
has been added to the other permanent deployments of the
79Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean
as a continuous exercise in naval suasion designed both to
deter raids and, at the same time, to enhance Moscow's
political influence with a non-client. At this writing,
the :Soviet Navy maintains a maritime reconnaissance squad-
ron which includes long-range "Bear" turboprop aircraft










because Moscow attaches long-term strategic importance to
that area as a critical sea route in and out of the Indian
Ocean for both Persian Gulf supertankers and U. S. Navy
. . 80
ships.
Sierra Leone in 1 9?1 Moscow exercised naval suasion
on behalf of another West African non-client when, in 1971,
a Soviet Navy "Kashin" -class guided missile destroyer,
apparently detached from the West African patrol, demon~
strated Soviet solidarity with the embattled regime of
Op
President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone " who had just
declared his country a republic, engineered his own elec-
tion to office, and publicly accused the United States of
complicity in a recent attempt to depose him. Apparently
pleased with Steven's turn toward "positive neutrality t ""
the Soviet Navy made its first "business visit" to Free-
town in late May, no doubt to lend support to Steven's
83government and to discourage further plots, J
Iraq i
-
Kuwaiti Border Dispute of 1973 One of Moscow's
most recent political applications of the Soviet Navy oc-
curred early in April, I973i when Admiral Gorshkov and a
John W, Finney, "Soviets Said to Use Guinea to
Observe U. S. Shipping," The New York Times (December 6,
1973) » PP* If 13 J Drew Middleton, "U. S. Global Military
Role 1 Are Forces Big Enough?" The New York Times (March
17, 197*0. P. 30.










contingent of Soviet naval ships visited Iraq at the time
O/i
of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border dispute. With the assistance
of the USSR, Iraq is developing a port and naval base at
Umm Qasr as an alternative to Basra, currently Iraq's
major naval base, from which, for several years, movement
of Iraqi ships to the Persian Gulf—accessible only via
the disputed Shatt-al-Arab River—has been constrained by
the Iranian Navy. Desiring to expand the defense peri-
meter around Umm Qasr, virtually adjacent to the approxi-
mate boundary between Kuwait and Iraq (ten years of efforts
to formally demarcate this border, an issue which had been
left unsettled when the Iraqis recognized the independence
of Kuwait in I963i had Proved unsuccessful), Iraqi military
forces attacked the nearby Kuwaiti border post of Al-Samitah
on the morning of March 20, 1973 • to climax increasing
tensions following a breakdown in negotiations. While the
moderate Middle Eastern regimes
—
particularly Bahrain,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran—supported Kuwait and medi-
ated, at Kuwait's request, to prevent an escalation of the
conflict, the two Western powers with long-established in-
terests in the area—the United States which has no lever-
age in Baghdad and Britain which did not feel that the
security of Kuwait was seriously threatened—adopted a
Anne M. Kelly, The_ Sovi et Naval Presence During the
Iraq -Kuwaiti Border Dispute; March-April 19?3~ Arlington,
Center for Naval Analyses, June 19?^f P. 5.
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"hands off" policy. The Soviets, however, gave immediate
support to their client by broadcasting, on March 21, the
official Iraqi version of the border incident which blamed
Kuwait for the attack. Then, on March 30, Tass announced
that Admiral Gorshkov would pay a "friendship" visit to
Iraq "during the first half of April at the invitation of
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense." No specific reason for
this visit was given; nor did Moscow announce that the
Soviet Navy would accompany him as it did. Gorshkov and
a contingent of Soviet naval ships visited Iraq from April
3 through April 11, 1973- 8 ^
Several hypotheses have been advanced concerning the
exact nature and objective of this instance of naval sua-
sion in Iraq. One of these, that it was only a routine
good will visit not intentionally related to the crisis—
and, therefore, an example of latent naval suasion--is
based on the assumption that Gorshkov' s visit was scheduled
prior to its outbreak—as it could have been—and that the
Soviets either could not cancel the visit, which was coin-
cident with the first anniversary of the Iraqi-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, without alienating
their Iraqi client or had not monitored the situation
closely and, oblivious to the political implications of
their actions, went ahead with the visit as scheduled.





(1) there are precedents for cancellations of Soviet naval
visits under such circumstances and Moscow had sufficient
time and some incentive to do soi (2) there is no precedent
for a naval representation at such treaty celebrations and
Gorshkov did not represent the USSR at the celebration;
(3) Moscow was concernedly watching events closely and not
oblivioa to the implications of the USSR's own behavior;
(4) the ships' visit was not announced as usual prior to
good v/ill visits; and (5) precedents do exist for the use
86
of "routine" naval visits to clients in time of crisis.
Two other explanations view the presence of the Soviet
Navy as one of active naval suasion in the coercive mode
intended either to deter third party intervention in the . -
dispute or as a compellent show of force designed to evoke
Kuwaiti acceptance of Iraq's demands for the areas surround-
ing Umm Qasr. As far as the deterrence hypothesis is con-
cerned, while third party intervention by Iran, Saudi
Arabia, or Western naval forces operating in the area was
a possibility, it was never a strong probability, and the
Soviets were in a position to make this assessment. More-
over, there is no precedent for a Soviet Navy deployment
against the hypothetical possibility of third party involve-
ment, Iran and the Western powers made no military or naval
moves immediately following the border attack that could





Soviet naval visit occurred after the height of the crisis
when the possibility for any third party intervention
appeared even less likely. Although the visit coincided
with the resumption of negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait,
the "compellent show of force" explanation appears less
than adequate because there is no evidence that the Soviets
attempted to put any diplomatic pressure on Kuwait. '
A more reasonable explanation of this instance of
active naval, suasion— in which Soviet behavior does not
indicate that compellence or deterrence was intended
while, at the same time, there is sufficient evidence that
more than a routine good will port call was intended--is
that it was one of "support for Iraq in this crisis" in
which "the generally negative world reaction to Iraq's
aggression provided the USSR with an opportunity to demon-
op
strate to Iraq the benefits of strong ties with Moscow,
"
During a visit of the Iraqi vice president to Moscow
following the border incident, Premier Kosygin pledged
continuing support for Iraq in "consolidating its national
independence" and, in so doing, lent credence to the inter-
pretation of the naval visit as tangible .support for border
adjustments which would help ensure Iraq's security as well
as maritime and petroleum operations against her less "pro-
gressive" and non-Soviet oriented neighbors (i.e., Iran,
8?Ibid.
, pp. 7-8, 12-16.
Ibid
. , pp. 16, 19.
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Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) in the Middle East. 89
The significance of these political actions of the
Soviet Navy—three of which occurred outside the waters of
the Middle East- but which have been included in this study
as part of a general trend as well as for their illustra-
tive value—resides in the fact that they were not just
isolated instances of the use of naval forces for political
purposes. Rather, they continued and reinforced a trend
initiated in I967 when the exercise of naval suasion con-
tributed to the acquisition of long-sought shore facilities
in Egypt for the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron which other
forms of diplomacy had been unable to deliver. Furthermore,
each of these actions demonstrated the increased awareness
of and higher value placed by Moscow on the Soviet Navy as
an instrument of foreign policy which t as similar oppor-
tunities presented themselves in and around the politically
unstable Middle East, possessed a unique potential to con-
tribute to the eventual emergence of a Middle Eastern com-
munity more amenable to the USSR's extra-regional and
intra-regional interests than might be expected to result
from the normal course of events.
Active Naval Suasion and the U. S. Navy. In addition to
such effects of active naval suasion evoked by the Soviet





naval presence in the Middle East has contributed in seme
measure to the American perception of reduced freedom of
naval action in the region. Although the primary con-
straint on the use of the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Med-
iterranean is probably the dearth of Arab states that
90
would welcome it, the presence of the Soviet Mediterr-
anean Squadron, which has been designed largely as a
91
counter to the United States naval presence, has elimi-
nated the certainty that American naval operations in the
92
area will not be opposed during crises in the Middle East.
Indeed, the use of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron to
constrain the West during such crises by neutralizing
American interventionary capabilities— i.e., the Sixth 4
Fleet--as potentially directed against their Arab clients'^
has been cited frequently by the Soviets as justification
for their presence m the Mediterranean. ' For example,
at a time of considerable tension in the Middle East during
July, 1970, Admiral Gorshkov observed that: *-*
Horelick, _op_. cit.
,
p. 14; Becker and Horelick,
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. , p. 61
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Ships of the Soviet Navy are systematically present
in the ocean, including the areas of the presence of
the shock navies of NATO. The presence of our ships
in these areas binds the hands of the imperialists,
deprives them of a possibility to interfere unhindered
into internal affairs of the people.
The impact which the forward deployment of the Soviet Med-
iterranean Squadron has had on Washington's ability to act
within the naval environment of the Middle East is probably
best viewed as the difference between what is possible
given an ensured monopoly of naval power, on the one hand,
and what may be done given the necessity of taking into
account the dangers of a confrontation with the Soviets,
on the other. Certainly, the deployments of inordinately
large contingents of Soviet naval combatants in the general
area of hostilities during the Six Day War of 196?, the
97Jordanian civil war . of 1970, and, most recently, the Yom
Kippur War of 1973 when approximately ninety Soviet naval
98
ships converged on the eastern Mediterranean, v/ere in-
tended to dissuade the unilateral exercise of American
naval power as the Sixth Fleet had exercised that power
during the Lebanese crisis in 1958.
This difference, for which the exercise of active
naval suasion by the Soviet Navy is partially responsible,
is best illustrated by a comparison of Washington's ability
96Sick, op_. cit . , pp. ^7-^8.
9?Blechman, op_. cit.
, pp. 22-23.
987 Drew Middleton, "Potential Reopening of the Suez
Canal Raises Questions of Military Strategy," The New Yotk
Times (January 25, 197*0 • p. 6.
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to act in the case of the Lebanon landing of 1958, which
could proceed without fear of Soviet opposition, with its
inability tc do so during the I969 confrontation between
the government of Lebanon and the Palestinian guerillas.""
If, at the time President Eisenhower was making the decision
for the Sixth Fleet to land Marines in Lebanon, he had
been informed that a Soviet cruiser, two destroyers, and
an unknown number of submarines were operating off the
Lebanese coast and that the Soviet ambassador to the United
Nations had announced that any outside interference in the
internal affairs of an Arab state would be considered pre-
judicial to the stability of the entire region, the decision
may not have been different, but it would have been taken
on entirely different grounds. While the actual decision
to intervene in 1958 was presumably based on the determina-
tion that it would promote stability and Western influence
in the area, a similar decision today— or at any time
following the extensive forward deployment of the Soviet
Navy in the waters of the Middle East—would have to be
based on a determination as to whether or not the stakes
in Lebanon v/ere sufficiently important to justify the risk
of a direct confrontation with the USSR.
Thus, during the confrontation between the government
of Lebanon and the Palestinian guerillas in October and
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November of 196$, the United States was constrained by the
presence of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron to limit the
role of the Sixth Fleet to that of a concerned observer.
V/hile officially expressing "great concern" that the inde-
101pendence and integrity of the country be maintained,
\7ashington disclaimed any intentions of intervention or
102
other interference in the events as they progressed.
Moscow, on the other hand, exploited the crisis, taking a
strong public stand against possible outside interference
in Lebanon and attacking the mild American statement of
concern as "reminiscent of the old colonial practice" of
103intervention. J Meanwhile, the Soviet ambassador to
Beirut was involved in negotiations designed to enhance
the desired image of the Soviet Union as the protector of
the Arabs against the West. After a long meeting with
Ambassador Azimov, Lebanese Premier Rashid Karami stated
that "the Soviet Ambassador emphasized to me that the
Soviet Government not only will not intervene here but will
104
also forbid others from intervening in our affairs."
101
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Although this demonstration of American inability to
influence events in the Middle East was certainly a conse-
quence of a complex of events which transcend the change
in naval relationships in the eastern Mediterranean pro-
duced by the forward deployment of the Soviet Navy, the
impotence of United States policy in this particular in-
stance was fundamentally a result of the perceived danger
of provoking a naval confrontation with the USSR over a
non-vital issue. > The presence of the Soviet Mediterr-
anean Squadron had been combined with other diplomatic
behavior in an exercise of active naval suasion which de-
terred American intervention.
THE SUCCESS OF THE SOVIET NAVY
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
By deploying its naval forces in the waters of the
region, the Soviet Union has introduced an important force
into the politics of the Middle East. That the Soviet Navy
has been employed successfully as an instrument of foreign
policy throughout the region is apparent from the instances
of naval suasion documented in this chapter.
Overstatement and Misstatement of Success. Given such
evidence, however, there are apparent tendencies to over-
state or to misstate the success of the Soviet Navy as an
-'Richard Halloran, "U. S. Aides Fear a. 'MajorI05j





instrument of Moscow's foreign policy in the Middle East
—
either to credit the Soviet Navy alone with such achieve-
ments as the acquisition of needed shore support facili-
ties or to dub it the "neutralizer of the Sixth Fleet,"
for example, or not to perceive its primary importance as
a symbol of the USSR's power and influence in the region
which has enabled other instruments of Soviet foreign
policy to operate under more favorable circumstances.
While the Kremlin's claims to being a Middle Eastern
power have been rendered much more credible and its influ-
ence and position in the region have been greatly enhanced
by the presence of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron and
other elements of the Soviet Navy deployed there, neither
the erosion of American influence in the Middle East nor
the political gains which Moscow has achieved throughout
the region may be ascribed exclusively or even primarily
to the Soviet naval presence. Other aspects of Moscow's
foreign policy appear to have been of paramount importance.
In the cases of Cairo and Damascus, for example, the notable
political gains which the Kremlin achieved during the late
1960s must be attributed primarily to the military, econ-
omic, and political support which Moscow extended to these
tv/o countries in their confrontation with Israel. Indeed,
Egypt's President Sadat has acknowledged that it was in
payment for the Soviet resupply effort after the Six Day
Smolansky in MccGwire, op_. cit.
, p. 3 i{ 0.
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War that Cairo granted the use of naval facilities at Alex-
107
andria, Port Said, and Mersa Matruh to the Soviet Navy.
Other pragmatic foreign policy initiatives emphasizing
maritime aid—the provision of naval vessels and develop-
1 nft
ment of ports which are not functions of the Soviet Navy
—extended to regimes ranging from "reactionary" monarchies
to "progressive" nationalists have secured access for the
Soviet Navy to many excellent ports throughout the Middle
East Hodeida on the Red Sea, Berbera and Aden on the Gulf
of Aden, and Basra and Umm Qasr at the head of the Persian
Gulf109 which have been vital to Soviet naval operations
in the Indian Ocean because of the closure of the Suez
Canal110 and will enhance its presence "east of Suez"
once the canal is reopened. The success of the Soviet
Navy, in short, is as an integral part of the Soviet for-
eign policy effort in the Middle East.
Perhaps most indicative of the Soviet Navy's success
as an instrument of foreign policy was a statement made by
an increasingly disenchanted President Sadat in December,
I967, which at once reflected his resentment of Moscow's
° 7Lav/rence W. Whetten, "The Military Consequences of
Mediterranean Super Power Parity," The New Middle East
No, 30 (November 19?1). P. !6.
108Patterson, 00. cit . , p. ^6.
109Klieman, op. cit., pp. 55-62; Wynfred Joshua, Spvie_t
Penetration into the Middle East, New York, National Strat-
egy Information Center, Inc., 197 1 . PP. 30-3*.
°Patterson, pja. cit. , p. 52.
Joshua 1 loo , cit .
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growing hold over Egypt and the effects of Soviet naval
suasion. While admitting that he was eager to send such
Soviet military units as the air defense missile units
home, Sadat expressed a sincere reluctance to evict the
Soviet Navy from its facilities in Egypt "because they
1 12
stood by us m our darkest days." When, in July, 1972,
Sadat announced his decision to reduce the Soviet military
presence in Egypt, his initial order specifically exempted
some of the naval facilities enjoyed by the Soviet Mediter-
113
ranean Squadron. Although the Soviet Navy retained
limited access to port facilities in Alexandria and Mersa
11^
Matruh, the loss of its naval air reconnaissance capa-
bilities struck a blow at its potential political effec-
tiveness in the Middle East by reducing its overall oper-
ational capability. -* Moscow's subsequent attempts to
strengthen its ties with Syria, where ships of the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron began to call frequently at the ports
of Latakia and Tartus and the Soviets began to construct a
1 1 ft
submarine base near Ras Shamra, and Iraq reflect efforts
112
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to reduce the effects of the setback in Egypt. '
The presence of the Soviet Navy in the eastern Medi-
terranean has certainly limited the ability of the Sixth
11 R
Fleet to intervene unilaterally in local crises, but
any conclusion to the effect that this capability has been
completely eroded would also be an overstatement and a
misstatement of the success of Soviet naval suasion. The
crisis of the Jordanian civil war in 1970 demonstrated
that, although the Soviet naval presence in the Middle East
has restricted the range of options open to United States
policy makers as evidenced in the case of Lebanon in 1969
described above, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has not
li o
neutralized the Sixth Fleet in all circumstances. 7 Al-
* - *
though the stakes which could justify American action have
been raised by an unknown degree as a result of the Soviet
naval presence, where these stakes are deemed to be high
121
enough, the United States is still capable of intervention.'
When the Syrians moved to intervene with tank forces in
Jordan's battle with the Palestinian guerillas, the United
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States employed the Sixth Fleet—augmented into an over-
whelming force by the emergency deployment of a third
attack aircraft carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy—to sup-
port King Hussein and to deter Syrian involvement (see
Chapter IV, pp. 119-121). Although shadowed by the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron throughout this operation, the




ated freely signal American intentions and deter
Syrian action.
The Media and Success. Much of the overstatement which
has contributed to Moscow's successful political exploita-
tion of the Soviet Navy in the Middle East may be attrib-
uted to perceptions generated around the world not only by
Soviet propaganda statements but by the sudden and vocifer-
ous awareness of the Western media of the fact that the
Soviet Union has a navy which goes to sea.
Unlike the American media, which feature reportage
and official statements which constantly magnify Soviet
naval pov/er while emphasizing the inadequacy of American
naval forces and capabilities and reflect the present Amer-
ican mood of retrenchment and self-denigration, the Soviet
media always stress the power of the Soviet Union and the
122
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.strength of its .forces. According to Lut-twak: J
The endless official U. S. statements (from CNO on
down) which describe American ships as "old," "obso-
lete," "inadequate," et cetera are not duplicated on
the Russian side. The Russians instead denigrate
American power and especially those forces which
would be most impressive to third party observers
(i.e., the carriers—though this is no longer so now
that the Russians are building their own carriers)
.
The following statement from the Soviet press is not only
representative of the positive approach taken by the Soviet
media but also reflects its apparent success in evoking
perceptions favorable to the political application of
naval force
:
The situation is different now in the Mediter-
ranean, where the Soviet ships are a mighty factor in
peace and the security of peoples. "The presence of
the Soviet Fleet," the Algerian newspaper Actualite
states, "objectively contributes to the establishment 4
of a balance of forces in the face of the notorious
U. S. Sixth Fleet, which represents a constant threat."
The very presence of our ships restrains the
imperialist aggressors and their confederates.
Alarmist, and often ill-informed, Western comment has
brought the Soviet Union political benefits which the Soviet
Navy could never have achieved on its own. The insistence
of some American commentators that the Soviet naval pre-
sence in the Mediterranean perforce neutralizes the Sixth
1 Oh,
Luttwak in Naval War C ollege Review (November-
December 1973) » oy< c'ixT." p. 39.
Ibid.
Captain V. Pushton, Krasnaya Zvezda (February 15,
I969) , translated in The Current D i ge s
t
of the Soviet





Fleet and paralyzes Western naval initiatives in the region
delivered a substantial—and undeserved—propaganda success
to Moscow. Although alarmism may have been considered
necessary to arouse a sense of concern in NATO or to extract
funds from a reluctant U, S. Congress, it also provided
useful instruction to the Kremlin on how to distress the
West through a relatively small diversion of resources. '
Perhaps more important, such alarmist reactions in the
Western media to the Soviet naval build-up in the Middle
East may have enhanced the prestige and strength of both
the perceptions and the positions of those in the Soviet
decision-making hierarchy who favor the increased offensive
128political use of naval power to the real detriment of
the Western position. As Michael MccGwire so aptly stated
^ 129tne ca.se
:
In the late 1950s the Soviet Union derived sub-
stantial political benefits from the publicising by
Western commentators of the mythical Bomber and .Mis-
sile Gaps, and the ease with which the West can still
be induced to credit their opponents with an exagger-
ated military capability must be a source of continu-
ing gratification to Soviet leaders. It conceals
their technological inadequacies from critical world
opinion, and allows them to make retrospective claims
to have influenced the outcome of events in situations
where they have sat by helpless, as selfishly worried
spectators. It is significant that well into 1968,
the Russians remained understandably silent about
their negative contribution to the outcome of the June
] 27Michael MccGwire, "The Level of Analysis—Its
Effect on Assessments," in MccGwire, op_. pit . . pp. 2~3,
Griffiths, op_. git , , p. 12.
3 29
'MccGwire, pp . c i t . , p. 3«
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war, concentrating their propaganda on linking the
presence of the U. S. Sixth Fleet with the Israeli
attack; but by 19^9* the Soviets were emboldened to
play back the West's more alarmist assessments, and
now claim that it was the Russian naval presence
which saved the Arabs from imperialist intervention
in I967.
A Changing Mission for the Soviet Navy? Sufficient evi-
dence exists to suggest that, at least in the eastern Med-
iterranean, the primary mission of the Soviet Navy in the
Middle East may indeed be changing from that of strategic
defense which originally powered its forward deployment
into the region to one of active exercise of naval suasion
to implement Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East.
The growth of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron in the
past few years has coincided with the decreasing importance
to the United States of the Mediterranean as a nuclear
strike launching area. When, in the late 1950s, Soviet
Navy surface warships were only occasional visitors, the
aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet sustained the U, S.
Navy's entire contribution to the American strategic deter-
rent and the eastern Mediterranean provided their most ad-
vantageous launch points. Today, however, ballistic missile
submarines rather than carrier-based strike aircraft pro-
vide most of the sea-based nuclear strike potential of the
United States. Because only a small percentage of the stra-
tegic strike capability is retained by the Sixth Fleet's
carriers, the destruction of all American surface forces in
the Mediterranean v/ouid only slightly reduce the American

102
capacity to devastate the territory of the Soviet Union.
in the event of a general war. As far as the Soviet Navy's
ability to defend the USSR against the U. S. Navy's ballis-
tic missile submarine is concerned, Rear Admiral Levering
Smith, who ran the Polaris program, observed in 1971 that
the Soviets had not detected a single submarine on patrol
131in more than ten years of operation. J Even if an effec-
tive anti-submarine warfare capability dependent upon air-
craft and surface ships eventually is developed by the
Soviet Navy, such a breakthrough will be swiftly countered
as the longer range Poseidon system makes the Mediterranean
an obsolete patrol area for American submarines just as
132
Moscow has begun to counter the threat there. *
If, indeed, the primary mission of the Soviet Mediter-
ranean Squadron remains one of strategic defense, the past
few years seem to have witnessed the Soviet Union in hot
pursuit of a shrinking prize with increasingly larger
forces. As a primary mission of strategic defense becomes
either impossible as a result of the change in the threat
from surface to subsurface systems or increasingly irrele-
vant should technological advances cause removal of the
threat, it may become increasingly worthwhile to pursue
other goals with the increasing proportion of surface
1 30Cable, op . pit . , pp. I38-I39.
1 31J George C. Wilson in The Washington Post (May 31,
197'0» no page number.





warships available for peacetime foreign policy missions. -^
Whether or not and when this trend toward change in the
primary mission of the Soviet Navy in the waters of the
Middle East is extended to influence the mission structure
of Soviet naval forces in the Arabian Sea and the wider
Indian Ocean in response to future generations of U. S.




. , pp. 139-1^1.

CHAPTER IV
THE SOVIET NAVY: A CHALLENGE TO
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
As those who shape American foreign policy search for
approaches applicable to the maiiy problems of the Middle
East in the 1970s, the persistence of disputes within the
region—between Israel and the Arab states, among the
Arabs themselves, between Turks and Greeks over Cyprus,
between Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf~-
will increase the probability of continued and more in- "
tense superpower involvement in the region—either to ex-
ploit the disputes for their own purposes or to resolve
certain conflicts which threaten their interests —and
make appropriate responses to Moscow's activities there
of continuing concern to the United States.
An appropriate approach to the political application
of naval force in support of American foreign policy re-
sponses to the Soviet naval challenge in the Middle East
would be, essentially, one which eschewed the simplistic
shibboleth of maintaining the so-called naval "balance of
power" to provide a naval force structure which may be




utilized as required to evoke suasion effects essential to
the successful pursuit of American policy within the com-
plex political environment of the region. While perceptions
of such a "balance" may be important as a commonly held
concept among at least some of those to be influenced, the
construct itself represents an unrealistic attempt to escape
2the complexity of foreign policy.
Extreme and simplistic approaches to the complexities
of the Middle East are inappropriate. Because a total
United States disengagement from the Middle East and its
problems would, in effect, deliver the region to the USSR
—
placing Israel and the friendly Arab states as well as the
waters of the region under Soviet hegemony to benefit Mos-
*
cow*s efforts to become a global power at the cost of Amer-
ican interests and strategic mobility --such a response,
which has not gone without advocates in the post-Vietnam
era of retrenchment, would not be an appropriate one.
Likewise, while policy responses based entirely upon non-
military diplomatic, economic, and moral resources would
be preferable to the application of military force to the
2Robert J. Pranger, American Pol icy for Peace in the
Middle East 1969-1971 : Problems of Principle , Maneuver,
and Tim e , Washington, D. C,, American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1971, PP. 19-20.
^Hurewitz, op_. pit .
, p. 47.
hHenry Brandon, The Re treat of American Power, New
York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 19~?2, p. 127:" "Senator
[Mike] Mansfield [is one who] believes . . . that the




solution of international political problems, it would be
naive to expect that such an approach could succeed in a
world of "power politics" in which Soviet-American detente
c.
remains an ambiguous intangible v and in which "it is not
even certain that national capacities for inflicting vio-
lence internationally have ceased to be the principal com-
ponent of international power." Hopefully, at some time
in the not-too-distant future, non-military approaches
will represent realistic alternatives in international
politics. In the meantime, however, in a time when diplo-
macy must be bulwarked by military strength if it is to
be credible, the presence of the Soviet Navy in the waters
of the Middle East is a reality with which the United States
must deal in kind.
As long as the threat of escalation to nuclear war
looms over any potential United States-Soviet military
engagement, the probability of a shooting war between the
superpowers remains small. Consequently, the driving force
behind the superpower naval rivalry in the Middle East is
not the fear that either side will achieve a military
^Drew Middle ton, "Soviet Military Might Grows Under
Detente," The Denver Post (July 21, 197^) » p. 24; Dana
Adams Schmidt, "Detente—Does It Mean Same to Both Sides?"
The Christian Science Monitor (August 1, 1 97^) , p. 4.
Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the
Nuclear Age, Princeton, N. J. , Princeton University Press,
1966, p. 135.
'U. S. Congress, House, lh_ S^ Int erests in and Pol icy
Toward the Persian Gulf, p. 2.
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advantage sufficient to initiate large-scale conflict but
the fear of the political consequences of any perceived
o
significant change in their relative naval power. For
the United States, which has long enjoyed a position of
overwhelming naval superiority in the region, the fear is
o
that some Middle Eastern nations,
perceiving the naval (and more general military)
balance to be turning toward the Soviet Union, would
be reluctant to associate themselves with the United
States, would make concessions to the Soviet Union
inimical to U. S. interests, and would eventually be
drawn closer to the Soviet orbit. Beyond this, there
is concern that growing Soviet naval capabilities may
increase Soviet willingness to take risks in bringing
pressure to bear on other countries and may diminish
U. S. willingness to assume comparable risks.
Thus, in terms of the political application of naval force
in the Middle East, the requirement for effectively exer-
cising naval suasion exists on two levels: the superpowers
vis-a-vis the Middle Eastern countries and the superpowers
vis-a-vis each other.
There is sufficient evidence today—such as the in-
creasing strength of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
and Moscow's continuing efforts to obtain port facilities
11in India in anticipation of the expansion of its naval
Blechman, op. cit
. , p. 38.
9Ibid.
, p. 39.
Middleton in The New York Times (January 25, 197 ;0»
loc. cit,
11Bernard Weinraub, "India and Soviet Will Expand Ties,"
I'ha New York Times (November 29, 1 973) . P. 9.
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squadron in the Indian Ocean following the reopening of
12
the Suez Canal in 1975 — of increasing emphasis on the
peacetime and crisis use of the Soviet Navy for political
purposes in the Middle East to make readily apparent the
need for ensuring that the U. S. Navy's forces in the
region are fully capable of accomplishing their missions
as instruments of American foreign policy there—both the
projection of United States power and influence and the
countering of Moscow's efforts to project its own influ-
ence. J
The challenge which the Soviet Navy presents to Amer-
ican foreign policy in the Middle East, then, is essen-
tially that of developing, deploying, and directing in the
,
waters of the region a U. S. Navy force structure of suf-
ficient visibility and viability to be perceived as cred-
ible enough by both Moscow and the Middle Eastern capitals
to evoke the suasion and countersuasion effects required
to promote the interests and objectives of the United States
in the region. Application of the concept of the political
application of naval force facilitates identification of
both appropriate and inappropriate policy responses to the
Soviet Navy's challenge in both the eastern Mediterranean
Sea and the area "east of Suez."
1°
"'Drew Middieton, "Suez Reopening, Weighed by Cairo,
Seen Bolstering Soviet Position," The New York Times
(November 11, 1973), p. 26.
1'3




CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
A POLICY OF SURROGATION?
As one possible response to the Soviet challenge in
the Middle East the United States, following a major re-
examination of American defense commitments around the
world at the impetus of the overwhelming passage by the
Senate in 19&9 of the "national commitment" resolution
which informed the President that vague commitments lead-
ing to wars such as the one in Vietnam would meet with
widespread congressional opposition, began moving toward
a so-called "policy of surrogation" in the early 1970s
when it appeared that the mood of the American people
would allow no other. Under this policy, the aim "is
not to maximize {^United States] military capabilities
within the Middle East, but to augment them by the utili-
zation of local military forces ... of proven capability,"
Toward this end, the United States considered the possibil-
ity of enlisting Turkey and Israel--the only Middle Eastern
nations then possessing military forces of demonstrated
16
effectiveness —as surrogates, continued assistance to
the Iranian Navy to enable the Shah to establish hegemony
over the Persian Gulf as London withdrew its operational
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to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Such a policy, however, would seem an inappropriate
one for the United States on at least two counts. First,
in order to be effective, it would require dependable sur-
rogates whose interests parallel those of the United States,
Because "Turkey ... is pursuing a political future that
must give first priority to alleviating certain internal
political stresses" which renders "the Turkish military
machine of doubtful use even in areas compatible with Amer-
19ican interests," 7 only Israel could be considered a pos-
sible surrogate in. the eastern Mediterranean. However,
because Israel "has foreign policy aims that cannot auto-
matically be equated with [those of the United States]"
and "the Israeli navy is being developed to perform limited
functions as required by Israeli military considerations,"
the policy of surrogation would severely limit the United
States' "range of policy alternatives ... to those com-
20patible with [Israeli] interests" and would mean "little
21
more than letting the State of Israel defend herself.
"
While domination of the Persian Gulf by a surrogate Iranian
Navy would probably prove compatible with American inter-
ests there, a change of regimes in Tehran v/hich brought
1 P
"Policeman of the Persian Gulf," Time (August 6,
1973), P. 30.










radical Iranian nationalists to power "could render the
Iranian naval force in the Gulf a threat rather than a
22
surrogate for American military might,"
Second, and perhaps more important, is the fact that,
even if dependable surrogates with which a substantial
confluence of interests did exist v/ere available in the
Middle East, pursuit of such a policy to the extent that
a surrogate naval presence were to be installed as a sub-
stitute for a substantial American naval presence could
preclude the effective political application of naval
force insofar as American interests in the area were con-
cerned. While the surrogate navy would possibly be able
to perform the same conventional military function, it
could not, because it would not represent the national
power of the United States, perform the political function
of evoking the suasion effects—both latent and active--
that a credible American presence symbolic of American
power could evoke. Moreover, the absence of a United
States naval presence in favor of a surrogate naval pre-
sence could be perceived by both Kremlin and Middle Eastern
leaders as a signal of declining American interest and
resolve in the area which could result in misunderstandings
of potentially disastrous consequences.
While friendly Middle Eastern navies' may promote Amer-






American policy there primarily because surrogate forces
are not representative of American concern and power and,
therefore, are unable to evoke the suasion effects which
could be evoked by the credible presence of the U. 3. Navy—
a presence clearly representative of United States interests.
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
The forward deployment of the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron in waters once dominated by the U. S. Sixth Fleet
has been documented above. At this writing, many of the
newest and most advanced combatants of the Soviet Navy
23
number among the approximately 55 ships J which ply the
Mediterranean in pursuit of the Kremlin's avowed policy of
undermining and eventually eliminating American Influence
in the Middle East: an article in Izvestia in late I968
stated that "the Mediterranean must become a sea of peace"
and that "this great goal
. . . can be achieved only
through , . . the liquidation of , . . the U. S. political
2k
and military system in the Mediterranean. " Soon, the
new "KieV'-class aircraft carrier—Moscow's first "full-
fledged" carrier—is expected to venture out of the Black
2 *5Sea and into the Mediterranean J to join the political
23^
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News (August 15, 1974), p. 6,
2k ,Smolansky m MccGwire, op_, crt
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p. 336.
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battle for men's minds which is the essence of the super-
power naval rivalry in the Middle East. Because, accord-
ing to Western intelligence services, Soviet construction
of surface ships and submarines will continue at its pre-
sent pace, increased deployment in the Indian Ocean fol~
lowing the reopening of the Suez Canal--a challenge ad-
dressed below—is not expected to result in a reduction
26
of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. "' This is a chal-
lenge, not to any chauvenistic ideal of American military
27
supremacy but to the flexibility and effectiveness of
American foreign policy in the Middle East which requires
an appropriate naval response.
American policy makers must determine what that re-
sponse must be. To date, they appear to have been react-
ing to the Soviet Navy's challenge with caution. Although
the inclination of many American admirals was to enlarge
and diversify the Sixth Fleet, the political decision was
to maintain the status quo and the United States naval
presence in the Mediterranean Sea has been neither perma-
nently expanded nor contracted since June, 1$>67, when it
first became obvious that Moscow could maintain a credible
naval force there. Congress, reflecting the new attitude
of the American public concerning foreign military
p f
Middleton in The Nov- York Times (January 25, IP?^-),
loc. cit .
27
'"Back to the Gunboats," The Chris tian Science Moni-
tor (May 1
,
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commitments—an attitude which grew out of frustration at
the United States' inability to win either a political or
military victory in Vietnam and fear that other commit-
ments could lead to "new Vietnams"—has been reluctant tc
permit the Navy to accept new obligations. Some sena-
tors—and even the U. S. Navy, although for somewhat dif-
ferent reasons explained below—have considered the desir-
ability of withdrav/ing one of the Sixth Fleet's two carrier
29task forces. Often, it would appear, in what James
Reston has termed "disenchantment and even bitterness
about the cost and complexity of world affairs" and "wea-
30
riness and resentment at the price of American leadership,"^
some representatives of the American conscience appear to
have lost sight of the fact that, for American diplomacy
to be credible, the Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern
states must perceive that the United States' resolve is
fixed and that, although it would prefer non-military dip-
lomatic settlements of disputes, it is prepared to apply
31force when necessary.
The Sixth Fleet and the Six Day V/ar. The importance of the
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to the Soviet Navy's accelerated contestation of its dom-
inance in the eastern Mediterranean was perhaps best illus-
trated by its application during the events leading up to
the Six Day War as well as during the v/ar itself.
When the crisis broke in the middle of May, 1967, most
of the Sixth Fleet was in the western Mediterranean. Cor-
rectly anticipating that American policy would be to stand
aloof from military involvement, if possible, and to main-
tain a low military profile which would allow the greatest
possible latitude for diplomatic maneuver while remaining
available if needed, the naval command moved its forces
eastward in a way which clearly signalled Washington's in-
tentions. First, by moving ships already at sea eastward,
the United States demonstrated its concern but, by not in-
terrupting any scheduled visit in any Mediterranean port
to deploy ships ahead of schedule, also provided a clear
signal that it was not rushing headlong into the affair.
Reported immediately by newspapers throughout Europe, this
signal was clearly understood by all concerned. Second,
to reinforce Washington's posture of no military involve-
ment, the Sixth Fleet's amphibious force of almost 2,000
Marines left Naples on schedule in the third week of May
only to put in immediately at Malta where all concerned
could see them—a thousand miles away from the southeastern
corner of the Mediterranean. Third, by not steaming all
the way to the coasts of Egypt or Israel, but by operating
well over 300 miles from Suez and 200 miles from Egypt's
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western desert (i.e., roughly west of a line running from
Libya's Jebel Akhdar to the eastern end of Crete) in close
proximity to Soviet ships, the United States further in-
dicated its attitude. Thus, according to J. C. Wylie,
the Sixth Fleet's move to readiness during the Arab-Israeli
mobilization had three careful diplomatic signals built
into it: no premature departures from scheduled port
visits j the deliberate and visible retention of the amphib-
ious forces in the central Mediterranean; and the purpose-
ful positioning of American forces well clear of the pro-
spective scene of action. In addition, by not placing the
aircraft carrier USS Intrepid , which was transiting the
Mediterranean enroute to the. Gulf of Tonkin, under the
operational control of the Sixth Fleet as was customary,
but retaining it as a separate unit directly under the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Navy, Europe, in London who re-
quested Intrepid'
s
transit through the Suez Canal, the
Navy ostentatiously avoided the impression that the Sixth
. . 32Fleet was being reinforced in response to the crisis.
Once the war began and American and Soviet naval
forces had moved closer to the combat zone, the exercise
of naval suasion by the Sixth Fleet deterred Moscow from
intervening on behalf of its Arab clients. When, at one
point, the Kremlin apparently decided to threaten Israel
J J, C, Wylie, "The Sixth Fleet and American Diplo-
macy," in Hurewitz, ed. , Soviet-American Rivalry in the
Middle East, pp. 58-60,

117
with Soviet intervention, V/ashington was able to persuade
Moscow, by merely shifting the cruising range of the Sixth
Fleet from 100 miles off the Syrian coast to 50 miles,
that any such move would result in a confrontation with
the United States. 33 According to Pfaff: 3
, The orders given to move the fleet closer to the
Syrian coast in response to the Russian threat were
immediately relayed to Moscow by Russian submarines
monitoring the Sixth Fleet. This was exactly what
was intended to happen. The Soviet Union got the
message.
Thus the Sixth Fleet, a formidable combat force, functioned
during the Six Day War as a sensitive and responsive tool
of American foreign policy to evoke naval suasion effects
on behalf of United States interests— in this case f the
continued existence and well-being of the State of Israel--
in the Middle East.
The Sixth Fleet Since the Six Day War. Were it not chal-
lenged by the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, the Sixth
Fleet would remain the dominant force in the eastern Med-
iterranean v/hich it was for almost a quarter century fol-
lowing World War II. In recent years, however, increases
in the Soviet Navy's presence in the Mediterranean Sea
have overtaken the Sixth Fleet numerically and, while it
may remain the most powerful force in the area, its posi-






3Sfree from possible challenge. ^ Nevertheless, although
its relative power has been diminished by the deployment
of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron as well as by the
development of indigenous Middle Eastern air power which
has relegated its carrier air wings to the status of a
"small" air force by local standards (even though know-
ledgeable observers would not presume to equate locally-
deployed aircraft with their U. S. Navy counterparts on a
one-for-one basis) , the Sixth Fleet remains a viable and
valuable instrument of American foreign policy in the Mid-
dle East. While the Sixth Fleet's political effectiveness
has been derogated insofar as it represents "local" Amer-
ican military power which may be brought to bear in order
to affect the outcome of a confrontation, it retains the
symbolic power—subject, of course, to others' perceptions
of domestic American attitudes toward foreign commitments
which affect the magnitude of that power—which is the
^6 37
essence of that effectiveness. ^ In other words;^'
. . , where the commitment of the Fleet implies the
commitment of American power in all its dimensions,
including diplomatic "triangulation" on the Soviet
Union (in order to induce the Russians to control
their clients) , the actual relative capabilities of
the Fleet per se do not determine its overall polit-
ical effectiveness. ... it is the overall politi-
cal context that [determines] the effectiveness of
the Fleet.
-^Dadant, op_. cit
. , pp. 30-3 1-'
>0Luttv/ak, op_. cit .





The continuing efficacy of and requirement for the
Sixth Fleet as an instrument of American foreign policy
in the Kiddle East was demonstrated, both during the 1970
Jordanian civil war, which President Nixon later termed
the "gravest threat to world peace since this Administra-
tion came to office,"-^ and during the Yom Kippur War of
1973.
Precipitated by the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine's hijackings of three Western airliners to
the Jordanian desert in early September, heavy fighting
between the fedayeen and the Jordanian army which broke
out on September 16 threatened to topple King Hussein and
39his government. As the fighting continued over the next
few days, President' Nixon, fearing either the establish-
ment of a regime closely linked with Moscow or a full-
scale Arab-Israeli war if Hussein were overthrown, dis-
cretely informed the world through a Chicago newspaper
that he would be "inclined to intervene" on Jordan's behalf
should Syria or Iraq join the fighting on the side of the
Palestinians, After an estimated 200 Syrian tanks did
1Q





Benjamin Wells, "U. S. --Israeli Military Action on
Jordan Was Envisioned," The Now York Times (October 8,
1970), p. 1.
41Quandt, op . cit .
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p. 4-8,
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indeed enter Jordan on September 19 and 20, J Hussein's
appeal for outside help to turn back the invasion spurred
the United States and Israel to plan for coordinated mili-
tary action. According to this plan, Israel would attack
the Syrian tank forces which had invaded Jordan if it
appeared that Hussein's forces were incapable of stopping
them; meanwhile, the Sixth Fleet would secure Israel's
44
rear and flanks from Soviet or Egyptian attack. However,
Hussein's commitment of his own air force to do the job
envisaged for the Israelis made execution of the plan un-
necessary. J Harassed by Jordanian jets and armor, the
46Syrian tanks retreated into Syria. As the Syrian govern-
ment withheld its own air force and the Iraqis stood aside
from the fray, the necessity for outside help to Hussein
vanished. Within several days, under pressure from Presi-
47dent Nasser, the war came to an end,
Although the Sixth Fleet was not actually called upon
to protect Israel as planned, its presence and operations
in the eastern Mediterranean were essential to the combin-
ation of public and private diplomacy employed by Washing-
ton to bring the crisis to an end with American interests
4l ,




Wells, loc . cit .
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intact. Its obvious presence and much publicized reinforce.
ment—at once the symbol and substance of American commit-
ment—supported Washington's private warnings to Moscow to
h o
"lean on" the Syrians and, presumably, the Iraqis, with
the sobering effects noted above. In the language of sua-
sion, it was an instance of active naval suasion, both
coercive and supportive. In the coercive mode, negative
deterrent suasion was evoked as a result of Washington's
use of the Sixth Fleet to prevent a Soviet or other anti-
Jordanian intervention and positive compellent suasion was
reflected in the fleet-supported demand that Syria with-
draw its armor. While the supportive element of this in-
stance of active naval suasion appears to have been of
secondary importance in light of the fact that Hussein was
fully resolved to resist the Syrian attack, "the insurance-
provided by the 'projection' capabilities of the Sixth
Fleet must have intruded on Jordanian calculations by re-
ducing any incentive to a political settlement [of the
conflict] and a fresh compromise with the Palestinian
military organizations."
°
While it is apparent that the conclusion drawn in
some quarters from this instance that military consider-
ations are more important than diplomatic oriGs^°-~or, in
^8
Wells, op_.
_c.i t . , p. 12.
Luttwak, 0£. cit
. , p. ?.
SOQuandt. op. cit., p. kQ.

122
the words of Horatio Nelson, that "warships are still the
best negotiators in the world" --is unwarranted , it is
equally apparent that credible naval forces capable of
evoking the desired suasion effects remain an important
adjunct to American foreign policy in the Middle East.
More recent experience has reinforced this conclusion.
Although outnumbered by a Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
augmented from a normal 60 to approximately 90 ships,
the Sixth Fleet appears to have effectively exercised
naval suasion as recently as the Yom Kippur War of 1973-
For example, it is doubtful" indeed that the Israeli Navy,
which played an important combat role against both Syria
and Egypt, could have sunk 43 Arab vessels in and, once
gaining local superiority, attacked Syrian and Egyptian
port and naval facilities-^ from waters dominated by the
Soviet Navy. It is reasonable to conclude that the pre-
sence of the Sixth Fleet deterred Soviet naval intervention
against the Israeli Navy on behalf of their Arab clients
and thereby supported Israel.
Since the Yom Kippur War, the active presence of the
U. S. Navy in the eastern Mediterranean has made a signif-
icant contribution to the cause of American-Egyptian
* Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "Navy Adding to Muscle in
Indian Ocean," Navy Times (February 20, 197*0* P. 5 3.
12^
'Middle tori, 3 oc . cj._t,
^Lawrence Whetten and Michael Johnson, "Military
Lessons of the Yom Kippur War," The World Today , Vol. 30,
No. 3 (March 197*0 1 P. W.
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rapproachment. At the invitation of President Sadat, -*
the United States agreed early in 197*+ to help clear the
Suez Canal and make it available again to international
shipping. -* By early June, the U, S. Navy's Mine Warfare
Force had completed its minesweeping operations in the
canal weeks ahead of schedule, paving the way for the
remainder of the year-long U. S. Navy-assisted project
which Egypt is confident will play a central role in its
57future prosperity. Two months later--and only two months
after an American official was quoted as saying that "the
time was not ripe" for an appearance of the Sixth Fleet
(JO
commander on Egyptian soil? --the light guided missile
cruiser USS Little Rock with the Commander, U. S. Sixth
Fleet, embarked, entered Alexandria harbor for a four-day
port call to the greetings of small boats and shouted
welcomes of Egyptian seamen. It was the first time since
I96?. that a Sixth Fleet flagship had visited an Egyptian
port. 59
5UJ John K. Cooley, "U. S. Helps Egypt Clear Sues Canal,"
The Christian Science Monitor (June 27, 197*0, p. Fl.
""U, S. Agrees to Help Egypt Clear Suez Canal of Mines,"
The Christian Science Monitor (March 19, 197*0 » P. 6.
56J
"Suez Sweep Finished Early," Navy Time s (June 19,
197*0, P. 33,
Cooley, loc. pit .
58Navy Times , loc. cit.
-
7
"Fleet Flagship Makes Stopover m Alexandria," Navy
Times (August 28, 197*+). P. 26.
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The purpose of the Sixth Fleet, a credible naval force
capable of carrying out a wide variety of operations, has
been shown to be essentially a political, one of exercising
naval suasion. While its presence has not stopped the
spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East, " the Sixth
Fleet has prevented Moscow from freely exerting military
pressure on political situations in the region by virtue
of the fact that the Kremlin alone would otherwise possess
the visible military force capable of influencing deci-
62
sions. While the Soviet naval presence in the eastern
Mediterranean certainly has provided a measure of support
and security for its Arab clients, it also, paradoxically,
appears to have reinforced the general wariness of most of
the Arab states of too close an association with Moscow
and most Arab leaders, their public statements to the con-
trary notwithstanding, probably welcome the presence of the
Sixth Fleet as an offset to the political impact of the
/To
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, ^ If there had been no
Sixth Fleet or the initiative to commit it when necessary
during the past quarter century, "the Mediterranean, in-
stead of changing slowly from a Western lake to an inter-
national sea, might long ago have become a Soviet sea."






U, S. CongresSi House, S oviet Involvement in, the
Middle East and the Western Response, p. 159.
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Howe, op. cit. i p. 2 5.

125
The Sixth Fleet and the American Response. Retention in the
Mediterranean Sea of a Sixth Fleet sufficiently configured
and properly deployed to symbolize United States power and
interest in the Middle East, therefore, appears essential
to American foreign policy in the region. The purpose of
this force is not now and will not be to assure victory in
the event of war--the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would
act as a strategic defense suicide force in the event of a
general war which would bypass the Middle East anyway but
to prevent adventurous Soviet moves should the Kremlin come
to perceive its own naval strength in the region sufficient
to cause the United States to back down in a crisis. $
This does not necessarily mean that the Sixth Fleet •
must be expanded or even be maintained at all times in its
current numerical relationship to the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron as long as it is maintained as a modern, militarily
strong, and credible force structured to possess those
qualities of visibility and viability which will optimize
its political impact on all concerned. Indeed, Secretary
of the Navy John H. Chaffee argued before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in 1971 for a "flexible" force structure
in the Mediterranean which would permit a reduction of the
"two carrier" commitment to the Sixth Fleet. 66 In terms
^U, S, Congress, House,
_op_. pit . , p. 141,
* P. A. JJur, "The U. S, Sixth Fleet: Search for Con-
sensu;:,- U. S\_ Naval I nstitute Proceedings. Vol. 100. No. L i-
(June 197^7. pp. 22-23.
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of the political application of naval force, a Sixth Fleet
reduced in size by one carrier task force could continue
to symbolize American power and represent American inter-
est in the region and could be reinforced as required in
times of crisis to communicate the same concern and evoke
the same suasion effects as had previous reinforcements
during crises and do so with a reduced total commitment of
67
scarce naval resources. In other words, according to
this concept, reinforcement of a one-carrier Sixth Fleet
with a second carrier would evoke the same suasion effects
as the reinforcement of a two-carrier Sixth Fleet by a
third carrier as was accomplished, for example, in the
cases of the emergency deployment of the USS John F_._ Kennedy
during the Jordanian civil war of 1970 and again during the
6R
Yom Kippur War of 1973. The idea, however, apparently
was quashed by some NATO countries ' which for years have
seemed content to allow the United States to bear the bulk
of. the Western burden in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern
70
affairs' and whose declining defense expenditures (as a
percentage of GNP) reflect a failure to cope with the real
67
'Personal interviev; with Robert G. Weinland, staff
member and Soviet Navy analyst at the Center for Naval
Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, on May 30 > 197^.
68John W. Finney, "U. S. Carrier Force is Sent Toward










prospects of a reduction in the American naval presence.'
Of course, the development of a Sixth Fleet force
structure representative of and capable of implementing an
appropriate American policy response to the political chal-
lenge of the Soviet Navy in the eastern Mediterranean is a
task for political and naval operations analyses which
transcend the scope of the present study. Secretary Chafes'
s
proposal, which reflected not only the reduced size of the
U, S. Navy but also a firm grasp of the principles under-
lying the political application of naval force, is repre-
sentative of the options which must be explored if the
United States is to retain its capability to exercise naval
suasion in support of its policy in the Middle East. Cer-
tainly, any decision by the makers of American foreign
policy which would impair this capability—such as an in-
ordinate reduction of the Sixth Fleet's vital visibility
and viability factors relative to those of the Soviet Med-
iterranean Squadron or even a unilateral withdrawal of
naval forces from the political context of the eastern
Mediterranean—v/ould be as inappropriate as it would be
unrealistic.
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE "EAST OF SUEZ"
Once the Suez Canal js reopened sometime in 1975» the







the area of growing superpower interests' "east of Suez"
is expected to increase substantially. Indeed, in spite
of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's reassurances
that the value of a reopened canal will far transcend the
73
military problems raised, J the principal beneficiary of
its reopening probably will be the Soviet Navy. While the
economies of the Western world have adjusted to the closure
of the Suez Canal since I967 and the European nations which
had extensive interests east of Suez prior to World War II—
principally Britain, France, and Holland—no longer main-
tain appreciable military and naval forces in those areas
and have seen their commerce with Middle Eastern and Far
74Eastern countries greatly depreciated, the reopening of
>
^
the canal has become essential to Soviet naval power—now
a prime instrument for the extension of Moscow's political
influence -3—which easily could be doubled' to achieve
77
naval superiority and political objectives'' as a result,
72
U. S. Department of State, U^ S_^ National Security
Policy and the Indian c e an , Washington, D. C. , U. S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1 97I
, p. 3.
'-^Dana Adams Schmidt, "U. S. Aid to Follow Up in Mid-
East?" The Christian Science Monit or (June 5, 1974), p. 2.
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Ironically, it is not the Soviet Navy but the U. S. Navy,
in pursuit of Washington's objective of improved relations
with Egypt, which has spearheaded the canal clearing
79
operation. ' 7
By the middle of 197** » the Soviet Navy was reported
to have a squadron of more than 20 ships—about half of
them modern combatants (including, for the first time, the
"Moskva"-class helicopter carrier Leningrad ) and the re-
mainder auxiliaries—deployed forward in the Indian Ocean
where, less than a decade ago, a Soviet naval presence was
Rn
practically nonexistent. For most nations on the Indian
Ocean littoral, foreign influence was first exercised by
sea power. While the Soviet Union as a great land power
was, therefore, an abstraction to. many leaders of these
nations, visiting Soviet warships have shown that there
are other naval powers than the United States and Britain
in terms which they readily comprehend. Although aug-
mentation of Moscow's Indian Ocean squadron could conceiv-
ably prove politically counterproductive in light of the
expressed opposition of some littoral governments to the
"Clearing Suez," The Chri stian Scie nce Monitor
(March 25, 197*0 , P. 8.
79
'John Leech, "Task of Clearing Suez Canal Begins,"
The Christian Science Monitor (April 5, 197*0 1 P. 5.
HO
"Soviets Build Up Indian Ocean Fleet," The Christ -
ian Science Monitor (July 12, 197*0, p. 12; Drew Middleton,
"Indian Ocean Ships: Soviet 20, U. S. 3," The New York






82presence of superpower navies in the Indian Ocean 9 it
appears likely that an expanded Soviet naval presence there
will require the development of new responses—especially
in terms of the political application of naval force--to
this challenge to American foreign policy in the Middle
East.
The Middle East Force as a Response. At this writing, the
only permanent operational naval presence maintained by
the United States in Middle Eastern waters east of the
Suez Canal is the small Middle East Force which has been
stationed at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf since its creation
in 19^9. In pursuit of its mission "to demonstrate, by
visiting friendly countries [in its area of operations],
the continuing interest of the United States in these
countries and the desire of the United States to maintain
good relations with them" the Middle East Force—a rear
admiral's command which consists of the USS LaSalle , a
former amphibious transport configured as an auxiliary
flagship, and two destroyers usually on a six month deploy-
ment from the U. S. Atlantic Fleet •*—calls at ports over
a two million square mile area ranging from the Persian
"Naval Rivalry in the Indian Ocean," The Christian
Science Monitor (March 27, 197*0, p. F8.
^U. S. Congress, House, U_._ S_^_ Interests in and Pol -
icy Toward the Persian Gulf










Gulf and Red Sea to Sri Lanka "distributing 'handclasp'
material from encyclopedias stamped with Uncle Sam's hand-
shake to ice cream and movies." In 1971 » ships of the
Middle East Force made 108 port calls in seventeen coun-
Orp
tries ' and, in I973i the Force conducted three major sea
88
rescues.
i Following the Labor government's decision of January,
I968, to withdraw operational British military forces from
east of Suez by the end of 1971 and the March, I968, deploy-
ment of Soviet naval forces into the Indian Ocean on a sus-
tained basis for the first time, a review of American pol-
icy toward the Persian Gulf resulted in the decision to
89
retain the Middle East Force. 7 According to James H.
Noyes, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near
90Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs •.
It was believed that the continuation of our modest
naval presence at Bahrain would contribute to the
stability of the Persian Gulf as the small states of
the area emerged into full independence, and that to
withdraw MIDEASTFOR , especially when the British were
leaving and the Soviet naval effort was increasing,
: would give the impression, already gaining ground in
some Arab circles 9 that Western interest in the Per-
sian Gulf was waning.
Joseph Fitchett, "U. S. Navy Must Prepare for
Bahrain Withdrawal," The Ch ristian Science Monitor (Feb-
ruary 12, 197*0 1 P. 3.
'U. S. Congress, House, op_. cit.
,
p. 12.
Fitchett, loc . cit .






Critics of this decision, however, maintain that the
Middle East Force, while it may represent American inter-
ests in the Persian Gulf area, does so rather ambiguously
in that: (1) as a naval force, it is representative of
neither American naval power nor national power? and (2)
as a symbol of American interest, it is vague and confus-
91ing. Admittedly not a particularly impressive presence
in terms of force composition and technical sophistication
—one American commentator has referred to it as a couple
of "ancient World V/ar II rust buckets,"" the Middle East
Force has, in fact, been the subject of unflattering com-
ment by local rulers and officials who have observed that
its vessels are not nearly as modern as the Soviet Navy
ships which began showing the flag prominently in the Gulf
in 1968. -^ In addition, its critics contend that the main-
tenance of a permanent United States military unit in the
area "is an indication somehow [to local observers] that
we intend to do something with it'"/ and that if, indeed,
American policy is not to become involved in the defense
of the Persian Gulf, the presence of the Middle East Force
stationed there may imply commitments which do not exist
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express concern that the presence of United States naval
ships at Bahrain may well attract a similar, if not larger,
permanent Soviet naval presence to the Persian Gulf.
Urging that American policy makers "rethink the implica-
tions of maintaining a U. S. naval presence homeported in
97Bahrain," many suggest that a more appropriate and effec-
tive way for the United States to demonstrate its interest
in the Gulf area would be through periodic visits of "rov-
ing fleet units" truly representative of the real sea power
98
of the United States 7 and more impressively symbolic of
its national power.
In terms of the concept of the political application
of naval force, a strong case for altering the I968 policy
decision and replacing the Middle East Force with a periodic
representative presence may now be made. While withdrawal
of the Middle East Force at the time of British departure
from and Soviet arrival in the Persian Gulf indeed could
99have communicated "a diminution of American interest" 7 ^ in
the area east of Suez, a new approach providing for periodic
visits by more credible evidence of United States naval
capabilities would appear a more appropriate vehicle for








. , p. 95.

13^
for this increasingly important part of the Middle East as
it enhanced the U. S, Navy's ability to evoke suasion
effects—by avoiding unfavorable comparisons with the
Soviet naval presence—without running the risk of imply-
ing commitments which are not intended. Since the effec-
tive exercise of naval suasion depends upon others' per-
ceptions of the naval force in question—its tactical
capabilities as well as the political intentions which it
represents—the Middle East Force, which at present may
be perceived as too unimpressive when compared with the
Soviet naval presence to evoke suasion effects in the
event of a crisis, could be construed as somewhat detri-
mental to American interests in the area. Indeed, the . %
maintenance of so inferior a presence could be perceived
as symbolic of a lack of interest. Given the construction
by Moscow of extensive naval facilities at Urnm Qasr, fears
that any continued U. S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf
would attract a permanent Soviet naval presence now seem
irrelevant. Thus, the question has been and remains not
so much one of the requirement for the United States to
show the flag in that part of the world as one of how it
should be done, "Perhaps," as Alvin J. Cottrell suggested,
"an occasional visit by a carrier task force would serve
to remind all concerned that the United States has a defi-
nite interest in the stability of the area."





By late I973i it appeared that the question of the
Middle East Force's continued presence in the Persian Gulf
might be settled by Bahrain itself which, not so much be-
cause of any dislike for the American presence as because
it had to reckon with the attitudes of Egypt, decided
during the Yom Kippur War to revoke the American lease to
the former British facilities and informed Washington that
it had one year in which to remove the U. S. Navy contin-
gent from the island. Although the ruling sheikh who
canceled the lease in the heat %of war subsequently stated,
in the wake of recently improved relations betv/een Egypt
and the United States, that he would like the Middle East
Force to remain on Bahrain, anti-American demonstrations
which already had occurred on the heavily populated island
have made the further usefulness of the facility question-
102
able. Thus, any future American naval presence east of
the Suez Canal will probably have to be maintained from
outside the Persian. Gulf. If this presence is to consist,
of a carrier task force—certainly the most impressive
symbol of American power afloat—the proposed construction
of a naval and air station on the island of Diego Garcia in
the middle of the Indian Ocean takes on increased signifi-
cance for American foreign policy in the Kiddle East.
Fitchett, loc, cit. j Drew Middleton, "U, S. Navy
Setback Giving Soviet an Edge in Mideast," The New York
Tjjnen (November 10, 19? ;0, p. 13.
4 An
'''Schmidt in The Christian Scienc e Moni tor (January
29, 197^), loc. cit.
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Diego Garcia and the American Response. Prior to 1971 i the
American naval presence in the Indian Ocean area had been
a persistently modest one, Washington did not rush to fill
the so-called "vacuum" perceived by some as a result of the
British departure and, with the exception of the small Mid-
dle East Force which made periodic shore visits throughout
the western littoral of the region, the United States pre-
sence was limited to occasional transits of U, S. Navy
ships, humanitarian missions in response to typhoon and
flood emergencies, and the operation of communications
stations in Western Australia and Asmara , Ethiopia. Un-
certainty about the future of the installation in Asmara
led Congress in 19?1 to approve construction of a modest
communications station on the small Chagos Archipelago
island of Diego Garcia, a part of the British Indian Ocean
103Territory over 1,000 miles south of India •* which was
destined soon to take on greater strategic and political
significance.
As the Soviet naval presence east of Suez increased,
the United States responded by sending carrier task forces
into the Indian Ocean twice in 1971 » first in April and
again in December during the Indo-Pakistani war. The
mission of the latter task force, led by the nuclear-powered
103^Howard Wriggms, "U c S. Interests in the Indian
Ocean," in Cottrell and Burrell, op_. cit.
, pp. 362-363,
Richard J. Lovine, "The Debate Over Diego Garcia,"




attack carrier USS Enterprise t was "to evacuate Americans
from East Bengal if necessary" as well as "to impress the
Indians and to counter [the presence of] any Soviet ships
... in the region. " * As the American ships returned
to their normal area of operations in the Western Pacific
early in 1972, "the Pentagon announced that the U. S. Navy
would be seen more often and in greater strength in the
Indian Ocean in the future. The last United States air-
craft carrier to visit the Indian Ocean pursuant to this
107policy announcement was the USS America in March, 1973.
. By October, 1973» the Yom Kippur War and its after-
math—including the Arab oil embargo and the cancellation
of the Middle East Force's lease on station facilities in
Bahrain as well as the projected reopening of the Sues
Canal—had combined to increase Washington's interest in
the Indian Ocean and to focus attention on this latest
arena of superpower naval rivalry. The first symbol of
this increased interest was the sudden deployment to the
area of a task force led by the aging carrier USS Hancock
which was detached from the U. S. Seventh Fleet during the
l05"Naval Rivalry," Time (January 1?, 1972), p. 26.
106,,.,Ibid
.
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war. ' On the following November 30, Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger, disclosing that the Hancock would be
relieved by the USS Oriskany , announced that the U. S. Navy
would establish a "pattern of regular visits into the
Indian Ocean" and that the American "presence there [would]
be more frequent and more regular than in the past."
Since then, major U. S. Navy combatants have been deployed
111in the Indian Ocean almost constantly as a demonstration,
in the words of one American admiral t that "the Indian
112Ocean is not a Russian lake,"
To support this presence, the United States and Great
Britain agreed to expand an existing U. S. Navy communica-
tions station on Diego Garcia into a naval and air station
capable of refueling and resupplying American warships
—
113including aircraft carriers - --and accommodating long-range
109^Schmidt. , loc . cit .
1 10T • -, • j.Levme
,
log . cit .
Ill
In February, 197^1 the Oriskany was relieved as
flagship of the U. S. Navy force in the Indian Ocean by
the nuclear-powered guided missile frigate USS Bainbridge
which i in turn, v/as relieved in March by the attack carrier
USS Kitty Kawk
.
After an apparent two-month hiatus in the
American naval presence, the "routine" presence of the
guided missile cruiser USS Ch ica go, two destroyers, and an
oiler in the Indian Ocean v/as reported by the Pentagon in
early July, 197^.
112
"U, S, Shows Force in Indian Ocean," The Christ ian
Science Monitor (July 3, I97 ;0i P. 6.
113
-'John W, Finney, "Zumwalt Backs U. S. Plan for




U. S. Navy patrol aircraft. Unveiled in the aftermath
11 •>
of the Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil embargo, J the
Pentagon's $29 million plan to expand port, runway, and
fuel storage facilities on the island touched off a storm
of protest overseas and a lively foreign policy-national
11 £>
security controversy in Washington which continues at
this writing.
117Led by India's expression of "total opposition," '
several littoral governments early in 197^ protested the
increased United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean
and the plans to develop Diego Garcia to support that pre-
sence. Explaining this opposition, India's Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh noted that his government "cannot escape the
conclusion" that United States plans for Diego Garcia are
"connected with a more long-term presence of United States
naval forces in the area" which he fears "will start a
chain reaction leading to big-power rivalry and military
competition"" in the Indian Ocean. Other, although
114James S. Keat, "U. S. and Britain to Build Indian
Ocean Supply Base," The Sun (February 8, 197*0 i no page.
-\Levme, loc . cit .
11 6
Michael Getler, "Indian Ocean Base Seen Unaffected,"
The Washington Post (March ?, 197*0 1 p. &?•
117
'Bernard Weinraub, "U. S. Plan to Set Up Island Base
Is Chilling Relations With India," The New York Times
(February b, 197*0 1 P. 61.
118
"India Criticizes U. S. Move," The New York Times
(March 13, 197'0, P. 3.
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somewhat lesser, protests were voiced by Australia, New
Zealand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Kenya, and Singapore. "
Previous attempts by Third V/orld countries to prevent an
anticipated superpower naval race in the Indian Ocean, em-
bodied in three United Nations General Assembly resolutions
since 1971 designating the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace"
and calling on the superpowers to halt escalation of their
military presence there and to keep the ocean free of mili-
120tary bases and nuclear weapons, have been ignored by
121
the United States and the Soviet Union.
In Washington, most congressional opposition to the
Diego Garcia proposal was reflected in Senator Claiborne
Pell's introduction of legislation to delete from a sup-
plementary military appropriations bill the $29 million
requested by the Department of Defense on grounds that
expansion of American military involvement in the Indian
Ocean "would prove costly, unwise ( and contrary to our
122long range national plans" as v/ell as stimulate, rather
123than deter, a Soviet naval threat in the area. J "From
9Getler, loc. cit. ; "Atoll Trouble," Time (April 1,WO, P. 38.
120Charles W. Yost, "A Zone of Peace," The Christian
Science Monitor (March 21, 197*0, P. 8.
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our experience in Indochina, we know too well the cost of
early, easy congressional and State Department acquiescence
to Pentagon demands," Senator Pell observed, emphasizing
that "we must profit from our past errors" and that Con-
gress' "handling of this authorization request for Diego
Garcia offers such an opportunity." ~ In a further effort
to prevent "a costly U. S. -Soviet naval race," Senator Pell
and Senator Edward M. Kennedy jointly introduced a resolu-
tion calling for negotiations between the superpowers on
12 ^limiting naval facilities and warships in the Indian Ocean. -
Taking still another tack, Senator Henry M. Jackson proposed
to "stop an arms race in the Indian Ocean before it starts"
by negotiation of an international agreement to close the
Suez Canal to the warships "of all outside powers"—specif-
ically those of the United States and the Soviet Union—
before it is reopened. Reflecting some of the Senate's
fear of precipitate action, Representative Patricia Schroeder,
in an attempt to force discussion of the proposal, intro-
duced legislation in the House of Representatives "to prevent
the use of funds for expanding United States air and naval
127facilities" on Diego Garcia.
12^Levine, 3jjc. cit .
Ibid .
Heinl in Navy Times (April 10, 197*0. loc cit.
j 2 *?
'"Two Bills Would Block Diego Garcia Project," Navy
Times (March 27, 197^). P- 23.
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The principal proponents of the plan to expand Diego
Garcia into "a modest supply installation designed to sup-
port intermittent naval operations in the Indian Ocean"
are the Departments of State and Defense. According to
the State Department, the Yom Kippur War underscored "the
vital necessity" for a United States naval presence in the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Testifying before the Sub-
committee on the Near East and South Asia of the House
Foriegn Affairs Committee in March, 197^" » Seymour Weiss,
Director of State's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
stated that the presence of the U. S t Navy in the Indian
Ocean "helped back up" Secretary of State Kissinger's dip-
lomatic initiatives in the Middle East following the Octo- .
12°
ber war, ' Emphasizing the political utility of the U. S.
Navy as a "military presence [which can] support effective
130diplomacy without . . . ever having to be used," J Weiss
noted that the protests voiced by Indian Ocean governments
against the Diego Garcia project were "far more restrained"
than the United States had expected and explained that many
of the region's leaders had apparently felt it necessary
131for "political reasons" to speak out against the move J
128John W. Finney, "Role of Indian Ocean Base is Dis-
cussed," The New York Times (March 13, 1 9?4 ) , p. 3.
'Washington's Reaction," The New York Times (March
7, 197^)i p. 1^.
1 ';50 T . , . ,,.
• Levme, loc . pit .
3 Getler, loc . cit.

v-o
while they privately hoped that the United States would
proceed as planned to counter Soviet influence. J Among
the nations Weiss listed as favorable to the Diego Garcia
project and an American naval presence in the Indian Ocean
were Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, and the People's Republic
of China, These countries would be more concerned, he
said, if the United States were to let Soviet naval expan-
131
sion in the area go unchecked. JJ
In testimony before the same subcommittee, Admiral
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. , Chief of Naval Operations, depicted
the Indian Ocean area as possessing the potential to pro-
duce major shifts in the "global power balance" during the
next decade. "It follows," he said, "that we must have the
ability to influence events in that area, and the capabil- *
ity to deploy our military power in the region is an essen-
tial element of such influence." Without a naval support
base on Diego Garcia, Admiral Zumwalt pointed out, the
U, S, Navy would be "taxed to the absolute limit" to sup-
port naval operations in the Indian Ocean. In response to
one of the main objections ra.ised in Congress, Admiral
Zumwalt observed that expansion of the Diego Garcia facility
would not result in a superpower naval race in the Indian
Ocean because the Soviet Union was "already on the move"
in the region where its expanding naval presence already
possesses a shore support system which he described as
-




"substantially more extensive than that of the United
1 In-
states." J
If, as Senators Pell and Kennedy have urged. Washing-
ton and Moscow were able to negotiate an agreement to limit
their naval activities in the Indian Ocean or if, as Sena-
tor Jackson suggested, closure by international agreement
of the Suez Canal to American and Soviet warships could
check Soviet naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, both
superpowers might be spared the expanse of a naval compe-
tition there which may not significantly enhance either
nation's security. However, many factors make realization
of the Pell-Kennedy approach seem a remote possibility
indeed. Not the least of these include the Soviet Navy's
demonstrated intention to expand further into the area in
its drive to become a "blue water navy" capable of mounting
a global presence and reaping the political benefits of
show3_ng the flag, '-' the poor track record of Soviet-
American conventional and strategic arms limitations nego-
tiations which has included an unsuccessful effort by
Washington to follow up on Secretary Brezhnev's 1971 hint
of Soviet interest in naval arms limitations talks (see
Chapter V, pp. 160-162), and superpower reluctance to
1 if
agree to any restrictions on their use of the high seas.
^Finney in The New York Times (March 21, 197*0, locney
cit.
^Richard Burt, "U. S. Defense Dispute: Indian Ocean
Base," The Christian Sci enc e M onit or (April 13, 197*0 « P- 3.
^Robert D. Heinl, "Soviets linger India by Diego Garcia
policy." Navy Times (Juno 5. 197*0 1 P* 1 3.
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While demilitarization of the Suez Canal would certainly
reduce Moscow's ability to reinforce rapidly its naval
presence in the Indian Ocean, there is significant reason
to doubt that any such agreement could ever be negotiated
successfully with a Kremlin for which reopening the canal
has been and remains an overriding strategic objective. J(
In sum, Moscow apparently intends continued application
of its expanding naval power in the Indian Ocean to gain
political influence throughout the area. While a few Soviet
gains in weak littoral countries may not make a significant
difference to United States interests, at some point cumu-
lative Soviet gains could become consequential, -* Because
sound foreign policy is made neither on the basis of "worst
case" considerations of interest to military contingency
planners nor on the basis of the fond hopes of some members
of Congress but on the basis of that which is most likely
to occur, J ' the United States would appear to have no
practical alternative to the development of a policy re-
sponse to the Soviet naval challenge in the Indian Ocean
which includes a naval presence capable of securing Ameri-
can interests in the Middle East and elsewhere in the area
without risking undue alienation of the littoral nations.
Certainly, Senator Pell's concern that increased American
100
J( Heinl, op_. cit .
, pp. 13, '1-9.
1 "< ftJ Wriggins, _op_. cit..
, p. 36O.
39Criffith3, op. cit
. , p. U,
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involvement in the Indian Ocean would "stimulate" a Soviet,
naval threat in the area appears unfounded in light of both
the present magnitude of the Soviet naval presence there
and Moscow's long-standing determination to develop that
presence in support of its interests in the area regardless
of whatever action Washington takes. A credible U. S. Navy-
presence, symbolic of the strength of American resolve,
may, however, deter Soviet moves inimical to American
interests in the region.
Howard Wriggins of Columbia University, a scholar who
has urged American naval restraint in the Indian Ocean, has
observed that:
. . , if there can be no agreement between the super-
powers to leave the Indian Ocean virtually free of
their naval vessels t the next best thing would be for
there to be at least two competing, relatively low-
level, naval presences. The worst of all for the
littoral states and the United States would be for
the USSR to have a sole dominant position. If there
were more than one naval presence, each would be con-
strained by the presence of the other from ill-con-
sidered political action.
In terms of the political application of naval force, de-
ployment of a United States naval presence in the Indian
Ocean and development of Diego Garcia to support it would
signal Moscow that, v/hile Washington remains committed to
detente, the United States will not allow the Soviet Union
to use a period of relaxed tensions to acquire a position
of unchallenged naval superiority which could be exploited
140Wr 1ggms , loc . cit
.
1V1
Burt, loc . c j t .
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to make political gains. A decision by Washington to do
otherwise—not to respond resolutely to the growing Soviet
naval presence in the Indian Ocean—could, and probably
would, be perceived by the Kremlin and others as evidence
of American acquiescence to a marked change in the distri-
bution of power there which could cause them to misjudge
the value of the American deterrent to Soviet involvement
in the Middle East and elsewhere.
An appropriate and politically effective policy re-
sponse to the growing presence of the Soviet Navy in the
Indian Ocean would not, however, be one which matched Mos-
cow's naval presence there ship for ship or raced to over-
whelm that presence numerically. Indeed, such a massive
U. S. Navy presence could cast the United States in the
role of the threatening power--"the precipitator of super-
143power competition in the Indian Ocean" J—rather than that
of the protecting power, to the detriment of American in-
terests. To be as effective as possible in the essentially
political role of representing American power and interest
and dissuading easy and consequential intervention, there-
fore, the United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean
should quietly but visibly demonstrate a modern naval capa-
144bility. While the force deployed to maintain this pre-
sence should not be large in numbers, it should be, and
3 42
Wriggins, op_. cit .
,
p. 372.






should be perceived as, the most up-to-date and effective
force possible in order to evoke the suasion effects essen-
tial to the successful pursuit of American policy. In time
of crisis, such a force could be readily and visibly aug-
mented as necessary to the successful exercise of naval
suasion without undue strain on limited naval resources. -
Establishment on Diego Garcia of a genuinely modest facil-
ity to support such operations in the Indian Ocean, while
subject to propagandistic exploitation, could hardly be
considered the "crucial lap" of a naval race in the region
li(-6
which it has been termed by one Western commentator
when compared with the advances in the region of a Soviet
Navy which has obviously overcome its ideological barrier .
Ike
-'This is essentially the view of the U. S. Navy.
As recent former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R.
Zumwalt, Jr., testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in 1972 in response to a question posed by
Senator Peter H. Dominick as to weather or not the Navy
considered it essential that the United States "maintain
equal or superior naval forces in the Indian Ocean:"
. . .
we must maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean
and be ready to reinforce it when required .... I
don"t think that it is mandatory that our presence
there always be at all times superior to the Soviet
force provided we have the capability to make it
superior when needed. But I think a permanent pres-
ence is mandatory.
(U. S. Congress, Senate, Fi scal Year 1973 Authoriza tion
for M ilitary Procuremen t , Re searc h and Do ve l o pmen c, Con -
struction Authori zation for the Safeguard ABM , and A ctive
Duty and. Selected Reserve Strengths—Par t: 2, Washington,
D. C.'i U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 981.





against foreign bases as the use of naval power as an in-
strument of foreign policy has become increasingly accept-
able and important to the leadership in the Kremlin. '
Moreover, the limited nature of such a facility compared
with Moscow's shore infrastructure could communicate the
contrast between American restraint and Soviet ambition.
It is likely that, as increasing numbers of littoral regimes
become fearful of Soviet intrusion into their affairs fol-
lowing the reopening of the Suez Canal, the American pre-
sence in the Indian Ocean will be increasingly welcome and
popular. That India, while continuing to make its op-
position clear, has "refrained from using strident tones" "
in doing so, may be indicative of a trend favoring a counter-
veiling American presence apparently discernible in other
nation's attitudes. *
Other objectives of American foreign policy in the
Middle East could be served by the development of a support
base on Diego Garcia. That of ensuring the continued ex-
istence of the State of Israel is one of these. In the
very real eventuality of another Arab-Israeli war, * the
147
'Mackintosh in MccGwire, loc . cit .
Wriggins, op_. pit.
, p. 372.
Henry S. Haywood, "U. S. , India Rebuild Rapport,"
The Christi an Science Monitor (August 2, 1 97-+)
, p. 5.
Getler, loc . pit.
J
"A Critic's View of U. S.-Arab Relations," The
Christian Science Monitor (June 25, 197 Z0. p. 4; Ja3on
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ability to maintain supplies on the island would eliminate
the necessity of obtaining the permission of other nations
to fly over their territories to effect an emergency air-
lift to resupply Israel as it did during the Yom Kippur
War when such permission was refused by some of the United
States' allies. 1 ^2
Another interest--"defense of the sea lanes" --which
derives from the dependence of nations friendly to the
United States on the safe transit through the ' Indian Ocean
of Persian Gulf oil vital to their economies is often in-
voked to gain support for American naval expansion in the
Indian Ocean. This, however, would seem an invalid justi-
fication for the response advocated herein. While Japanese,
.... 4
Europeans, and Australians do indeed depend upon Indian
Ocean sea lanes, - severe anxiety over the possibility of
Morris, "Israel Begins to Talk of a Return to War," The
Christian Science Monitor (August 5» 197*0 1 P. 3; John K.
Cooley, "Soviets See New Peril in Mideast," Th_e Christian
Science Monitor (August 13. 1974) » PP- l t 6; "Soviets,
Syrians Brace for More Mideast Fighting," The Christian
Science Monitor (August 14, 1974), p. 6; John K. Cooley,
"Mideast Hostilities Simmer," The Christian Science Moni-
tor (August 23, 1974), p. 1; "Syrian Hawks Pushing for
New Mideast War," Rocky Mountain News (August 31, 1974),
p. 41; Henry J. Taylor, "An Ominous Threax of Future Blood-
shed in the Middle East," Rocky Mountain News (August 31,
1974), p. 49.
1^2y Keat, loc . cit .
1 ^T
"^Wriggins, op_. cit.
, pp. 369-370. Middle Eastern
oil shipped via Indian Ocean sea lanes is especially vital
to the economic survival of Japan, which depends upon oil
for 75 percent of her energy needs (Central Intelligence
Agency, co. cit.
,
p. 22) and imported 85 percent of her
total oil imports in l9?l-?2 from the Persian Gulf (Ibid.
,
p. 2j), a percentage which continues to increase.
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Soviet interference with this shipping appears unfounded.
It is highly improbable that the Soviet Navy would harass
or attack Western shipping in the Indian Ocean or anywhere
else. Such a hostile act --an act of war—could trigger the
war between the superpowers J which it is in the vital
interests of both to prevent. Geoffrey Jukes, an Austra-
lian analyst, has written: -^
It is difficult to envisage a situation, short of
world nuclear war, in which the Soviet government
would be prepared to place the bulk of its merchant
fleet at risk by engaging to 'interfere' with Western
shipping in the Indian or any other ocean.
Although the House of Representatives voted by a wide
margin to allow expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia as
requested by the Department of Defense, •* the Senate Armed
Services Committee deferred action "until later in 197^"
1 ^7
on the controversial request. -" Despite the debate in
Washington and expressed opposition of several governments
in the Indian Ocean region, it appears at this v/riting that
Congress will grant the funds for the project. * V/hen it
does, the United States should move prudently in the Indian
1 ^k
^ Levine, .toe , cit .
-^Geoffrey Jukes, "The Soviet Union and the Indian
Ocean," Survival , Vol. XIII, No. 11 (November 1971)
•
P. 37*K
^ The Christian Science Monitor (May 1, 197*0 loc .
cit .
-^Finney in The New York Times (April 4, 197*0, loc
cit.




Ocean to ensure that this response to the Soviet naval
presence there remains an appropriate and effective polit-
ical application of naval force which will elicit at least
a modicum of regional approval without inviting unv/arranted
blame for violating the "zone of peace."

CHAPTER V
THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
NAVIES AND FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE FUTURE
In recent years, it has been shown, the expanding
Soviet Navy clearly has seized the initiative in the poli-
tical application of naval force in the waters of the Mid-
dle East—an initiative for which the United States pur-
sues appropriate responses. While the Kremlin's intentions
regarding continued application of the Soviet Navy as an
instrument of its foreign policy in the region are not the
sole or even the dominant factor involved in decisions con-
cerning American foreign policy in the Middle East, esti-
mates of those intentions will continue to play an impor-
tant role in the development and deployment of a U. S. Navy
force structure capable of successful implementation of
that policy. Thus, the future political roles of super-
power navies in the Middle East will be, to a great extent,
a function of the way in which the Soviet Navy is employed
as a policy tool,
SOVIET VIEWS OF THE SOVIET NAVY
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
The future of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of for-
eign policy in the Middle East will depend primarily upon

15^
Moscow's future perceptions of its value and best use as
such within the evolving political environment of the
region. A variety of ideas on this subject appear to be
held by members of the Kremlin leadership.
Appreciation of the Soviet Navy as an Instrument of Foreign
Policy. That many in the Soviet leadership perceive the
value and favor the use of the Soviet Navy as an instrument
of foreign policy is apparent not only from its intensified
employment as such from I967 through the present but also
from a series of eleven articles entitled "Navies in War
and Peace" written by Admiral Gorshkov which appeared in
Morskoy Sbornik
,
the navy's monthly journal, from 1972 into
1
1973. The entire tone of this series reflects Gorshkov'
s
understanding of the Soviet Navy as an active instrument
2
of the "state interests" of the USSR which, according to
Herrick, include the primary foreign policy objectives of
"enhancing the USSR's global influence and international
prestige ... by maintaining a world-wide naval presence"
and "conducting shows-of-force and low-risk use of limited
naval force to support client and 'progressive* states
. . .
against imperialist aggression"^ as well as providing for
Clyde A. Smith, "The Meaning and Significance of the
Gorshkov Articles," Naval War College Review , Vol. XXVI,
No. 5 (March-April 1974) , p. IB.
2Michael MccGwire, The Gorshkov Ser ies-- "Navies in War
Q-pd Peace " s A Preliminary Analysis , Arlington, Center for
Naval Analyses, May 1973i p. 20,
^Robert W . Herr i c k , Soviet Nay y_ Commander -in -Chief
Advocates Construction of a Much Larger Navv_, Arlington,
C^enter"Tor" Naval Analyses", May T97T1 p". WE.
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the strategic defense of the homeland.
Asserting that military power is the sine qua non of
world politics, Gorshkov observes that naval strength has
always been an essential attribute of great power status.
Russia, he notes, has always suffered when she neglected
her navy; the Soviet Union needs a powerful navy to main-
tain its status as a superpower in a world in which the
relevance and importance of navies to the achievement of
political objectives is on the increase. Emphasizing the
inherent attributes of naval forces for the pursuit and
defense of a nation's interests beyond its borders, Gorsh-
kov details the unique capacity of naval forces to demon-
strate a nation's economic and military might and to pro-
ject military power in peacetime. Throughout the series,
Gorshkov advocates the continued application of the Soviet
Navy as an instrument of foreign policy.
However, the mere fact that Gorshkov published this
series of articles suggests that his view of the Soviet
Navy as a valuable foreign policy instrument may not be a
unanimous one in the Kremlin.
Criticism of the Soviet Navy as an Instrument of Foreign
Policy. Recent high-level disillusionment over poor returns
from Moscow's investments in the Middle East apparently
extends to the question of whether or not the benefits of
MccGwire, op_. cit .
,
p. '+.
Herrick, op . cit . , p. 5.
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forward deployment outweigh the political and economic costs
of the effort. While Gorshkov has been advocating a larger
navy and its continued application as an instrument of for-
eign policy, certain factions within the Defense Ministry
and the consumer-oriented Politburo appear to be question-
ing its effectiveness as such and the increasingly wide-
spread deployment of the Soviet Navy in the Middle East may
7be under attack from these quarters. ' Although precise
information on this criticism—much of which certainly
arises also out of the factional competition for the allo-
cation of resources—is not available, the probable percep-
tions giving rise to it are a matter for productive specu-
lation,
Conceding that the Soviet naval presence in the Middle
East may convey "the impression of rising power" to some
advantage to the USSR and to certain disadvantage to the
Y/est, these critics almost certainly question the ultimate
effectiveness of this presence as a means of increasing
Moscow's influence in the region to the point of suggesting
its counterproductivity and its danger to Soviet objectives.
Apparently aware of the potential damage to their political
image which the Soviet Navy carries with it, these critics
perceive the likelihood that its presence casts doubt in
Arab minds about the USSR's role as "a disinterested








benevolent onlooker" and that it retains "old-fashioned
o
imperialistic overtones" repugnant to these peoples.
Like any other market, they no doubt would contend, the
diplomatic one for such activities as good-will port visits
and showing the flag can be saturated to the point of pro-
ducing swiftly diminishing returns or even a negative re-
o
action. They would certainly agree with Martin that any
demonstration of naval power is a demonstration of the
capacity to enjoy access to the shores of others and that
the: newer nations which have only recently gained indepen-
dence from a Western domination based on maritime strength
—a category that includes most of the Middle East—may
well see an implied menace in even the most amiable visit.
Sensitive to today's more inhibited attitudes toward the
casual use of force, they question the value of a naval
11presence.
At least some events in the early 1970s v/hich appear
to militate against Gorshkov's concept of naval power as
an effective, instrument of Soviet foreign policy in the
Middle East may have served to reinforce this disillusion-
ment and criticism. The Jordanian crisis of 1970 demon-
strated that, as described in Chapter IV, although the
Smolansky in MccGwire, op_. cit .
, pp. 335-336,
q
McConnell, op_. pit .
, pp. 9-10.
10Martin, op . cit .
, p. l'i-0.
11
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Soviet naval presence in the Middle East has restricted the
range of options open to United States policy makers, the
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has not neutralized the Sixth
12Fleet in ail circumstances, While the Jordanian crisis
thus served to diminish the credibility of the Soviet naval
presence in some eyes, Moscow's attempts to strengthen its
ties with Syria and Iraq in order to recoup its 1972 losses
13in Egypt J probably increased the Soviet Navy's status as
a political liability among its critics who may view con-
tinued involvement on that level with politically volatile
clients as detrimental to Soviet foreign policy objectives
in the region. Alternatively, if the expulsion from Egypt
had the effect of enhancing the argument within the Soviet 4
Navy for the construction of aircraft carriers, such a
diversion of resources certainly would not find favor among
these critics.
Additional developments reinforcing these critical
perceptions and positions probably include budgetary evi-
dence that the Soviet Navy's high visibility level has
strengthened the hand of American advocates of a larger
U, S. Navy and a "blue-water" foreign policy for the United
States over those favoring reduced commitments in the wake
of the .Vietnam War and the increasingly negative reaction
1 2Smoiansky, op . cit . , p. Jh-1
1 3
^Smoiansky in C urrent History (January 1 973) f loc . c_it.
Smoiansky in MccGwire, _op_. c_it.
, p. jWl •
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among non-aligned countries in the Mediterranean Sea and
the Indian Ocean regions to the introduction of superpower
naval forces into these areas. -*
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE SOVIET NAVY
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
Western views concerning the possible future of the
Soviet Navy as an instrument of .foreign policy in the Mid-
dle East appear to vary at least as much as do Soviet per-
ceptions of its utility as such.
Possible Future I: "A Bargaining Chip. " Some analysts
have long suspected that the ultimate foreign policy objec-
tive of Soviet naval deployments in the Mediterranean Sea
and the Indian Ocean is to establish a bargaining position
from which to negotiate mutual limitations of superpower
naval deployments —perhaps the supreme exercise in naval
suasion.
In spite of its increased involvement with the Arab
states and its increased use of the Soviet Navy for polit-
ical purposes in the region, Moscow does not seem to have
lost sight of its original reason for forward deployment
of naval forces in the waters of the Middle East—the
threat to the USSR's industrial heartland of nuclear strikes
launched from U. S. Navy units in the eastern Mediterranean
Michael MccGwire, The Gorshkov Serin s— "Navies in




. , p. 14,
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and, more recently, in the Indian Ocean. As of this writ-
ing, the threat still exists, and to counter it remains
1?the priority task of the Soviet Navy. '
Implicit in the Kremlin's apparent interest in such
limitations is its realization that the Soviet Navy almost
certainly could not accomplish this first priority task.
In 19^8, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron v/as seen as in-
adequate and ineffective as a strategic defense force.
1 ft
According to Herrick:"
Except by a wholly unexpected attack, the USSR could
not realistically entertain much hope of their missile
destroyers or submarines successfully attacking the
Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers, let alone the Polaris
submarines, and, in any event, not before the latter
were able to launch their initial retaliatory strike
against the Soviet Union.
By the early 1970s, technological advances and new con- •
struction notwithstanding, although the Soviet Navy could
expect to have some success against aircraft carriers in
the event of a war, its capabilities vis-a-vis the threat
of the V/est's strategic submarine force remained extremely
limited.
Given this situation, some in Moscow may believe that
more could be gained by effecting a removal of the Western
naval presence at the price of its own presence, if possi-
ble, than by maintaining the present naval competition
i 7
'Michael MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Policy—Prospects
for the Seventies," in MccGwire, op. cit . , p. 4-18.
Herrick, Soviet Naval S trategy, p, 139
•




with its associated risks and costs. Although Soviet
proposals for limitations on naval deployments in the
waters of the Middle East are not new—such initiatives
may be traced at least as far back as the Soviet "Draft
Declaration of Non-intervention in the Middle East" pre-
sented to the United Nations in February, 1957 i and have
21been repeated fairly regularly ever since —this is a
type of bargaining that appears to be possible only under
22
conditions of strategic parity and possession of adequate
naval "bargaining chips" which the Soviets only recently
achieved. More recent Soviet proposals with respect to
this matter, therefore, have compelled greater attention
because they have been seen as perhaps less propagandists
and more serious in nature. On June 11, 1971 » Secretary
Brezhnev may have reflected this Soviet perception when,
in a sweeping foreign policy statement, he offered to
negotiate a mutual limitation of naval forces with the
24United States:
We have never considered, and do not now con-
sider, that it is an ideal situation when the navies
20
MccGwire, loc . cit. ; Blechman, loc. cit,
21
Blechman, loc . pit.
22





Dusko Dodor, "Brezhnev Asks Talk on Navies: Indian
Ocean, Mediterranean Limits Urged, The Washington Post
(June l?, t 1971 ), no page number 5 Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service, Daily Report (June 14, I9? 1 ). p. J-IV.
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of the great powers are cruising about for loiig
periods of time far from their own shores, and we
are prepared to solve this problem, but to solve it,
as they say, on an equal basis. On the basis of
such principles, the Soviet Union is ready to dis-
cuss any proposals.
Specifically mentioned as regimes of interest in Brezhnev's
neai
„26
statement were the Mediterra n Sea and the Indian Ocean -
as potential "seas of peace.
If the Soviet Union were able, at some time in the
future, to negotiate such a bilateral agreement on limita-
tions in, or even elimination of, superpower naval deploy-
ments in the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviet Navy would have
achieved much more effectively and economically through
disengagement the primary objective of Moscow's policy in
the Middle East which it could not achieve through forward
deployment--the negation of the threat posed by the West's
27
sea-based strategic strike forces. The most recent evi-
dence of Moscow's continued interest in this approach to
strategic defense was Secretary Brezhnev's mid-197^- an-
nouncement in Poland to the effect that the USSR was ready
to sign an agreement with the United States on the with-
drawal from the Mediterranean of all nuclear weapons de-
ployed there in Soviet and American surface ships and
2 *>J U. S. Congress, House, The Indian Ocean t Politica l
and Strategic Future, p. 190.
p f
Bernard Gwertzman, "Peace and Consumer Gain Stressed




r Ble chman, op. cit . , p, ^39.
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submarines —an arrangement which would eliminate the
Western sea-based strategic deterrent from the area with-
out significantly weakening the Soviet naval position and
its political potential. Although the particular condi-
tions of any such agreement would dictate the degree of
advantage, the Kremlin would certainly expect to accrue
additional advantages within the Middle East. For example,
certain to be among those resulting from an agreement for
mutual withdrawal would be the removal of the political
29
influence of the Sixth Fleet from the region ' upon which
the Soviets could capitalize to improve their relations
with the Arab states. Soviet spokesmen would, no doubt,
claim that the removal of the Sixth Fleet, long viewed as
a threat to Arab nationalism and a primary support for
Israel, resulted from the resolute actions of the USSR and
30
American fear of the might of the Soviet Navy.-' Having
eliminated the United States naval presence by agreement,
the Kremlim might view the purely political competition in
the Middle East as manageable or favorable to their inter-
ests, even without the presence of the Soviet Navy.
Although mutual benefits, not the least of which would
be a decreased chance of superpower confrontation in the
v
po
Paul Wohl, "Soviets Deny Their Navy Has Aggressive
Potential," The Christian Science Monitor (August lh , 1974),
p. 32.
.'MccGwire, op_. cit . , p. ^18.
30Blechman, oj>. cit.., pp. '+50 -451.
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Middle East, almost certainly would accrue to both super-
powers as a result of mutual naval arms limitations—depend-
ing, of course, upon the particulars of the negotiated
regime—a more probable future for the Soviet Navy appears
to be one of continued presence and application as an in-
• strument of foreign policy in the Middle East.
Possible Future II: Continued Application. Most current
indicators point away from the possible use of the Soviet
Navy as a "bargaining chip" in naval arms limitations
negotiations and toward a more probable future of continued
and perhaps increased use as an active instrument of for-
eign policy in the Middle East. In addition to Moscow's
continued interest and involvement in the region despite
its recent setbacks and Washington's apparent inability tc
elicit a positive response to Brezhnev's offer for naval
31
arms limitations talks, foremost among these indicators
are the current superpower "naval race" in the waters of
the Middle East which is expected to intensify with the
reopening of the Suez Canal, the Soviet Navy's vested
interest in the Middle Eastern policy which has powered
much of its recent growth, the apparent increased influence
of the Soviet military over the Kremlin's policy-making
32process-^ which was most recently significantly evidenced
31
U. S. Congress, House, loc
. pit ,
32,
'U. S, Congress, House, Soviet Involve ment in the
Middle East and the Western Resp onse
, pp. ?0-7l', tT9,"
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by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko's elevation to
lull membership in the Politburo during the Yom Kippur War, J
and some recent interpretations of Admiral Gorshkov's series
of articles as announcements of policy decisions.
A preview of this more probable future was provided
by Moscow's employment of its naval forces in the Indian
Ocean during the Indo-Pakistani War of December, 1971
»
when the Soviet Navy deployed a record force of 26 comba-
tants and auxiliaries as a political counterpresence to an
American carrier task force of ten combatants and four
34
auxiliaries inserted from the Gulf of Tonkin^ "to insure
the protection of U. S, interests in the area." Although
the exact aims of these superpower deployments remain un-
certain, it is apparent that -the likely target of U. S.
Navy "influence" was India. J As an exercise in active
naval suasion, the American naval presence was designed to
deter India. Washington* s primary objective was almost
certainly to assure the continued existence of Pakistan;
Islamabad seemed to lie at the mercy of a Soviet client,
India, once East Pakistan had been reduced. Because Soviet
fortunes in the Indian Ocean—and, therefore, in those
"Paul Wohl, "Soviet Military Men Slow Detente," The
Christian Science Monitor (April 5» 1974), P« 1«
34
' U, S. Congress, House, Department of De fense Appro -
pria tion s for 1 973 1 Washington, D. C, U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1972, pp. 11 9. 478.




areas of the Middle East accessible from that body of
water—were dependent to no little extent on the fortunes
of its client, the Soviet Navy deployed in response to the
presence of the U. S. Navy task force to defend and perhaps
to enhance its credibility with the Indian government.
This crisis not only revealed the high value placed
by Moscow on the application of limited naval force for
essentially political purposes but also suggested the
emergence of a set of objective norms or "rules of the
game" to govern the future of Soviet and American naval
intervention in defense of their minimum interests without
unacceptable risks of superpower confrontation. Essen-
tially, under these uncodified "rules" as they are described
by James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly of the Center for
37Naval Analyses, each superpower patron: -^
retains both the "right" of intervention and the
"right" of deterring intervention, but these rights
are in practice subject to limitations of context.
. . , it appears permissible for one superpower to
support a friend against the client of another super-
power as long as the friend is on the defensive stra-
tegically; the object must be to avert decisive de-
feat and restore the balance, not to assist the
client to victory. The issue of who began the war
is not central; it is the strategic situation of the
client at the time of the contemplated intervention
that counts. The tactical character of the inter-
vention is also not central; it can be offensive or





Moreover, these "rules" emphasize the value of the interest
at stake:-3
Eastern Europe, for example, is more important to
Soviet than to American security; hence the Russian
[interest] is stronger there. The Third World, how-
ever, is an intermediate area between the Blocs,
where superpower interests are relatively equal and,
moreover, generally not vital.
Finally, the "fact of possession" appears to be a decisive
factor:-59
A patron whose client is in recognized possession of
a, value has [a] greater [interest] than the patron
of a would-be conqueror. In each case of conflict
between clients
. .
. defensive interventions are
reluctantly allowed, offensive interventions dis-
couraged.
Given this "rules of the game" perspective, it would appear
to be offensive actions on the order of the Suez War of
I956, not defensive, limited interventions like that of the
United States on behalf of Lebanon in 1958, which will be
ruled out in the future. As far as the Indo-Pakistani
41War is concerned:
The Russians would probably have been aware that the
circumstances of the . . . conflict were almost
tailor-made for uncontested U. S. intervention under
these "rules" and that Washington was not obliged to
recognize the credibility of the Russian deterrent.
Under this interpretation, the Russian presence
would be designed to remind the President of the
seriousness of the situation, to force him to think








that real interests, and not just luxuries, were at
stake ... to enforce the "rules of the game," i.e.,
restrict the scope of the U. S. intervention and
confine it to defensive ends. If the opposing super-
power does not deploy a credible deterrent and there-
by demonstrate an interest, the "rules" are relaxed
and only the ordianry political, moral and local
military constrainst are operative. No policeman,
no law.
Although foreign policy intentions cannot be discerned
through analysis of military capabilities alone, the Soviet
Navy's increasing capability to project its sea power ashore
suggests an appreciation in Moscow of its potential for
defensive intervention in the Middle East within the "rules"
framework described above. Should the opportunity arise,
the Soviet Navy very likely could be expected to mount a
small-scale unopposed or lightly-opposed amphibious landing
of naval infantry forces in support of an established
J*2pro-Soviet regime or, possibly, in support of a coup d'etat
in pursuit of foreign policy objectives with an approximate
knowledge of the consequences of such an operation. The
"rules," therefore, would serve to increase the applicabil-
ity of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of an active foreign
policy in the Middle East. That the "rules of the game"
regime in this more probable future of political application
of Soviet naval force will require an American naval pre-
sence capable of evoking the suasion effects that will make
it operative is obvious.
h?.





Recent events, which have shown the Soviet Navy to be
increasingly activist and adventuresome in its pursuit of
Moscow's foreign policy in the Middle East even to the ex-
tent of violating the "rules" outside the context of s uper -
power naval interaction J further underscore the need for
an effective American naval presence in the region. The
transportation of Moroccan troops to Syria just prior to
the Yom Kippur War ' and participation in the Egyptian
Navy's blockade of the Red Sea during that war * are two
examples of Soviet Navy actions which represent attempts
to upset, rather than restore or maintain, the status quo
46between the USSR and another sovereign state supported
by a Western patron.
At this writing, it is apparent that Washington in-
tends to maintain a naval presence oriented toward counter-
ing the political challenge posed by the Soviet Navy in the
Middle East. President Gerald R. Ford has stated that, in
the face of Moscow's expanding naval power in the Middle
East, the United States must "maintain a task force of
sufficient size in the Med to be a deterrent" and "actively
explore the desirability of having an Indian Ocean Fleet."
43
-'Kelly, op. cit .
, p. 22.
Ibid.
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The present study was undertaken as an attempt to
develop an increased insight into the employment o.f super-
power naval forces as instruments of foreign policy in the
Middle East through an examination of some of the' recent
past, present, and possible future political applications
of Soviet naval power in the region and some of their
impact on and implications for pertinent aspects of Amer-
ican foreign policy toward the region. In pursuit of this
objective, Edward Luttwak's concept of armed naval suasion,
an explanation of the political application of naval force
as it seems to influence national actors in international
arena situations short of war, was adapted and applied as
a conceptual framework which facilitated a focus upon
available empirical data to demonstrate the evolution of
the Soviet Navy as an instrument of foreign policy in the
Middle East and to ascerxain appropriate and effective
American policy responses to the challenge which that navy
as such presents to United States interests in the region.
Following elucidation of the conceptual framework in
Chapter I and articulation in Chapter II of a substantive—
geographical, historical, and political—perspective on the
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Middle Eastern environment in which it is applied, two
basic conclusions were developed in the balance of the
study.
The first of these two basic conclusions is that the
Soviet Navy, during the course of the past several years,
has evolved from an essentially defensive military force
of questionable effectiveness into an increasingly impor-
tant and demonstrably effective instrument of foreign
policy in the Middle East which poses a serious—although
sometimes overstated- and misunderstood--challenge to the
successful pursuit of American foreign policy in the
region.
Originally deployed forward in the waters of the
region to defend the Soviet homeland against Western stra-
tegic attack from the sea, the Soviet Navy began to be
applied as an active instrument of foreign policy in the
Middle East only after its potential as such was dramamat-
ically displayed for Kremlin eyes during the summer of
I967 when the timely exercise of naval suasion on behalf
of its defeated and disillusioned client, Egypt, garnered
a triumph of sorts from the almost certain political trag-
edy of the Six Day War to enhance Moscow's political influ-
ence and strategic position in the region. Moscow's sub-
sequent exercise of naval suasion and countersuasion in
support of clients and potential clients and in constraint
of the American naval presence throughout the Middle East,
combined with Soviet propaganda and Western alarm, have
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established the Soviet Navy as the political force in the
region which it is perceived to be and utilized as today.
Although its political effect is often subtle and
intangible, the Soviet Navy—in company, of course, with
other policy instruments such as trade and economic and
military aid—has made important and unique contributions
to Moscow's interests in the region. The growing perception
of the Soviet Navy's ascendancy in the waters of the Middle
East, a perception engendered by its increased presence
and numerous demonstrations of its political utility,
appears to have so enhanced the Kremlin's own view of its
position and potential in the region that the primary mis-
sion of its navy there may be changing from one of strategic
defense of the homeland -to one of active exercise of naval
suasion on behalf of Soviet foreign policy. Because of
Moscow's vital extraregional defensive interests in regions
like the Middle East as well as other interests in such
regions, the Soviet Union as a superpower would seem to
have very few, if any, real alternatives to V/eitpolitik—
the pursuit of its "state interests" throughout the world.
As a consequence, the future role of the Soviet Navy as an
instrument of foreign policy would seem assured. Certainly,
today-, the pursuit of these interests with naval assistance
provides a primary outlet for an active Soviet foreign
policy as well as a primary challenge to American foreign
policy in the Middle East,
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The second basic conclusion is that the political
challenge posed by the Soviet Navy to American interests
in the Middle East must be met through an array of responses
including the judicious political application of naval
force by the U. S. Navy in the waters of the Middle East
if the United States is to continue to function successfully
within the region's complex political environment. -
Application of the conceptual framework to general
policy alternatives which fall between the simplistic ex-
tremes of unilateral American naval disengagement which
would "deliver the region to the USSR," on the one hand,
and participation in a ship-for-ship naval race with the
Soviet Union to maintain a so-called naval "balance of
power," on the other, facilitated, identification of both
appropriate and inappropriate naval responses to the
Soviet naval challenge in the Middle East.
A proposed policy of surrogation which would augment
American military capabilities throughout the Middle East
with indigeneous forces--to the extent of substantial sub-
stitution of regional naval forces for the presence of
U. S. Navy units-»was determined an inappropriate response.
Not only is there a demonstrable lack of dependable potential
surrogates within the region with which to implement such
a policy but, more important insofar as the political
application of naval force is concerned, no surrogate could
symbolize the concern and represent the power of the United
States in such a way as to evoke the suasion effects which

1?4
could be evoked and achieve the results which could be
achieved by the credible presence of the U. S. Navy.
In the eastern Mediterranean, retention and revital-
ization of a modified U. S. Sixth Fleet
—
primarily a
political force since its inception—as a symbol of Ameri-
can power and interest in the Middle East and as a con-
straint on Soviet designs therein was confirmed as a re-
sponse essential to American foreign policy in the region.
Although its military power and political influence have
suffered somewhat in the last few years, partially as a
consequence of the increased presence of the Soviet Navy,
the Sixth Fleet's success at exercising naval suasion in
recent regional crises has proved its continuing value
there. A recent suggestion that a smaller Sixth Fleet
force structure retaining sufficient visibility and via-
bility to be perceived as a credible force could conceiv-
ably evoke the same suasion effects as those evoked by the
present force structure was found to merit pursuit.
Fast of Suez, where an already substantial Soviet
naval presence is expected to expand following the reopen-
ing of the Suez Canal in 1975, elimination of the U. S.
Middle East Force stationed in the Persian Gulf and devel-
opment of a credible intermittent American naval presence
in the Indian Ocean supported by a modest facility to be
developed on Diego Garcia were shown to be appropriate to
the pursuit of American interests. Continuation of the
small Middle East Force was determined to be detrimental
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to the United States position in this increasingly impor-
tant part of the region where recent unfavorable comparisons
of its obsolete and unimpressive U. S. Navy units with
markedly superior modern Soviet warships could evoke
erroneous perceptions of decreasing American concern and
where its continued stationing could imply unintended
commitments to the defense of the Persian Gulf. Any risk
of communicating "a diminution of American interest" in
the Persian Gulf through withdrawal of this force could be
more than compensated for by a new approach providing for
periodic visits by credible naval forces truly representative
of American naval and national power: a carrier task force
or other impressive detachment of U. S. Navy combatants and
auxiliaries routinely deployed on an intermittent basis in
the Indian Ocean. At the same time that this presence and
its modest support facility at Diego Garcia could be com-
pared with the seemingly permanent Soviet naval presence
and its more extensive littoral support infrastructure to
contrast American restraint and Soviet ambition, it could
signal both Moscow and the Middle Eastern capitals that
Washington will not permit Soviet exploitation of detente
to achieve unchallenged naval superiority and political
gains in the region which would follow therefrom. In tames
of crisis, this presence could be utilized in the tradi-
tional role of supporting American diplomatic initiative's—




As is evidenced by the numerous references to Luttwak's
construct in these conclusions, it is indeed doubtful that
the present study could have succeeded to the extent that
it has in transcending mere descriptive narrative to deter-
mine the essence of the Soviet Navy's political challenge
in the Middle East or to identify what appear to be appro-
priate American naval responses to that challenge without
benefit of the concept of the political application of
naval force introduced in Chapter I and applied throughout.
By defining and classifying the ways in which a navy's
political effects are generated within the dynamic environ-
ment of international politics and by providing insight
into the probable consequences of those effects, this con-
ceptual framework bestowed direction and purposiveness on
thought which otherwise could have meandered indefinitely
and unproductively , unable to approach and process available
empirical data in such a way as to arrive at meaningful
conclusions. In the most fundamental way, both the effec-
tiveness and the essentiality of the conceptual framework
in and to the present study are attested to by the fe'ct
that its application has produced conclusions concerning
the evolution and present status of the Soviet Navy as an
instrument of foreign policy and such aspects of the Amer-
ican response thereto as the present political utility and
future force structure of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, the
retention of the Middle East Force, and the development of
the U. S. Navy's presence in the Indian Ocean which ore
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not completely commensurate with, and sometimes directly
contrary to, the writer's former opinions on these issues
—
opinions which may have prevailed without access to this
orienting device and analytical tool.
To emphasize the utility of the conceptual framework
to realization of the objectives of the present study is
not to allege its perfection. Indeed, that any such frame-




" is necessarily limited in its precision
and stability was recognized at the outset. Certainly
among its limitations are those inherent in any construct
dealing with something as intangible as others* perceptions.
Refinement of the present framework through incorporation
of whatever may be learned as a result of extensive empir-
ical research about the perceptual and reactional propen-
sities of potential Middle Eastern target polities vis-a-vis
naval stimuli could lessen the effects of this limitation
to render the construct a more viable and reliable one for
relation by planners to specific political applications of
naval force in specific contingencies in order to maximize
the political utility of naval power. Another limitation
involves the physical inability of any such framework to
encompass and focus on the many other factors extant in the
Middle Eastern political environment which may impinge upon
successful political application of naval force. This
limitation is one which, in many circumstances, would pro-





to the status of those of a component study contributing
to a systematic analysis of major policy, or even operational,
alternatives. In short, the conceptual framework is no
panacea. However, as applied herein to develop general
conclusions concerning the evolution and status of the
other superpower's naval challenge to American foreign
policy in the Middle East and the appropriateness and
effectiveness of broad policy alternatives as responses
to that challenge, it appears to have served its purpose
well.
Although admittedly not perfect, the concept of the
political application of naval force has proved a useful
tool in the preparation of the present study and, in a
very practical sense, appears representative of the type
approach which, when refined and applied to analyses by
those charged with shaping American foreign policy to the
best intelligence for decision-making available, should
contribute to the development of policies which will pro-
mote the emergence of a world order as favorable as possible
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THE POLITICAL APPLICATION OF NAVAL FORCE:
SUASION INPUTS AND OUTPUTS*
The Inputs of Naval Suasion









The Outputs of Naval Suasi o
n
1. To augment the intensity
of coercive or supportive
suasion.
2. To "show concern" where
no specific goals obtain.
3. To pre-empt superpower
suasion that a local
client may invoke against
the deploying party or
his client.
1. To signal disengagement,
2. To discourage the unwanted
activism of a local client.
3. To close combat options in
order to facilitate resis-
tance to pressures for
their use on own or client'
behalf, including domestic
pressures.
1. To evoke coercive or sup-
portive effects in general
where no direct relation-
ship to any enemy threats
obtains.
2, To show concern in general
where no specific goals
or client affiliations
obtain, i.e., in a crisis
involving only third






b. Port visits and
transits in direct proxi
mity to land:
c. Display of combat
capabilities in action,
where no direct relation-
ship to any specific threat
obtains.
Effects i and 2, as above.
More suitable for effects on
public opinion as opposed to
the ruling groups only.
Essentially supportive but
not alv/ays.
To augment the intensity of
effects 1 and 2, as in B/a
above.
d. Display of specific
combat capabilities in
action where these are
appropriate to counter a
specific enemy threat or to
pose an equally specific
threat (e.g., an ASV/ dis-
play if enemy submarine
threat to friendly ship-
ping; amphibious display






in battle readiness (i.e.,
withdrawal of logistic sup-
port ships and any non-
combatant auxiliaries; or
on the contrary, anticipation





out of narmally deployed
fleet to accentuate specific
combat capabilities. 2.
To augment intensity of
effects 1 and 2, as in
B/a above
.
To render coercion, and/or
support, narrow and limited
as opposed to general and
open-ended. Where the aim
is to avoid a stance of
general opposition (or sup-
port) and to convey inten-
tion to oppose some spe-
cific enemy acts, or re-
quire a specific act of
compliance, or support a
client in some particular
respect t and not in any
venture he may be contem-
plating.
To augment/reduce intensity




To augment suasion effects,
as above, further.
To limit scope of coercion,
or support to a narrower
range of ov.'n-side actions.
(e.g. , to deter, say, a

Syrian attack on Lebanon,
or compel a withdrawal,
task-force sent--as per
A & B—but without amphi-
bious elements in order
to prevent others* per-
ception of own-side inten-




a. Increase/reduction As in C/a~l and 2, above,




specific type of battle
readiness (e.g. , carrier
aircraft sent up for CAP
[Combat Air Patrol] and
ASW only; or for attack
too 5 gunfire readiness or
ASW readiness only) . Appli-
cable where ship flexibility
obtains, and where data
available to prospective
targets of suasion.
E. Use of Capabilities
a. Intrusive recon-
naissance by naval aircraft
or ships in direct proxi-
mity to land or adversary
warships,
As in C/b-1 and 2, above.
1. To deter adversary moves
by signalling advance
knowledge and 'possibility
of alerting the prospec-
tive targets.
2. To intensify coercive or
supportive effects in
general in association
with other moves under A.
B, C, D.
b. Interposition (of
fleet units between third-
party or adversary warships
3. To suggest preparation
for particular combat
actions (e.g, air strikes)
in association with D/d,
C/b, or Jj/b.
1
. To reinforce deterrence
or compellence, or provide
support to clients.

and their targets; to pro- 2,
vide close escort of threat-
ened shipping; to intercept
amphibious landings, etc.):
195
To render suasion effects
specific, and therefore
limit the scope of inter-
vention in others' eyes,
as per B/d.
c. 'Symbolic' and As in b/1 and 2 above,
non-destructive force.
(e.g., forcing submarines
to the surface by contin-
uous pursuit; harassment
of adversary ship movements;
deliberate off-target shoot-
ing or air attack; infliction
of minor damage seen to have
been deliberately minimized,
etc. )
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